Climate change disputes and justice in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia

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Abstract: In 2010, the province of Central Kalimantan in Indonesia was established as a Climate Change pilot province to reduce emissions from deforestation and through peat land forest rehabilitation. Today, international agencies, carbon traders, local and national governments, non-governmental organisations, and local populations have participated in debates and disputes over the establishment of carbon forests and forest protection areas in Central Kalimantan. One such scheme, promoted by the government of Australia (Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership), intended to establish a REDD+ pilot project within an area that covers about 120 000 hectares in Kuala Kapuas in Central Kalimantan, the field location of this research. This specific dispute offers a case study based on ethnographic research that helps to illustrate how widespread climate change debates and disputes become embedded at local and national levels in Indonesia. The dispute over REDD+ will be discussed within a framework of dispute theories which focus on moments of crisis, wherein participants must present arguments and justify their actions and theories of justice. The article shows that competing and conflicting conceptions of justice that emerge in the dispute may bring to a halt a climate change pilot project in the locality.

Keywords: dispute, forest, justice, justification, NGO, REDD+

Introduction

This article discusses climate change disputes, justice and access to justice, illuminating how local populations in environmentally vulnerable locations perceive global and national climate change schemes in Indonesia. It explores notions of justice in the political practices, narratives and statements of dispute participants when they question REDD+ climate change interventions at different levels – from villages to national or global negotiation forums or seminars. REDD+ interventions draw on economic principles that in many places have given rise to conflicting views on how to mitigate emissions in a just way. The feelings of injustice often emerge in response to the application of justifications that local groups see as inappropriate. I consider climate change project interventions and related disputes and negotiations to be moments when disputants must both present their own claims and justify them, and also challenge those made by others, thus problematising whose actions, rules and moral principles are legally valid. The question of whose voice is heard becomes even more salient when people debate the notion of justice and try to get access to it.

The proponents of the REDD+ mechanism consider that reducing emissions through improved forest carbon management offers justice to the local populations because local communities receive monetary incentives if they protect forests in specific locales. However, the idea that Indonesia should conserve forests in order to reduce emissions and get involved in carbon trading through REDD+ has been challenged by many Indonesian environmental NGOs, which claim that Northern countries should reduce their consumption and industries rather than intervene in the national and local forestry policies and practices in the South, monetising forest-related practices. These NGOs claim that REDD+ projects that
offer monetary incentives for non-monetary spheres of life that relate to forest protection are unjust in the local context (see Sikor, 2013a,b).

The questions being investigated here are: What kinds of political action are being taken in the course of the dispute? How do parties justify their positions in this conflict situation? What are the main arguments being presented in the dispute? How does justice figure in the arguments at different levels? In terms of theoretical issues, my article contributes to discussions concerning dispute, justification and justice. Since the 1980s, one strand of critical sociology has addressed questions of justice and dispute in France, a debate mainly developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), who argue for a new kind of dispute analysis and a ‘sociology of critical capacity’ to examine claims of dispute participants and justifications for their actions in moments of crisis. They suggest a theory of justice based on a model of ‘worlds of justification’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) – civic, domestic, market, industrial, inspiration, ecology and fame – which are used to defend arguments and actions in a dispute and can be invoked by anybody involved. The proviso is that in order to reach agreement, these worlds should be commonly experienced and understood.

However, even if one could agree that the justifications of disputants display common moral principles – which Boltanski and Thévenot derive from Western political philosophers and claim to be universal – I argue that it is more appropriate to employ an ethnographic approach to dispute in a non-Western and normatively plural context like Indonesia (Bowen, 2003). Anthropology has advantages in dispute studies because of its focus on understanding relationships between rules and processes, an approach that dates back to Malinowski, the first ethnographer to demonstrate that laws are not merely written texts but are formed in the course of social processes and everyday life in specific cultural contexts (Malinowski, 1926; Moore, 1978; Roberts, 1979; Comaroff and Roberts, 1981; Merry 1992; Bowen, 2003). Anthropology and ethnography can bring to light the values and norms of local populations by exploring how and why people select their arguments and how they justify their claims and actions through their reasoning in a dispute. In this way, we can gain understanding of culturally specific conceptions of justice and how they interact with other notions of justice and values, and also get insights into how plural societies are formed and disputes negotiated. As Bowen notes, scholarly liberal characterisations and universal principles to define justice have often derived from Western social histories, but

people from other backgrounds have developed different, equally principled bases for politics and justice [. . .] In other words, there is neither a single political structure regulating issues of basic justice, nor an overlapping consensus on the current pluralistic legal arrangements – and for principled reasons, not merely as a compromise born of expediency. (Bowen, 2003: 11)

