

CHAPTER 29

 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
 IN CONTEXT

Finland

ÅSA VON SCHOULTZ (*NÉE BENGTTSSON*)

 PLACING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
 IN CONTEXT

IN the family of proportional electoral systems, Finland makes a rare flower by combining a proportional formula and multimember districts¹ with fully open lists and mandatory preferential voting. *Open-list proportional representation* (OLPR) provides the Finnish electoral system with two levels of competition. In line with Duverger's law (1954), the proportional formula applied in multimember districts has generated a multiparty system, which in turn involves a high degree of *interparty* competition. Finnish elections, as elections in most Western European countries, are fought between parties (or alliances of parties), and the allocation of seats across parties determines how power is distributed and used in the parliament. The open lists and mandatory preferential voting features do, however, also provide the system with a high degree of *intraparty* competition. Alongside the constituency-based battle between parties, candidates within the same party compete over the seats that the party collectively will win.

This inherent duality has a multitude of effects on how elections are played out at different levels of the political system. It has consequences for the *nomination* of candidates, for how *campaigns* are fought and *elections* won, and for the behavior and attitudes of *voters*, *politicians*, and *parties*, just to name a few. The effects of this duality and in particular how the high degree of intraparty competition influences the political logic of Finnish politics will be explored later on in this chapter after a thorough presentation of the basic features of the electoral system.

Apart from the two distinct dimensions characterizing the Finnish electoral system, another striking feature is the durability of the system. Many of the basic characteristics of the system date as far back as the Parliamentary Act of 1906 and were implemented at the first parliamentary election held with universal and equal suffrage in 1907. In 1906, when the system was introduced, it was considered far-reaching and radical. Finland—at the time an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia—was the first European country to give women an equal right to vote (Karvonen 2014).² Other important features that date back to 1906 are the use of proportional representation with relatively large constituencies and the D'Hondt formula as the distributor of seats to parties (Raunio 2005, 474f).³ The feature that makes the Finnish system particularly interesting in comparison to many other proportional systems—that is, the current use of relatively extensive open lists with mandatory preferential voting (of one candidate) in combination with the absence of party ranking of the candidates—was, however, not introduced until 1955 (Sundberg 2002, 76). Until 1955, fielded lists contained three internally ranked candidates. From 1906 to 1935, voters were given three options: to support the entire three-person list (the most common option), to alter the order of the candidates, or to alter the list by adding the names and addresses of (a maximum of three) eligible citizens not included on the list. The first candidate on the list was given one vote, the second half a vote, and the third one-third of a vote. In 1935, the number of candidates that a voter could cast a vote for decreased to two and the opportunity to alter the order of the candidates was abolished (Raunio 2005, 475; Sundberg 2002, 77).

Finland is a parliamentary democracy and a unitary state with no regional government,⁴ but instead a relatively powerful local government (Karvonen 2014, 15). Up until the turn of the millennium, Finland was classified as a semipresidential system. Especially during the long presidency of Urho Kekkonen (1956–1981), the far-reaching constitutional powers of the presidency were used to control domestic politics and government formation to guarantee a stable foreign policy line and to avoid tension in the sensitive Finnish–Soviet relations that marked Finnish politics until the end of the Cold War (Karvonen 2014, 14). After the Kekkonen era a process of parliamentarization was initiated, culminating in the introduction of the new constitution of 2000, by which the powers of the presidency were substantially reduced and its former powers over cabinet formation were abolished (Paloheimo 2016, 57–66).

Historically, Finnish politics have been characterized by a high degree of party system polarization (Sartori 2005, 129) and government instability (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001, 366), but these two tendencies have in the post-Kekkonen era been replaced by consensus (Mickelsson 2007) and government stability (Karvonen 2014, 73). Today, ideological differences are less pronounced and coalitions can be (and are) formed among virtually all parties (Karvonen 2016, 122). The most common type of government is that of a surplus majority coalition, representing twenty-six out of forty-three governments formed since 1945 (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 25).⁵ Despite the candidate-centered electoral system, the Finnish parliament is characterized by a high level of intraparty voting cohesion, particularly among the government coalition parties (Pajala 2013, 44).⁶ Finland is

a corporatist country with extensive interest group consultations as an important feature of political decision making (Raunio 2005, 474). Party subsidies were introduced in 1967⁷ (Sundberg 2002, 78) and since the 1970s they have accounted for the bulk share of the financing of parliamentary party organizations (Karvonen 2014, 57f).

The Finnish multiparty system is one of the most fragmented in Western Europe (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 29f) with an average effective number of parties of 5.12 in the post-World War II era.⁸ The core of the system is constituted by three medium-sized parties with a historical basis in two cleavages and three major poles of conflict: *labor/workers* (the Social Democratic party), *capital/business owners* (the National Coalition⁹), and *the rural periphery/farmers* (the Centre Party¹⁰) (Rokkan 1987, 81–95). In addition to these three parties, the modern Finnish party system contains several parties, generally gaining less than 10 percent of the vote: a left-wing party (the Left Alliance,¹¹ a former communist party), a party representing the Swedish-speaking minority (the Swedish Peoples Party), a social-conservative party (the Christian Democrats¹²), and a green party (the Green League¹³). In the 2011 election when the Finns Party, a populist right party, experienced a major breakthrough,¹⁴ the traditional setup of the party system was disrupted and the fragmentation of the system further increased. This new configuration with four medium-sized parties and only one party exceeding 20 percent of voter support was continued in the 2015 election.

The following delving into the Finnish electoral system will revolve around elections to the National Parliament, the *Eduskunta* in Finnish, or *Riksdagen* in Swedish.¹⁵ Finnish voters are, however, faced with relatively frequent elections since direct municipal, European, and presidential elections are not held concurrently. The electoral systems applied to all elections are similar (PR with the D'Hondt formula and mandatory preferential voting) for all elections except for the presidential elections, where a majoritarian two-round system has been applied since 1994.¹⁶

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS PECULIARITIES

Elections to the Finnish national parliament takes place on the third Sunday of April every fourth year with the Ministry of Justice as the highest election authority.¹⁷ The electoral system used is classified as OLPR. The two hundred seats in the *Eduskunta* are, according to the constitution, to be distributed in twelve to eighteen constituencies using the D'Hondt highest average method. In the parliamentary election in 2015, the number of districts was thirteen,¹⁸ including the single-member district of the autonomous Åland Island,¹⁹ and district magnitude (M) ranged from 6 to 35. The variation in M across districts has increased over time, and no fixed electoral threshold or national tier is applied, the effects of which will be discussed further later.

Table 29.1 Election Result in the 2015 Parliamentary Election

	No. Votes	% Votes	No. Seats	% Seats	Diff. Votes–Seats
Centre Party	626,218	21.1	49	24.5	3.5
National Coalition	540,212	18.2	37	18.5	0.3
Finns Party	524,054	17.7	38	19.0	1.3
Social Democrats	490,102	16.5	34	17.0	0.5
Green League	253,102	8.5	15	7.5	–1.0
Left Alliance	211,702	7.1	12	6.0	–1.1
Swedish People's Party	144,802	4.9	9	4.5	–0.5
Christian Democrats	105,134	3.5	5	2.5	–1.0
Pirate Party	25,086	0.8	–	–	–0.8
Independence Party	13,638	0.5	–	–	–0.5
Others	17,678	0.7	–	–	–
Åland Islands	22,222	0.5	1	0.5	–
Total	2,968,459	100	200	100	
Gallagher LSq	3.23				
Eff no. parliamentary parties	5.84				

Source: Statistics of Finland 2016, Ministry of Justice 2016.

Interparty Competition: Parties as Central Actors

The Finnish OLPR combines the feature of open lists with a *pooling vote* (Cox 1997, 42), which makes the system highly competitive both between candidates (intraparty) and between parties (interparty). Parties²⁰ and constituency associations,²¹ or an alliance of parties or constituency associations, present a single list of candidates at the district level, and all individual preference votes count for the list. The total amount of votes cast for candidates on each list determines how many seats the list is rewarded. The first seat is assigned to the party with the highest list total. In the following step the D'Hondt divisor (one, two, three, four, and so on) is used to calculate comparison figures for each list.

Table 29.2 Allocation of Seats in the Constituency of Lapland in the 2015 Parliamentary Election

	Comparison Figures				
	% Won	Votes Won	First Divisor	Second Divisor	
Centre Party	42.9	43,393	43,393.0 (1)	21,646.5 (2)	14,431.0 (4)
Finns Party*	16.5	16,621	17,733.0 (3)	8,866.5	10,823.3 (7)
Left Alliance	13.7	13,827	13,827.0 (5)	6,913.5	8,658.6
Social Democratic Party	10.8	10,943	10,943.0 (6)	5,471.5	
National Coalition	10.1	10,155	10,155.0		
Green League	2.6	2,643	2,642.0		
Christian Democrats*	1.1	1,112	-		
Pirate Party	0.8	818	818.0		

* The Finns Party and the Christian Democrats had formed an electoral alliance.

Source: Ministry of Justice 2016.

The comparison figures (or averages) determine the order in which the seats are distributed across the lists. See Table 29.2 for an example of how the seats were distributed in the Lapland district, a small-*M* district in the far north of Finland, in the 2015 election.

The Finnish electoral system belongs in what Rein Taagepera (2007) labels a “simple” system, since it lacks a mechanism that links the share of votes a party receives at the national level with the distribution of seats at the district level. The single-tier system in combination with the D’Hondt highest average formula, which is one of the electoral formulas considered most advantageous for large parties (Gallagher 1991, 34), makes for a fairly disadvantageous system for parties with a lower and geographically equally distributed support. In the 2015 election (see Table 29.1), the national level of disproportionality was 3.13 using the Gallagher least squares index (LSq) (Gallagher 1991). This played out as a 3.5 percentage point overrepresentation for the Centre Party (corresponding to six seats) and an overrepresentation of the Finns Party by 1.1 percentage points (two seats), both gaining large shares of their voter support in small-*M* constituencies. Three of the four minor parties (Left Alliance, Green League, and Christian Democrats²²) were in turn underrepresented with about 1 percentage point each, corresponding to two seats per party in the *Eduskunta*. The level of disproportionality (LSq) has been relatively stable over time with an average of 3.02 between 1907 and 2015. However, it should be noted that the level of disproportionality at the district level is substantially higher but evened out at the national level (Sundberg 2002, 89f).

A strategy for small parties to deal with the occasionally relatively high effective electoral threshold is to form electoral alliances. Alliances are formed at the constituency level, most commonly in small-*M* districts. Alliances are generally considered as purely strategic (Arter 2013, 105) and do not involve a joint political agenda or an effort to be consistent in terms of ideology or policy proposals. It should be noted, however, that votes only are pooled at the list level, and not over parties who decide to join forces in an alliance. A party can form alliances with different parties across constituencies or run independently in some districts while forming strategic alliances in others (Shugart and Taagepera forthcoming). The general pattern is that of smaller parties forming alliances with a larger party in small-*M* constituencies where the minor party on its own would not receive enough votes to pass the effective threshold. Among the three parties traditionally dominating Finnish politics, the Centre Party has been more prone to form alliances, while the Social Democratic Party has been the most restrictive in this sense (Paloheimo and Sundberg 2009, 219). Smaller parties have generally been successful in their formed alliances, while larger parties have tended to come out on the losing side (Paloheimo and Sundberg 2009, 233).

The number of districts has been relatively stable over time. Since the first parliamentary election held in 1907, the number of districts has varied between thirteen and sixteen, and relatively few changes have been made over the years.²³ During a near-fifty-year period, from 1962 until 2011, the number and the configuration of districts was largely unchanged. While the period was characterized by stability in terms of the number of districts, the opposite can be said about the distribution of seats across districts. Due to a relatively strong wave of urbanization, there has been a steady redistribution




FIGURE 29.1. Electoral districts in the 2015 parliamentary election.

of seats from the eastern and northern parts of the country toward the larger districts in the south, in particular to the large district of Uusimaa, surrounding the capital of Helsinki (see Figure 29.1).²⁴

As has been acknowledged by Monroe and Rose (2002), the structure of districts is very important in determining the overall level of proportionality and the effective threshold in single-tier systems. This is evident from the development in Finnish district magnitude from 1962 to 2015 presented in Table 29.3. The difference in the effective threshold between districts has increased substantially over time and peaked in the 2011 parliamentary election, with the lowest threshold of 2.1 percent in Uusimaa, while the corresponding figure was as high as 10.7 in the two districts of North Karelia and South Savo in the eastern parts of the country.

This development has not gone unnoticed, and since the late 1990s there has been intense debate and several public commissions offering alternative solutions to increase the overall proportionality of the system, and in particular to decrease the variation in conditions across districts. The situation was heightened in the aftermath of the 2007 parliamentary election when the Green League failed to get their party leader elected in the district of North Karelia, despite the fact that she received the second highest number of personal votes in the constituency and the party's overall electoral support in the district reached 11.7 percent.²⁵ The government that formed after the election appointed a new commission, which proposed an introduction of a two-tier system with a national threshold of 3.5 percent (a local threshold of 12.5 percent) and a ban on electoral alliances, while keeping the existing district structure. However, the proposal failed to receive enough support,²⁶ and instead, it was decided to opt for a less radical solution with a merger of four districts in the eastern parts of Finland into two.²⁷ The change came into place in the 2015 election and contributed to a substantive decrease of the

Table 29.3 District Magnitude and Effective Threshold: Development over Time

	1962	1972	1983	1991	2003	2011	2016	<i>Change</i>
Helsinki	20	22	20	20	21	21	21	1
Uusimaa	17	21	27	30	33	35	35	18
Varsinais-Suomi	16	16	17	17	17	17	17	1
Satakunta	14	13	13	12	9	9	8	-6
Häme	14	15	15	13	14	14	14	-
Pirkanmaa	12	13	13	15	18	18	19	7
Southeast Finland (26)							17	-9
Kymi	15	15	14	13	12	12	-	
South Savo	11	10	9	8	6	6	-	
Savo-Karelia (22)							16	-6
North Savo	12	11	10	10	10	9	-	
North Karelia	10	8	7	7	6	6	-	
Vaasa	20	18	18	18	17	17	16	-4
Central Finland	11	10	10	10	10	10	10	-
Oulu	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	-
Lapland	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	-2
Åland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
Difference min-max	11	14	20	23	27	28	28	17
Min. effective threshold	3.6	3.3	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	
Max effective threshold	7.5	8.3	9.4	9.4	10.7	10.7	9.4	
Difference min-max	3.9	5.0	6.7	7.0	8.5	8.6	7.3	3.4

Note: $t = 75\% / (m + 1)$. t = effective threshold, m = magnitude (Lijphart 1994, 4). This is often considered as the midway between the threshold of representation (min) and threshold of exclusion (max).