Bowen seems to be arguing that a Rawlsian notion of ‘public justice’ – though possibly relevant to Euro-American individual-oriented societies – is not appropriate to studying a pluralistic context such as Indonesia where ‘public’ includes both universal and contextually driven cultural conceptions. A Rawlsian notion of public justice is a secular notion to which everybody might agree upon (e.g. human rights), while different cultural notions of justice stay in the background, having their own definitions of the ‘good’ (Bowen, 2003: 11). In the Indonesian context, the public incorporates or ‘retains’ customary and religious norms indicating plurality of norms and, in my view, holistic approaches to justice. Bowen adds, ‘. . . the answers provided by much political theory suffer from a narrow empirical range and a legalistic focus [while] comparative ethnographies of public reasoning point to a broader range of ways of developing politically coherent multicultural societies’ (2003: 261). This raises interesting questions in relation to climate change disputes with REDD+, whose philosophy is based on universalised principles of capitalism with the distribution of economic benefit a basic human right and basis for well-being.

Sikor has argued that there are three main dimensions of justice: (i) distribution; (ii) participation; and (iii) recognition (Sikor 2013a: 11). In Indonesia, many indigenous groups are concerned that their identities, histories and sovereignty be recognised in cultural, economic and political terms, issues which have also been advocated by social movements and
environmental NGOs. Distributive justice relates to the transfer of property rights and benefit sharing and, in my article, the distribution of monetary incentives for activities related to reforestation and forest protection in REDD+ pilot projects (see also Sikor, 2010: 248). Participation has become one of the main controversies in relation to REDD+ projects, probably because communities taking part in them are sometimes so large that equal involvement has become almost impossible; there is always a segment of the population that seems to lack access to information or the opportunity to take part in the projects. Furthermore, communities are not party to upper-level climate change negotiations or the development of mechanisms. Distribution and recognition often seem to conflate when it comes to an ecosystem services framework such as REDD+, since REDD+ competes over access to land and forests with business interests and communities. In the course of this competition, land rights and access to forests may be redefined or re-categorised, with indigenous identity possibly becoming an important indicator of who is eligible for benefits or access to forest and land.

The proponents of REDD+ justify climate change projects by citing monetary incentives, while those contesting the projects claim that REDD+ is distorting the values of the local populations. These differing claims indicate plural notions of justice, as argued by Sikor (2013a, 2013b: 11–12), which evolve from different judgements about justice that reflect underlying values. These disputes are interesting because they reveal these plural notions of justice and underlying principles. As Bowen notes, people draw on norms and social values in the course of contestation that then become embedded in settlement efforts and justifications for their claims.

Indonesia is a unique place to study dispute, plural notions of justice and underlying principles of values, with its enormous population scattered over an extensive archipelago of different social and biological landscapes (see Bakker and Timmer 2014). It is a post-colonial country in which colonial politics of tradition and religion conflate with Indonesian independence policies. Since 1998, the country has recovered from 32 years of authoritarian rule and efforts to reform and overcome injustices. Bowen argues that there are two value directions in the recent efforts and demands for reform in Indonesia: The first is inwards ‘. . . towards indigenousness, authenticity, and Indonesian values, in an effort to find local points of support in the face of global moral corruption. The other direction is outward, towards universality, modernity, and transcultural values of social equality, in the hope that these values may help overcome local injustices’ (Bowen, 2003: 5).

Localities in Indonesia have become connected to different global influences, not least through environmental activism and its movements, many of which have created transnational networks since the 1980s. When the reformation began in 1998, some NGOs became openly active in ‘far-away-places’ such as Kalimantan, linking communities to national and global events and arenas; their principal methods were often executed at the level of grassroots involvement. Thus, local populations in ‘remote’ areas have become connected to global movements through networks or multisited processes facilitated by new communication technologies and travelling activist or expert knowledge practices that make politics of place at the same time local and global (Tsing, 2005; Escobar, 2008: 11, 14). Furthermore, climate change debates at the national and local level in Indonesia directly link up with global-level climate change negotiations and related efforts to reduce emissions through different globally agreed mechanisms. REDD+ is a globally produced but place-based project.