Source: Ministry of Justice 2016.

effective threshold in these districts, yet the problem with discrepancies in proportionality across districts still remains to a large extent.

Intraparty Competition: Candidates as Central Actors

The aspect that makes the Finnish system stand out in comparison to most other PR systems is that the fully open-list system makes it impossible for parties or constituency organizations to guarantee the election to parliament of any individual candidate. Preferential voting is mandatory: to cast a vote all voters are obliged to choose one candidate from a fairly large selection of aspirants, and they do so by writing the number of their preferred candidate on the ballot paper (see Figure 29.2). The sole criterion in determining the party internal ranking of candidates is the amount of preference votes each candidate receives (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Moreover, most parties refrain from ranking their nominated candidates.²⁸ By presenting candidates in alphabetical order on the lists, voters are left without indications of parties' preferred order of preference.²⁹

Lists are allowed to contain a maximum of fourteen nominated candidates per constituency, or, if M exceeds fourteen, as many candidates as there are seats to be distributed (Ministry of Justice 2016). If parties or constituency associations decide to join forces and form electoral alliances, the number of candidates nominated by an alliance (a joint list) may not exceed the maximum number of candidates for a single party. Within joint lists votes are not pooled; that is, the distribution of seats within the alliance follows the plurality principle and no account is taken of the relative vote shares for the partners within an alliance (Raunio 2005, 481). A candidate can only be nominated on one list (and hence in one district). The previously popular strategy of parties to use popular and high-profile candidates as a means to increase the list total in several districts has been prohibited since 1969.




FIGURE 29.2. The Finnish ballot.

Up until the late 1960s, candidate nomination was fairly unregulated and in the hands of the central party organization (Karvonen 2014, 62). Today nomination of candidates is, as in most Nordic countries, a decentralized matter and takes place at the district level (Lundell 2004, 39). Since 1975,³⁰ parties are legally required to use membership primaries if the number of aspirants exceeds the maximum number of candidates that can be nominated (Kuitunen 2002, 69). The extents to which primaries are used vary across parties and districts, but the larger parties use them more frequently than the smaller ones. The difference in the practices is mainly due to the weaker recruitment basis of smaller parties and the fact that smaller parties more frequently enter into electoral alliances (Raunio 2005, 477). Parties can decide how to organize primaries, but most parties follow the regulation stipulated in the Election Act, according to which local party branches, or a group of at least fifteen members from the same branch, are entitled to nominate aspiring candidates. Party members resident in the district are entitled to vote in the primaries.

The party executive in the district does, however (since 1988), retain the right to replace up to one-fourth of the aspirant candidates that have been elected in the primaries.³¹ List manipulation by the district party executive occurs frequently and rarely causes conflict within the district. Common motivations for replacements are candidate refusals and a need to create a more balanced list in terms of geography, gender, age, occupation, and ideology (Paloheimo 2007, 316). The decentralized nomination procedures make cross-constituency nominations rare (von Schoultz 2016, 182).³² Most candidates are resident in the district where they are nominated, and many candidates receive the main share of support from their “home turf” (Arter 2013, 110), that is, the area in which they live and are politically active.

For parties, OLPR is considered as a relatively easy playground. Since all preference votes are pooled at the party level, a vote for any nominated candidate is always beneficial for the party and does not jeopardize the overall performance in terms of how many seats a party can win. This implies that parties need not care about the distribution of votes³³ and can apply a *laissez-faire* strategy when it comes to managing the internal competition within a party list, and also that they have an obvious incentive to nominate as many candidates as the system allows (Shugart and Taagepera forthcoming). The *laissez-faire* strategy cannot, by contrast, be applied when electoral alliances are formed, since no sublist pooling of votes within alliances is applied. The general pattern of alliance formation is that small alliance partners can only gather electoral power enough to win one seat, which in turn involves a need to centralize their votes to one candidate.

Even under OLPR, where parties can have low incentives to manage intraparty competition, the nomination stage can be considered as strategically very important and parties apply different nomination strategies to try to maximize their vote shares (Arter 2013, 2014; Shugart and Taagepera forthcoming). The conventional nomination strategy used by Finnish parties is what David Arter labels *the balanced list strategy*. Fielding a balanced list can be described as a defensive strategy with the goal that no voter attracted by the party as a collective actor should be lost due to lack of a suitable candidate. Under

this strategy, parties aim at attracting as many votes as possible by fielding a list, which resembles the composition of the potential electorate in the district in terms of age, gender, occupation, and locality. Among these aspects, a good regional distribution of candidates has been especially valued over time (Arter 2013, 104).

Another, more offensive nomination strategy is to engage in strategic nomination of candidates with high name recognition who can function as *vote magnets*. Here the primary goal of parties is to increase the anticipated vote total by targeting nonpartisan voters who emphasize the qualities of the candidate, or voters who are attracted by pure name recognition of a particular candidate. Vote magnets can come in different forms but are candidates that are able to attract a strong personal vote. They can be experienced politicians such as previous members of parliament (MPs), ministers, or candidates with prominent positions from public life. They can also come in the form of “celebrity candidates,” politically inexperienced candidates with high name recognition from the world outside politics, such as media or sports (Arter 2014).

A third strategy identified by Arter is the *lead candidate strategy*,³⁴ a strategy associated with electoral alliances where vote management is vital to be successful. When entering an electoral alliance, parties—especially the smaller alliance partners—have similar incentives as parties under the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), where votes are not pooled at the party level. Vote concentration is necessary and parties try to convince voters to vote for a lead candidate, often by strategically nominating one experienced lead candidate (e.g., an incumbent) and a few candidates with far less vote-earning potential. It has, however, been noted that entering an alliance may be difficult for the local party branches across the district to accept if they are used to getting their own local aspirant nominated, which in turn might have an impact on the backing of the leading candidate (Almgren 1998, 65). From the perspective of voters, the lead candidate strategy applied within the framework of an alliance implies a limited intraparty choice and uncertainty in terms of outcome. Were the strategy to be unsuccessful, voters of the minor party within an alliance will have contributed to getting a candidate from another party elected to parliament.

After the nomination stage, which ends forty days before the election is held, the Electoral District Committee checks the eligibility of candidates. All with the right to vote who are not under guardianship or holding military office are eligible to stand for public office.³⁵ After candidates have been confirmed, the Electoral District Committee constructs the full candidate list, which is the record of all nominated candidates in the district. On this list all candidates are numbered consecutively but pooled so that all candidates running for the same list appear in sequence. The list starts with number two. The record is organized so that parties are ordered first, followed by joint lists and constituency organizations. A random draw determines the order of presentation within each of these groups of lists (Ministry of Justice 2016). The full candidate list is present at the polling stations and in the voting booth. Parties widely display and market their part of the list in the media, often with photographs of their candidates. The number given to each candidate is also extensively used in the individual campaigns run by candidates.

The common classification of the Finnish system is that of an open-list system. However, since Finnish voters are not given the opportunity to delegate the ranking of the candidates to other voters by merely casting a party vote, it has also been qualified as a subtype of the open-list PR called a *quasi list* (Shugart 2005, 42f). The system is hence only a list system in the sense that candidates are *pooled* at the party level when the number of seats is allocated among parties. The absence of a party vote ensures that all voters participate in the ranking of candidates and as such minimizes the risk of candidates winning a seat with a very low number of personal votes. If personal votes are optional, candidates can at least in theory be elected with very small personal networks, which in turn may lead to clientelistic relations (Shugart 2005, 44). The quasi list does not, however, fully avoid a situation where candidates are elected with a small amount of votes and the Finnish system does not stipulate a minimal vote share to gain representation. A list that fields a candidate with a very high number of supporters can by itself collect enough votes to guarantee that the list wins many seats. This in turn implies that the last candidates elected from that list will have won a marginal share of the list total. One such example is the Finns Party in the constituency of Uusimaa in the 2007 parliamentary election. The list total of 28,593 votes rewarded the party two parliamentary seats. Of the twenty-four candidates fielded, the party leader Timo Soini was ranked number one with 19,859 personal votes (69.5 percent of the list total). The second candidate on the list was Pirkko Rouhonen-Lerner with 1,058 personal votes (3.7 percent of the list total).³⁶

General Election Rules

In Finnish parliamentary elections, all Finnish citizens who have turned 18 no later than the day of the election are entitled to vote. As in most Western democracies (Bengtsson 2007), there has been a gradual decrease in the eligible voting age over time. The Election Act of 1906 stipulated 24 years of age, which was lowered to 21 in 1944, to 20 in 1969, and to the “age of 18 the year before the election” in 1972. The eligibility of 18 years or older on Election Day came into place in 1995 (Sundberg 2002, 79f). Since 1969, Finnish citizens living abroad are eligible to vote and do so at Finnish diplomatic missions or at Finnish ships abroad. Turnout within the group of around two hundred thousand expatriated Finns has increased slightly over time and was 10.1 percent in the 2015 parliamentary election (Statistics of Finland 2016). Turnout rates among eligible voters living in Finland (in 2015, it was 4,221,237) are substantially higher, although turnout has decreased since the 1980s and is considered low compared to the other Nordic countries (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 42). In the 2015 parliamentary election, 70.1 percent of the Finnish citizens resident in Finland cast their vote (Ministry of Justice 2016).

Voting can take place on Election Day, which since 1991 is on a Sunday, or in advance. Advance voting in Finland lasts for seven days. It begins on a Wednesday eleven days before the actual Election Day, and it ends on Tuesday five days prior to Election Day. Advance voting abroad starts on the same day as for domestic voters, but only lasts for four days. Despite the five-day period between the end of the advance voting period and

Election Day, voters who cast a vote in advance do not have the possibility to change their vote by casting a new one on Election Day. Despite this, the possibility to vote in advance is very popular in Finland, and since 1991 about 40 percent of all votes are cast in advance.

The register of eligible voters is compiled from the official population register fifty-one days before the election.³⁷ Voters living abroad are registered to vote in the municipality where they were resident prior to emigrating. All voters on the register receive a notice of their right to vote by mail including general information about the election, such as information about Election Day and the dates for advanced voting, the address and opening hours of the polling station on Election Day, and a list of advance polling stations within the electoral district. Advance voting can take place at any polling station, but voting on Election Day can only take place in the station noted in the voting register and on the voting card delivered by mail. The polling stations are open between 9 AM and 8 PM on the official Election Day. The municipality is responsible for arranging the polling stations (both on Election Day and for advance voting).³⁸ There should be at least one polling station in each municipality, but for practical reasons it is common to divide the municipality into several voting districts. On Election Day in 2015, there were about 2,200 polling stations in 317 municipalities (Ministry of Justice 2016).

After the polling stations close, ballots are counted and results are reported to the municipality's central election committee, which in turn reports the result to the Ministry of Justice. The constituency electoral committees count the advanced votes, and these results are made public after closing of the polling stations on the night of the election. A preliminary election result is published in the evening of Election Day. The electoral committee at the constituency level is responsible for the control count of casted votes. The official result is declared three days after the election and letters of appointment to the two hundred elected representatives are issued (Ministry of Justice 2016).

TWO LEVELS OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING

After the introduction of the open-list system with mandatory preferential voting in 1955, Finnish election campaigning has experienced a shift from being party based to candidate centered (Helander 1997, 65; Paloheimo 2007, 93). Up until the 1960s parties were the main actors running the political campaigns. Today campaigns are clearly marked by the embedded duality of the system where both inter- and intraparty competition is considered vital. Modern Finnish election campaigns involve two distinct levels of competition: a collective campaign organized by the party at the national and district levels and a multitude of individually run candidate campaigns (Karvonen 2010, 96f).

The collective campaign is run by the central party organization, revolves around the party leader, and generally involves relatively vague party slogans and platforms that are marketed nationwide. At the district level, local party branches in turn focus on

marketing the district candidate list. The vagueness of party campaigns and the absence of explicit election pledges can be attributed to the Finnish culture of government formation, where no pre-electoral agreements on cabinet formation are made and bargaining on the composition and the program of the government takes place after the election. Parties strategically refrain from specifics during the campaign in order not to endanger their bargaining position in the face of upcoming negotiations on cabinet formation. Another equally important reason for the overall vagueness at the central level is that parties aim to attract votes from as many quarters as possible by allowing a great diversity among their nominated candidates (Karvonen 2014, 69).

Large shares of election campaigning are decentralized and run by the individual candidates independently of the party. These campaigns tend to be highly visible and to revolve around more specific issues. Most candidates gather support groups without formal organizational attachment to the party and most of the activities are organized without support from the party organization (Borg and Moring 2007, 48). In fact, many candidates stage joint campaign meetings with candidates from other parties rather than with copartisans (Arter 2013, 111). The average campaign team for the elected candidates and deputies in the 2011 election consisted of seventy people (Bengtsson 2011), and most teams combine traditional means of campaigning such as posters next to roads and newspaper ads with the use of social media channels (Mattila and Ruostetsaari 2002, 97; Strandberg 2013, 1330). Even though the level of intraparty competition is high and individual campaigns at the district level often are more targeted toward intraparty competitors, the system does not encourage negative (intraparty) campaigning since this could hurt the overall success of the party and in turn the relative chance for each candidate to become elected (Karvonen 2010, 96).

The public subsidies introduced in the 1960s contributed to an early professionalization of Finnish election campaigns compared to the other Nordic countries (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 103) and involved the use of opinion polls, focus groups, and comparatively large expenditures on television campaigning (Borg and Moring 2007). While the financial burden of election campaigns is divided between the central party organization and the individual candidates, the general trend is that it has been pushed toward candidates, who collectively spend a considerably larger amount on their individual campaigns than the parties do on their central campaigns (Moring et al. 2011). In the 2007 election the overall campaign spending was 35 to 38 million euros, of which two-thirds were used for individual campaigning and one-third for party campaigning (Mattila and Sundberg 2012, 233). The average campaign spending by elected MPs was 34,000 euros in the 2011 election (Mattila and Sundberg 2012, 234).³⁹ Many candidates receive some financial support from their party, but most of the money invested in the campaigns comes from donations and private resources (Arter 2009, 26). In the year 2000, the Act on a Candidate's Election Funding was introduced with the intention to regulate and increase transparency regarding campaign financing. The act required all elected MPs (and substitutes) to submit a report on their campaign budget to the Ministry of Justice after the election. The report was not actually made mandatory until 2009, after harsh critique from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and extensive

media attention directed toward several campaign finance scandals in the aftermath of the 2007 election.⁴⁰ Both party and candidate campaign financing have since become more regulated (Ministry of Justice 2016).