This paper is based on fieldwork in Kapuas, Central Kalimantan, which quickly revealed the global and non-local dimension of the climate change debate. I have never seen another ‘remote village’ in Kalimantan that is visited by such a large number of different actors. In the localities and villages, it results in a flow of visitors from NGOs, UN, World Bank, state officials, consultancy companies and, of course, from REDD+ institutions. In the village where I conducted my research, there were also researchers and students from various institutions who were taking part in REDD+-related research (including me). In a curious way, central Kalimantan as a ‘laboratory for REDD+’ became a reality. These dimensions of globalisation create not only tensions and friction, but also strange collaborations (Tsing, 2005; Li, 2007).
In the course of my research, I have conducted multi-sited fieldwork, or rather employed methods that Ann Tsing has called ‘ethnography of global connections’, using participant observation as the main tool in obtaining data at different sites, in particular documenting which people have been party to the dispute over REDD+ and its negotiations in Indonesia, their chains of connections; I have also interviewed NGO activists, state officials, climate change project staff and representatives of the climate change office. While gathering data and writing this article, I visited Jakarta and Central Kalimantan (Palangkaraya, Kapuas District, Mentangai sub-district) three times between 2012 and 2014.

Dispute and the making of a frontier landscape

The climate change dispute in the locale under discussion first emerged in the district of Kapuas, in Central Kalimantan, which shares borders with East, South and West Kalimantan and, to the north, the Malaysian part of Borneo. It is largely made up of swamp and peat land, and prior to the 1990s, a large part of the province comprised jungle (Schiller, 1996). Its population is about 2 250 000, of which about 500 000 are Ngaju Dayaks; 9000 Ngajus live in the area of the Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP) climate change pilot-project site. The Ngaju people, the biggest indigenous group in Central Kalimantan, have practised slash and burn rice cultivation, horticulture, hunting and fishing, and mainly lived by the rivers until recent years (Schiller, 1997: 16).

Mentangai Hulu, a primary location for the fieldwork, is one of the seven villages and seven sub-villages that are part of the Australian-funded REDD+ project. It contains 510 families or 2482 inhabitants of whom 95% are Ngaju Dayaks (RPJM-DESA 2011: 5). There is one sand or partly paved road cutting through it, fronted by wooden houses. On one side, the houses are partly built above the brownish Kapuas River, and on the other, they have backyards with rubber gardens, multiple tree species and vegetation. Before the 1970s, Ngaju Dayaks did not gain their livelihood from timber extraction, and there was no commercial logging. In the Kapuas district – including Mentangai Hulu – timber was used mainly for constructing houses and fire wood. People collected, used and traded in products such as rattan (Calamus), damar (Shorea) and jelutung (Dyera costulata) which, along with fishing and hunting (snakes, birds, deer and bears), were important sources of livelihood. From Mentangai Hulu, people travelled by river to forest sites far away from the village where they might live in small huts for some months, hunting, fishing and collecting forest products. Land rights were marked by trees, and people returned to the same places to collect harvests. Between the 1970s and 1990s, commercial logging, employing local men, started to provide enormous incomes in comparison with what had been earned earlier from trading fish, rattan and so forth (see Vanga 2013).³

According to villagers’ narratives, it was around the 1970s that the first ditches were dug in the peat soil to ease access to land far away from the river banks in the Kapuas area – a requirement which was probably connected to timber extraction. These canals (handel) were built by Ngaju Dayaks who then shared rights to the land based on the number of people in the group. The handel head might be responsible for hundreds of hectares distributed equally among group members. Smaller ditches (tatas) were also made to facilitate movement between forests and rivers, which were initially used mostly for timber transportation and then as routes for travelling to collect gemor, rattan, damar and so forth. In discussion with the handel heads, some men claimed hereditary rights over them dating back four generations, referring to handel as a river, which had later been transformed to a canal, after which new distribution of land rights along them had taken place.

The history of dispute over land rights was accentuated in the mid-1990s, when President Suharto’s government commenced the Mega Rice Project (MRP), aiming to feed the nation by making it self-sufficient in rice production. A network of canals and pits was dug over an area of 4000 km² of peaH lands stretching between the main rivers (the Kapuas and the Barito), bringing about astonishing environmental and agrarian change. Consequently, local populations partly lost their traditional livelihood sources. Furthermore, when peat land was drained, the hydrological balance of the
ecosystem was seriously affected, causing major forest fires. Every year, Ngaju Dayaks had to tackle conflagrations that threatened their rubber gardens and the forest areas where they gathered non-timber forest products. The increasing number of canals and ditches caused multiple changes in the landscape and livelihood systems of the local populations. While commercial logging used ‘soft methods’, leaving forests in some parts almost intact, the MRP was based on total land clearance, digging canals and draining the peat land – in addition to which numerous immigrants were brought to the area to become rice farmers (Suyanto et al., 2009: iii).