THE DUAL FORCES OF THE SYSTEM: A VOTER AND CANDIDATE PERSPECTIVE

The Finnish open-list system, where parties have an incentive to (and generally do) field full lists, can be considered highly demanding for voters. In the largest-*M* constituency of Uusimaa, the total number of fielded candidates in the 2015 election amounted to 395, of which Uusimaa voters were required to single out one candidate to cast their vote for. The extensive amount of candidates and the individualized style of campaigning mean that voters are overloaded with information to process, while receiving little guidance or shortcuts from parties as central actors (von Schoultz 2016, 167). Despite the challenge the system offers in terms of information processing, less than half of voters are positive toward introducing an option to cast a collective party vote: 35 and 43 percent in the Finnish National Election Studies of 2011 and 2015, respectively. The reluctance to introduce a party vote does not, however, imply that Finnish voters consider parties to be of low importance. On the contrary, most voters are highly aware of the inbuilt dual forces of the system, and many feel torn between the choice of a candidate and that of a party.⁴¹

When asked directly about the relative weight given to the choice of candidate and party respectively, about equal shares state that the choice of party was the most important for determining their vote (see Table 29.4). A slight increase in the emphasis given to parties is detectable in the period from 1983 to 2007, a period during which developments toward more candidate-centered campaigns have taken place. Since the 2011 election, however, the wind has turned and a clear majority of voters now emphasize the choice of party (Bengtsson 2012, 144). This is likely due to an increased party system polarization in terms of social-cultural issues generated by the growth of the Finns Party (Westinen, Kestilä-Kekkonen, and Tiihonen 2016).⁴²

From the perspective of candidates running for election, the duality embedded in the electoral system provides them with binary campaign incentives: try to maximize the party vote total, as well as the personal share of the votes in the constituency. To be successful, therefore, they need to cultivate a “personal vote”—votes derived from their personal characteristics, experience, or record of constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987)—alongside a “party vote,” which is considered as a collective good shared by all candidates running for the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

When asking candidates about which aspect they emphasized the most in their campaign, it becomes clear that they are highly aware of the importance of both aspects. On a scale from 0 (attract as much attention to yourself as possible) to 10 (attract as much attention to the party as possible), the average candidate scores 5.4 (Finnish Candidate

Table 29.4 "Which Was the Most Important to You When Casting Your Vote, the Party or the Candidate?": Finnish Election Studies 1983–2015 (%)

	1983	1991	2003	2007	2011	2015
Party	52	51	49	48	55	53
Candidate	42	43	47	51	44	42
Don't know	6	6	4	1	1	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	993	1,141	1,004	1,172	1,124	1,602

Sources: FSD1011, FSD1088, FSD1260, FSD2269, FSD2653, FSD3067.

Study 2011, n = 605).⁴³ About a third of the candidates have a distinct personal focus while an equal share run party-centered campaigns, and successful candidates tended to emphasize their personal reputation slightly more than candidates who fail to get elected (4.7 compared to 5.5). Yet, there are substantial differences between candidates from different parties, where candidates from the National Coalition and the Centre Party are more prone to be *individualizers* (Arter 2013, 104), while candidates standing for smaller parties (with on average lower prospects of becoming elected) tend have a more party-collective emphasis on their campaign.

HOW TO GET ELECTED UNDER OPEN-LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

What contributes to individual-level electoral success under OLPR? The literature on intraparty competition has emphasized the significance of personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) such as *political experience* (Erikson 1971; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000; Dahlgaard 2016), *name recognition* (Carey and Shugart 1995; Arter 2014), and *local ties* (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005; Tavits 2010), expectations that are largely confirmed by Finnish empirics (von Schoultz 2016, 176–184).

Incumbency is generally considered as the most valuable type of *political experience*, though the incumbency generally is considered to be weaker in multimember compared to single-member districts (Maddens, Wauters, Noppe and Fiers 2006). This is supported by data from Finland, where the level of intrapartisan defeats has tended to be relatively high (Villodres 2003, 64), while the level of interpartisan defeats has tended to be substantially lower (Arter 2009). Despite the tendency of Finnish voters to use intraparty competition as an opportunity to assign accountability within, rather than across, parties, the incumbency advantage is substantial. During the period 1962–2011,

85 percent of MPs ran for re-election, of which 76 percent were successful (Karvonen 2014, 67).⁴⁴ In an analysis of the candidates in the elections between 1999 and 2011, incumbency unsurprisingly stands out as the most powerful vote-earning attribute, while previous parliamentary experience and leading positions within the party at the national level were important but far less valuable attributes (von Schoultz 2016, 181).

While *name recognition* can be seen as vital to cultivate a personal vote, it can come in many forms. A distinct characteristic of Finnish politics has been that of celebrity candidates, that is, candidates who have gained a reputation from areas other than politics (Arter 2014).⁴⁵ Being a celebrity indeed significantly increases the chances of being elected (von Schoultz 2016, 181). The overall impact at the system level is, however, relatively minor considering that these types of candidates on average only constitute 1 percent of all elected MPs.⁴⁶

Several aspects speak in favor of the importance of the local perspective in national politics. The geographical representativeness of the two hundred MPs in the *Eduskunta* is good. In the 2011 election, the two hundred elected MPs represent as many as 113 different municipalities (of a total of 336). Still, MPs from urban areas are overrepresented, since a voter-rich municipality provides an electoral advantage (Paloheimo 2007, 357; Put and Maddens 2014, 620). *Local ties* are generally considered a valuable proxy for “knowing the area and its interest” (Shugart et al. 2005). Among the MPs elected from 1999 to 2015, 60 percent were native to the district and close to 73 percent were elected to local office within their district.⁴⁷ Moreover, when asked about their views on representative roles and foci, Finnish voters, as well as their elected representatives, tend to downplay the role of parties and emphasize the importance of the local perspective (Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Esaiasson 2000).

While the open list without party ranking in theory provides candidates with an equal opportunity to become elected, it is important to note that far from all candidates enter the race with the goal or expectation of becoming elected. According to Paloheimo (2007, 333–334), candidates can be divided into four distinct categories: *incumbents* seeking re-election, *challengers* with an actual prospect of becoming elected, *career builders* who utilize the election campaign to enhance their reputation and increase recognition for future contests, and *top-up candidates* who are nominated to attract the support of specific subgroups of voters but without posing a threat to the “main” candidates (see also Carty, Eagles, and Sayers 2003, 64; Arter 2013, 103). Parties hence use the last category of top-up candidates to make sure that all potential voters can identify a suitable candidate on the list, mainly in terms of sociodemographic background or residence (see the *balanced list strategy* earlier).

A corresponding differentiation of candidates can be made based on their personal vote-earning attributes and clearly demonstrates the different electoral prospects by type of candidates (Table 29.5). Of the candidates in the period 1999–2011 (nominated on what turned out to be a successful list), close to 40 percent can be classified as “top-up” candidates, due to their lack of classic vote-earning attributes. Together with the group of candidates who (only) have local-level experience, they constitute the close to 80 percent of all candidates who in general attract a limited amount of (local) followers

Table 29.5 Candidates' Personal Vote-Earning Attributes and Electoral Success (1999–2011)

	Success		Preference Votes		
	% Elected	Average No. Preference Votes	Average % of Preference Votes/ List	% of All Candidates	(n)
Incumbent MP	77.8	6,469	16.8	13	(630)
Celebrity (only)	29.9	3,155	7.1	1	(67)
Quality candidate	27.2	2,995	8.3	8	(423)
Local-level incumbency (only)	6.1	1,607	4.5	41	(2,071)
No vote-earning attribute	2.3	838	2.6	37	(1,831)
Total	15.8	2,074	5.7	100	(5,022)

Note: "Quality candidates" = not incumbents at the national level but at least one additional personal vote-earning attribute (leadership position within the party, previous MP, member of European Parliament, minister), to local-level incumbency. "Celebrities" = candidates who lack other attributes than name recognition from outside politics (media, sports, show business). Only candidates running for lists that were successful in winning a seat are included in the table.

Source: Database on Finnish candidates collected within framework of the project Intra-Party Dimension of Politics (Shugart and Bengtsson, 2012).

and have small prospects of getting elected. The probability of success increases substantially among the more qualified candidates (27 percent), among celebrity candidates (30 percent), and, as expected, among incumbent MPs (78 percent).

CONCLUSION

The Finnish open-list PR electoral system is characterized by stability and simplicity. The single-tier system and the D'Hondt formula have been in place since the first election held in 1907 with universal and equal suffrage, and the preferential voting system since 1955. The transformation from votes to seats is considered transparent and is taught in elementary school. The system has survived development from semipresidentialism to parliamentarism in the post-Kekkonen era and recurrent attempts at reform to address the increasing differences in the effective threshold across electoral districts.

Despite the overall simplicity of the electoral system, it involves a peculiar combination of party and candidate centeredness with substantial effects on all levels. The

decentralized nomination procedures empower the local and district level at the expense of the central party organizations, and the pooling of votes provides parties with incentives to field a diverse set of candidates at the expense of party cohesion. Candidates are in turn faced with the delicate balance of trying to maximize the collective party vote while simultaneously engaging in intraparty rivalry. And voters are overloaded with information and torn between political campaigns played out at two distinct levels, a party-centered campaign characterized by vagueness at the national level and a multitude of highly individualized candidate campaigns at the district level.

Against the backdrop of the modern Finnish political culture with oversized coalition governments, the high level of consensus, and the vagueness of national election campaigns, it seems fair to conclude that the Finnish OLPR system provides voters with a greater say over which candidates are to represent them in parliament but far less influence on the actual content of politics than voters in many other proportional electoral systems. The system does nevertheless enjoy a high level of legitimacy at all levels and is not likely to be changed in the near future.

NOTES

1. The concepts of “district” and “constituency” are used interchangeably in the text.
2. The radical representation reform of 1906 is often seen as a response to the internal Russian turmoil after the country had been defeated by Japan in 1905 (Karvonen 2014, 12). It followed from a period of Russification, which can explain why the Finnish elite could reach unanimity on the far-reaching reforms (Raunio 2005, 475).
3. The radical representation reform caused the Finnish party system to emerge. The reform was not, however, matched by democratic executive institutions during the period from the first election held in 1907 up until independence in 1917. During the period cabinets were controlled by the czar, which effectively hindered major reforms (Karvonen 2014, 12).
4. The autonomous region of Åland Island in the southwest archipelago does, however, hold strong regional powers and elects a regional assembly every fourth year. Moreover, the government of Juha Sipilä (2015–) has far-reaching plans on introducing popularly elected regional parliaments with responsibility for health care—a model that resembles the system used in the neighboring countries of Sweden and Norway.
5. Due to the relatively high fragmentation of the party system, the absence of a dominating party, and the role of the Centre Party as a bridge builder, the system has been characterized by pragmatism and a willingness to form ideologically broad coalitions. Since 1977, all governments have interchangeably been formed around two of the three parties constituting the core of the party system (Paloheimo 2016, 66–70; Karvonen 2016, 95–110).
6. Intraparty voting cohesion has increased over time. Finland does, however, have lower cohesion compared to the other Nordic countries (Jensen 2000).
7. This was seen as a matter of justice from the Social Democratic Party, which had low chances of gaining funding from affluent donors. It was also considered a reduction of the risk of moneyed interests gaining undue influence over parties (Anckar 1974, 82–88).
8. The average number of parties during the period 1907–2015 is 4.42. The calculations are based on Sundberg (2002, 86) and updated by figures from the Statistics of Finland.

9. A traditional conservative party.
10. From 1907 to 1965 the Agrarian Union.
11. From 1945 to 1990 the Finnish People's Democratic Unit.
12. The Christian Democrats (from 1966 to 2002 the Finnish Christian League) gained representation in the Eduskunta for the first time in the 1970 election.
13. The Green League gained representation as a registered party in the Eduskunta in 1991 election. In the 1987 election (later) members of the party became elected as a part of a constituency association (Sundberg 2002, 78f).
14. A populist party has been present in Finnish politics since the late 1950s. The Small Farmers Party (characterized as an agrarian populist party) was formed in 1958 by Veikko Vennamo, a dissident of the Agrarian. The party—which changed name to the Finnish Rural Party (FrP) in 1966—received varying levels of electoral support with a peak in the early 1970s and the early 1980s. The Finns Party, founded in 1995, is seen as a successor party to the FrP and built upon the FrP both in terms of organization and the persons involved. The Finns Party (labeled the True Finns up until 2011) is generally classified as a member of the Radical Right Populist family (Jungar 2016, 113).
15. Finland is a bilingual country in which Finnish and Swedish are given the same status in the constitution. The mother tongue of the vast majority (88.7 percent) is, however, Finnish, while only 5.3 percent are registered as Swedish speakers (Statistics Finland 2016).
16. Legislation concerning all four elections is gathered in the Election Act of 1998 (Raunio 2005, 476; Ministry of Justice 2016).
17. Up until 1965, elections to the national parliament were traditionally held in July. In 1965, the Election Act was changed and elections were held on the third Sunday and the following Monday in March (Pesonen 1968, 11). Until 1991 the polling stations were open during two days (Raunio 2005, 478). Since 2011 the election has been held on the third Sunday of April (Ministry of Justice 2016).
18. In the 2015 election four districts were merged into two to increase proportionality and lower the effective electoral threshold (Ministry of Justice 2016).
19. The Åland Island is the only single-member district in Finland. The electoral system is, however, the same as for the multimember districts, meaning there are competing party slates containing more than one candidate. The winner then is defined as the candidate that receives the most votes within the party with the most votes. As such, the election in the Åland constituency works as does the presidential election in Uruguay (Shugart 2005, 40).
20. Parties allowed to nominate candidates are to be entered into the party register kept by the Ministry of Justice. A requirement to be entered into the register is the signed support of at least five thousand persons entitled to vote. Parties that fail to win a parliamentary seat in two consecutive elections will be deleted from the party register (Ministry of Justice 2016).
21. A constituency association may be established at the district level by the support of at least one hundred persons entitled to vote in the electoral district. Constituency associations have managed to win a seat in the parliament on two occasions. The first was in 1983 when a popular MP from the Communist Party was denied access to the party list due to an internal party conflict. The second was in 1987 when members of the (current) Green League managed to win four seats in parliament before having become a registered party (Sundberg 2002, 78f).
22. The Swedish People's Party fares better because their electoral support is concentrated in four constituencies (Helsinki, Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi, and Vaasa). The party has, however, in recent elections fielded candidates in constituencies outside their strongholds as a