After the fall of President Suharto, President Jusuf Habibie established the so-called Reform Government which terminated the MRP in 1999. Soon after this, he inaugurated decentralisation policies (Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance) whereby power was devolved to district governments and even to villages through Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Affairs. There are two main perspectives on decentralisation: first, that it further encouraged corruption and natural resource extraction, causing environmental damage and insecurity (McCarthy, 2001, 2004; Peluso, 2002; Hadiz, 2003; Schulte-Nordholt, 2003); second, that it has strengthened democratisation processes in line with the policies of the World Bank. The first view is adopted in this article, following, for instance, Peluso (2002: 2), who notes that decentralisation may increase violence because it facilitates local authority struggles over the control of natural resources. In Central Kalimantan, a decentralisation policy that allocated resource extraction and legislative powers to district level was closely intertwined with struggle over access to natural resources and land (McCarthy, 2004: 1207).

Villages have been the main administrative units at the local level in Central Kalimantan since the village law inaugurated in 1979 (5/1979), which was changed after the reformation started. In Mentangai Hulu, the official state administration includes the village head and the village staff, the assistants of the village head (kaur), and neighbourhood heads (Kepala Rukun Tetangga). However, since the new provincial rule on customary institutions and heads in 2008, villages in Central Kalimantan may appoint customary leaders called mantir adat.4 Every village should have three mantirs; in Mentangai Hulu, there was one Christian, one Muslim and one Kaharingan customary leader. The village head is elected by popular vote and is supposed to report to the Village Representative Board (BPD), thereby creating competing factions in Mentangai Hulu and in many other villages. For instance, in Mentangai Hulu, the village head legalised private land ownership papers while the customary head was responsible for customary (adat) rights over land.5

In the aftermath of decentralisation policies, illegal logging was increasingly seen as legitimate and was supported by the district and provincial governments in Central Kalimantan (Casson and Obzinski, 2001: 50–51). Ngaju Dayaks increasingly engaged in legal/illegal timber transactions and gold mining, which became their principal source of income from the mid-1990s, if not before that. Meanwhile, the district government distributed permits – in particular to palm oil corporations – that extended outsider activities, again increasing land conflicts. However, it seems that decentralisation and raised natural resource extraction principally benefited local elites, who strengthened their power bases via networks of patronage and clientelism (McCarthy, 2004: 1216).

There was evidence of contradicting policies and interests among the central, provincial and district governments over timber concession operations: Kapuas district had in the process more than 150 small-scale logging operation permits in 2000, while central government was against excessive permit distribution. The police sometimes cooperated with the district, sometimes the central government and in some cases acted for their own benefit (McCarthy, 2004: 1207). In 2001, the central government inaugurated a new policy that changed the situation separating the armed forces from the police, who were then directly connected to the central government and superior to the armed forces at the provincial level. Furthermore, the forestry sector was recentralised by a new Government Regulation (No 34/2002), which shifted principal control over forest estate concessions to the central government. Consequently, police started to combat illegal logging on their own initiative, sometimes against the will of the district agencies, especially when it came to small-scale sawmills and timber transports and
brokers. Simultaneously, police benefited and maintained networks with some syndicates that continued illegal logging (McCarthy 2007: 163–174). This is a frontier landscape where struggle over land, the products of nature and natural resources can become violent at any time (Tsing, 2005: 68). However, since then, it has become much more difficult for the local population to be involved in illegal logging.

After the tightening police control over illegal logging, many Ngaju men returned to swidden, rice and rubber cultivation. Ngaju Dayaks, at least in Mentangai Hulu, became more dependent on rubber than previously; collecting gemor, for instance, was increasingly difficult because forests no longer existed near the village (Suyanto et al., 2009: iii). Meanwhile, after the failure of the MRP, many nature conservation projects were initiated, triggered by the deforestation of the devastated swamp and peat land areas that are the biggest contributors to the high carbon dioxide emissions in the country. International conservation organisations, the World Bank, the UN and state institutions all became interested in conserving the peat lands – which now became ‘valuable’ because they stored emissions (Dove, 2012: 252).

**REDD+ intervention in Central Kalimantan**

Under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), Indonesia has developed a specific REDD+ strategy, which has become the most important national climate change policy, aiming to reduce Indonesian emissions to 26% by 2020 or 41% with international assistance. In 2010, Indonesia made a one-billion-dollar conservation deal with Norway to cut its emission. It hosts about 50 REDD+ ‘demonstration activities’ (experiments on the effects of carbon trading systems on forests) that contribute to developing REDD+ mechanisms for post-Kyoto climate change directives (Lin et al. 2012: 220). Climate change mitigation through REDD+ is especially visible in Central Kalimantan, which became a ‘laboratory’ for REDD+-related projects and policies and was launched as a climate change pilot province in 2010.

The KFCP is one of the first REDD+ pilot projects initiated in Indonesia. In 2007, it was granted $100 million to reforest 70 000 hectares of degraded peat swamp and then plant 100 million trees (Olbrei and Howes, 2012). In 2008, the partnership was officially instituted between Indonesia and Australia (Indonesia Australia Forest Carbon Partnership/IAFCP). After preparations in the villages (the creation of agreements between the KFCP and villages), the project was officially launched in January 2010 by the Ministry of Forestry Indonesia. The project aimed to reduce carbon emissions by rehabilitating degraded peat land in a participative manner in what was once the MRP area in Central Kalimantan. The project followed on from the ex-MRP rehabilitation and revitalisation plan that had been in the making for a couple of years, and which was further accelerated by the Presidential Instruction in 2007 (Inpres No. 2/2007). The KFCP project envisaged two stages: (i) design 2009–2010 and (ii) implementation 2010–2014. However, it was halted in two villages in 2013 and terminated in 2014.

The KFCP as a climate change mitigation programme used at least six technical interventions: (i) village-based land-use planning; (ii) community-based forest management; (iii) fire management; (iv) sustainable livelihoods opportunities; (v) strengthening local institutions; and (vi) payment mechanisms to distribute REDD+ incentives. It is a result-based REDD+ project, meaning that all village-level activities must be monitored, verified and reported before actual payments can be made. In the district of Kapuas, all activities are exercised via the village head and functionaries, or through KFCP-related village institutions such as the TPK (Activity Management Team – Tim Pengelola Kegiatan) and the TP (Activity Monitoring Team – Tim Pengawas).

In December 2010, 58 Ngaju Dayaks and Kalimantan NGO representatives gathered in Kuala Kapuas to discuss and formulate a statement concerning the KFCP. At the meeting, it was claimed that the project threatened local indigenous groups (masyarakat adat) as it would turn their land into a natural protection area, thereby restricting indigenous access and denying original rights and sovereignty. In contrast, the Australian project’s presentation paper argues that the climate change project would rehabilitate peat land water systems, and
reforest and conserve valuable peat lands in a participative manner, integrating local indigenous people into the project from its inception. These different interpretations followed from the different positions of the parties to a dispute. The KFCP got its legitimacy from the global climate change negotiations, market-based approach, national climate change policies and Australian interests in taking part in the post-Kyoto climate change mechanisms, while indigenous groups had experienced many external environmental interventions (logging concessions, MRP or conservations projects) that carried with them top-down nature management programmes, sometimes causing intra-village or vertical conflicts that had long-lasting effects on the villagers.

Justice(s) and climate change dispute at the village

The climate change dispute under discussion in this article took a critical turn around the time I arrived at the village of Mentangai Hulu in May 2012 with Mursian (pseudonym), his wife and a lawyer who was also an activist from HUMA (Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis – Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform). I had met them the previous day in a climate change seminar in Kapuas city organised by a Jakartan NGO, Women’s Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan), together with a Kapuas-based NGO, the Yayasan Petak Danum (YPD–Petak Danum Foundation). On arrival, I was asked to visit Mursian’s house before settling into the home of the customary head where I lived for the following weeks. As I walked to their place along the small partly paved road, I was conscious of the looks I got from the villagers which made me feel like ‘just another foreigner with NGO activists’.

Mursian’s house was where people came to ‘complain’ (mengeluh) about the wrongdoings of the KFCP. When I sat in his house right after my arrival in the village, five men and two women entered the house. We sat in the front room, on the floor, and they all started to discuss the canal situation. The five handel owners had been asked to block ‘their’ canals and the two women had taken part in the KFCP’s reforestation activities. When I queried why villagers had problems with the KFCP, the handel heads told me that the KFCP did not respect their land rights: it was distributing land for the livelihood project even though this land already had rightful holders.