- means to prepare for a potential revision of the electoral system into a two-tier system. In 2011, they fielded candidates in six constituencies and in 2015 in eight constituencies.
23. The constitution (25§) stipulates that the number of constituencies on the mainland should vary between twelve and eighteen. In addition, one MP is elected in the district of Åland.
 24. *M* is determined based on the number of Finnish citizens resident within each district six months prior to the election with the exception of the electoral district of Åland, which (since 1948) is a fixed single-member constituency (Ministry of Justice 2016).
 25. Tarja Cronberg, the party leader of the Green League, was, however, appointed as Minister of Labour in the government that was formed after the election.
 26. Since the proposal would involve a change in the constitution, it was to be accepted in two stages by two different parliaments with an election in between (or in one stage by a two-thirds majority). The proposal was approved before the election in March 2011 but failed to receive enough support by the following parliament in 2011.
 27. The electoral districts of Northern Savonia and North Karelia were merged into Savonia-Karelia, while the electoral districts of Kymi and Southern Savonia were merged into Southeastern Finland.
 28. The Social Democratic Party generally deviates from this pattern by presenting their candidates according to their success in the primaries (Raunio 2005, 478).
 29. According to studies by Helander (1997) and Villodres (2003), being placed high on the list due to a surname beginning with a letter that appears early in the alphabet does not provide an electoral advantage. In cases where candidates are ranked according to their success in primaries (a procedure at times used by the Social Democrats), high placement on the list does contribute to more preference votes (Villodres 2003).
 30. Prior to the Electoral Act of 1969 and the Election Act of 1975, nomination was unregulated and more centralized and in the control of national party executives (Raunio 2005, 476).
 31. In the Social Democratic Party the district party executive can replace one-fifth of the aspiring candidates (Kuitunen 2002, 69).
 32. Among the MPs elected in 2011, only four were elected from a constituency where they were not resident. Moreover, all of these four cases were elected from the constituency of Uusimaa (Nyland), which surrounds the capital of Helsinki and is part of the same metropolitan area. The four MPs in question were all residents of Helsinki (constituting an electoral district of its own).
 33. In comparison to single transferable vote (STV) and SNTV, parties run no risk of losing seats due to overnomination (Johnson and Hoyo 2012, 134).
 34. Arter (2013, 109) also identifies a fourth strategy—the *level-playing-field strategy*—used by the Finns Party in the 2011 parliamentary election, where they had a very visible and popular party leader (only able to run in one constituency) and a strong tail wind in the national opinion polls (Borg 2012, 194), but lacked a pool of experienced candidates with personal followers to field in the thirteen mainland constituencies outside Uusimaa, where the party leader Timo Soini stood for election. This strategy involved running full lists of local candidates without extensive political experience or name recognition who were encouraged to engage in a high level of intraparty competition with fairly good prospects of becoming elected to parliament.
 35. The following must resign from their office to serve as MPs: the chancellor of justice of the government, the parliamentary ombudsman, a justice of the supreme court, and the prosecutor-general (Constitution of Finland, section 27).

36. A similar example is from the same election and constituency but for the National Coalition Party, where the former party leader, Sauli Niinistö, the minister of finance who was to become elected as president in the year 2012, won 60,563 personal votes (45 percent out of the list total of 133,885), while the eleventh candidate on the list, and the last to become elected, Eero Lehti, only received 3,215 personal votes (2.4 percent of the list total) (Ministry of Justice 2016).
37. After this date moving across districts did not change where you are entitled to vote.
38. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for organizing the advance vote abroad.
39. There are substantial differences in spending by elected MPs from different parties. Successful candidates from the National Coalition and the Centre Party in the 2011 election spent on average 49,000 and 41,000, respectively. Candidates from the Social Democratic Party had an average campaign budget of 30,000 euros, and candidates from the Finns Party had an average of 14,000 euros (Mattila and Sundberg 2012, 234).
40. For a detailed description of the process see Karvonen (2014, 56–60).
41. Confronted with the question of whether they would have voted for the same candidate would he or she have been nominated by another party, a majority of 56 percent said no in the 2011 election study. Only one out of ten gave an unconditional yes, while one-third stated that they would have voted for the same candidate if he or she had been nominated by “a party that was suitable to me” (Karvonen 2014, 131).
42. This political dimension is often described as the GAL (green-alternative-liberal)/TAN (traditional-authoritarian-nationalist) dimension (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). This is played out as a new dimension with the Finns Party on the TAN side of the spectrum, and the Green League and the Swedish Peoples Party on the GAL side, cutting across the traditional left/right dimension.
43. Only including candidates nominated for a party that gained representation in the Eduskunta.
44. Updated figures from Paloheimo (2007, 334).
45. Another distinct feature of Finnish politics is that of *celebrity politicians*, that is, politicians who are incumbents frequently appearing in the media to boost name recognition and their political image (Arter 2014, 3; Karvonen 2014, 68).
46. This figure represents celebrity candidates without any other personal vote-earning attribute. The total share of celebrity candidates during the period 1999–2011 is 2 percent (von Schoultz 2016, 185).
47. “Double seats,” that is, to hold elected office both at the national and local levels, is a popular strategy for MPs to maintain contacts with the local community and to increase the chances of becoming re-elected.

REFERENCES

- Almgren, E. *Villenpoika*. Gummerus: Jyväskylä, 1998.
- Anckar, D. *Analys av partiers beteende: en fallstudie i partistrategi*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1974.
- Ansolabehere, S., J. M. Snyder, and C. Stewart. “Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 17–34.
- Arter, D. “Money and Votes: The Cost of Election for First-Time Finnish MPs.” *Politiikka* 51, no. 1 (2009): 17–33.

- Arter, D. "The 'Hows', Not the 'Whys' or the 'Wherefores': The Role of Intra-party Competition in the 2011 Breakthrough of the True Finns." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 99–120.
- Arter, D. "Clowns, 'Alluring Ducks' and 'Miss Finland 2009': The Value of 'Celebrity Candidates' in an Open-List PR Voting System." *Representation* 50, no. 4 (2014): 453–470.
- Bengtsson, Å. *Politiskt deltagande*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007.
- Bengtsson, Å. "Kandidatval och rörlighet." In *Muutosvaalit 2011. Reports and guidelines. 16/2012*, edited by S. Borg. Ministry of Justice, 2012.
- Bengtsson, Å., and H. Wass. "The Representative Roles of MPs: A Citizen Perspective." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34, no. 2 (2011): 143–167.
- Bengtsson, Å., K. M. Hansen, O. Hardarson, H. M. Narud, and H. Oscarsson. *The Nordic Voter. Myths of Exceptionalism*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014.
- Borg, S. "Perussuomalaiset." In *Muutosvaalit 2011. Reports and guidelines. 16/2012*, edited by S. Borg. Ministry of Justice, 2012.
- Borg, S., and T. Moring. "Vaalikampanja." In *Vaalit Yleisdemokratiassa. Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2007*, edited by S. Borg and H. Paloheimo. Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2007.
- Cain, B., J. Ferejohn, and M. P. Fiorina. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
- Carey, J. M., and M. S. Shugart. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote." *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 4 (1995): 417–439.
- Carty, K. R., M. D. Eagles, and A. Sayers. "Candidates and Local Campaigns." *Party Politics* 9, no. 5 (2003): 619–636.
- Cox, G. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Cox, G. D., and M. D. McCubbins. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Dahlgaard, J. O. "You Just Made It: Individual Incumbency Advantage under Proportional Representation." *Electoral Studies* 44 (2016): 319–328.
- Duverger, M. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Translated by Barbara and Robert North. London: Methuen, 1954.
- Erikson, R. "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 66 (1971): 1234–1255.
- Esaiasson, P. "How Members of Parliament Define Their Task." In *Beyond Westminster and Congress. The Nordic Experience*, edited by Peter Esaiasson and Knut Heidar. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000.
- Gallagher, M. "Proportional Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* 10 (1991): 33–51.
- Gallagher, M., M. Laver, and P. Mair. *Representative Government in Modern Europe. Institutions, Parties, and Governments*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.
- Helander, V. "Finland." In *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, edited by Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hooghe, L., G. Marks, and C. Wilson. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Position on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 8 (2002): 965–989.
- Jensen, T. K. "Party Cohesion." In *Beyond Westminster and Congress. The Nordic Experience*, edited by Peter Esaiasson and Knut Heidar. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000.
- Johnson, J. W., and V. Hoyo. "Beyond Personal Vote Incentives: Dividing the Vote in Preferential Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* 31, no. 1 (2012): 131–142.

- Jungar, A.-C. "From the Mainstream to the Margin? The Radicalisation of the True Finns." In *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. Into the Mainstream?*, edited by T. Akkerman, S. de Lange, and M. Rooduijn. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Karvonen, L. *The Personalisation of Politics. A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010.
- Karvonen, L. *Parties, Governments and Voters in Finland. Politics under Fundamental Societal Transformation*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014.
- Karvonen, L. "No Definitive Decline. The Power of Political Parties in Finland: A Focused Analysis." In *The Changing Balance of Political Power in Finland*, edited by T. Raunio and L. Karvonen. Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press, 2016.
- Kuitunen, S. "Finland: Formalized Procedures with Membership Predominance." In *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control. Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, edited by H. M. Narud, M. N. Pedersen, and H. Valen. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2002.
- Lijphart, A., *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Lundell, K. "Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 10, no. 1 (2004): 25–47.
- Maddens, B., B. Wauters, J. Noppe & S. Fiers. "Effects of Campaign Spending in an Open List PR System: The 2003 Legislative Election in Flanders/Belgium." *West European Politics* 29, no. 1 (2006): 161–168.
- Mattila, M., and I. Ruostetsaari. "Candidate-Centred Campaigns and Their Effects in an Open List System. The Case of Finland." In *Do Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums*, edited by D. M. Farrel and R. Schmitt-Beck. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Mattila, M., and J. Sundberg. "Vaalirahoitus ja vaalirahakohu." In *Muutosvaalit 2011. Reports and guidelines. 16/2012*, edited by S. Borg. Ministry of Justice, 2012.
- Mickelsson, R. *Suomen puolueet: Historia, muutos ja nykypäivä*. Tampere: Vastapaino, 2007.
- Monroe, Burt L., and Amanda G. Rose. "Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 1 (2002): 67–89.
- Moring, T., J. Mykkänen, L. Nord, and M. Grusell. "Campaign Professionalization and Political Structures: A Comparative Study of Election Campaigning in Finland and Sweden in the 2009 EP Elections." In *European Political Communication. Campaign Strategies, Media Coverage, and Campaign Effects in European Parliamentary Elections*, edited by M. Maier, J. Strömbäck, and L. Lee Kaid. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.
- Pajala, A. "Government vs Opposition Voting in the Finnish Parliament Eduskunta since World War II." *European Journal of Government and Economics* 2, no. 1 (2013): 41–58.
- Paloheimo, H. "Eduskuntavaalit 1907-2003." In *Kansanedustajan työ ja arki. Suomen Eduskunta 100 vuotta 5*, edited by A. Ollila and H. Paloheimo. Helsinki: Edita, 2007.
- Paloheimo, H. "The Changing Balance of Power between President and Cabinet." In *The Changing Balance of Political Power in Finland*, edited by T. Raunio and L. Karvonen. Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press, 2016.
- Paloheimo, H., and J. Sundberg. "Vaaliitot eduskuntavaaleissa." In *Vaalit Yleisödemokratiassa. Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2007*, edited by S. Borg and H. Paloheimo. Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009.

- Pesonen, P. *An Election in Finland. Party Activities and Voter Reactions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Put, G.-J., and B. Maddens. “The Effect of Municipality Size and Local Office on the Electoral Success of Belgian/Flemish Election Candidates: A Multilevel Analysis.” *Government and Opposition* 50, no. 4 (2014): 607–628.
- Raunio, T. “Finland: One Hundred Years of Quietude.” In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, edited by M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Reynolds, A., B. Reilly, A. Ellis. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005.
- Reynolds, S. *Stat, nasjon, klasse*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987.
- Sartori, G. *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2005 [1976].
- von Schoultz, Å. “Passing through the Eye of the Needle—Individual Electoral Success in Finnish Parliamentary Elections.” In *The Changing Balance of Political Power in Finland*, edited by T. Raunio and L. Karvonen. Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press, 2016.
- Shugart, M. S. “Comparative Electoral System Research.” In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, edited by M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Shugart, M. S., and R. Taagepera. *Votes from Seats*. Forthcoming.
- Shugart, M. S., M. E. Valdini, and K. Suominen. “Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (2005): 437–449.
- Strandberg, K. “A Social Media Revolution or Just a Case of History Repeating Itself?—The Use of Social Media in the 2011 Finnish Parliamentary Elections.” *New Media & Society* 15, no. 8 (2013): 1329–1347.
- Sundberg, J. “The Electoral System of Finland: Old and Working Well.” In *The Evolution of Electoral and Party systems in the Nordic Countries*, edited by B. Grofman and A. Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press, 2002.
- Taagepera, R. *Predicting Party Sizes. The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Tavits, M. “Effect of Local Ties on Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour. The Case of Estonia.” *Party Politics* 16, no. 2 (2010): 215–235.
- Villodres, C. O. “Intra-Party Competition under Preferential List Systems: The Case of Finland.” *Representation* 40, no. 1 (2003): 55–66.
- Westinen, J., E. Kestilä-Kekkonen, and A. Tiihonen. “Äänestäjät arvo- ja asenneulottuvuuksilla.” In *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen. Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2015. Reports and guidelines. 28/2016*, edited by K. Grönlund and H. Wass. Ministry of Justice, 2016.

Internet Sources

- Ministry of Justice. 2016. www.vaalit.fi.
- Statistics Finland. 2016. www.stat.fi.

Databases

- Bengtsson, Å. The Finnish Candidate Study 2011. Part of the project *The Comparative Candidate Survey*. 2011. www.comparativecandidates.org.

- Borg, S., and K. Grönlund. FSD2653 Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2011.
- Gallup Finland. FSD1011 Finnish Voter Barometer 1983.
- Grönlund, K., and E. Kestilä-Kekkonen. FSD3067 Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2015.
- Karvonen, L., and H. Paloheimo. FSD1260 Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2003.
- Paloheimo, H. FSD2269 Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2007.
- Shugart, M. S., and Å. Bengtsson. Database on Finnish candidates collected within framework of the project Intra-Party Dimension of Politics. 2012.
- Pesonen, P., R. Sänkiäho, and S. Borg. FSD1088 Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 1991.