Furthermore, the villagers present in the house claimed that their demands for financial support in managing the preparation of the KFCP project’s livelihood package, which included the production of rubber seedlings and rubber garden sites along the canals, had not received an appropriate response from the KFCP at a meeting held to negotiate the continuation of the project in the village, leading to open conflict between the villagers and the KFCP. Villagers had been informed that the KFCP did not have funds for preparing the rubber garden sites and could only supply seeds, in accordance with the signed cooperation agreement between the villagers and the KFCP in 2009. The villagers claimed that establishing the rubber plantation was too costly to perform without financial aid and countered that it was unfair that they received so little. A tumultuous meeting to discuss the livelihood package and continuation of the project in May 2012 had resulted in KFCP staff and the village head fleeing from mutual deliberations, and then vacating the village itself. They told me they were afraid of the villagers because some of them had threatened the KFCP in the meeting – something denied by the villagers.

Reforestation was one of the main activities supported by the KFCP; the principal method used was the sourcing of tree seeds from forests in distant peat land areas. One woman who had taken part in the project said that sourcing seeds from the forests was hard work (berat sekali) and that if some of the seedlings died, they had to search for new seeds; otherwise, they were not paid. Following advice by the KFCP’s technical team, villagers were supposed to nurture seedlings to a certain height then bring them to the reforestation area. One KFCP representative told me that the villagers needed the KFCP’s technology for this cultivation (pembibitan) since they had no knowledge of native species (pohon alam) or any trees apart from rubber. However, one villager told me that local people were much more familiar with trees that would grow naturally in the locality; they felt that the
KFCP was imposing new techniques that did not fit with local ideas and practice.

About a week after my arrival in May 2012, Mursian organised a demonstration against the village head who, it was claimed, had withheld both villagers’ and KFCP money. The deputation was received by the sub-district head, the head of police forces in the district and the regional customary head (damang), and attended by the village adat head (mantir) and the head of village council (BPD). The negotiations resulted in the undertaking that complaints would be discussed at the district level and a recommendation that the villagers calm down. Some of the participants to the tumultuous meeting on May 3 were later summoned by the sub-district police, whereupon the situation defused.

Mursian was understood to be the most vocal in opposing the project in the village, often making public statements about the KFCP project on the Internet and at the meetings at different levels. His claims and opposition to them were examined to gain insights into the values and interpretations of justice within the area. Mursian’s background included a period as village secretary; he was the village adat head’s nephew, and he lived in a neighbourhood that was often classed as the most rebellious in the village by some village officials (kaur).

Mursian told me his father was descended from the regional customary head (damang), while his grandfather had magical capacities and could lead rituals and communicate with spirits (pawang). His main claim was that the KFCP caused disharmony among the families and it erased the Ngaju’s customary voluntary group activities; people had started to fight with each other. Principally, there was a feeling that the KFCP was not just (adil) because it did not treat villagers equally and because the project staff received greater benefits than the villagers who had to do the work amidst fears of losing the right of access to land inside the pilot project territory. Mursian justified his resistance by reference to the common good – harmony in the village and equal access to, and share of, the monetary benefits and livelihood resources (among the villagers themselves and between the KFCP and the villagers) – thereby revealing justice values among the Ngajus: equality in exchange relations and sharing (see also Dove, 2012: 234).

Equality emerged also in terms of fair pay for the work when the villagers felt they were not paid according to their work load: The KFCP paid the villagers for seedlings they were able to grow successfully, or trunks they cut for canal blocking and work related to it, but it was often felt that there was injustice in the way the system worked. If seedlings died, the villagers were not paid, and trunks they collected for canal blocking were not as valuable as they had been told they would be.

Many people later told me that the KFCP was only doing business (bisnis) for its own benefit; KFCP staff travelled by speed boats on the river, some bathed with bottled (expensive) water rather than in the river, and they got high salaries. Meanwhile, the Ngajus were afraid to lose their access to land and forests (timber or gemor). In their view, there was no difference between the aims of the KFCP and other conservation projects except that the KFCP intervened in their lives through their continual socialisation meetings, and their activities constantly raised questions concerning their rights and forest-related practices. Once again, the feeling of not being treated fairly by people coming from elsewhere yet with more power than the locals seems to have raised objections and increased frustration.

Different notions of justice emerged in the course of investigation of these claims: distribution of benefits emerged as a source of injustice. The most visible cause for the dispute – the lack of funding for rubber planting and maintenance – could be seen as distributional injustice. The villagers considered that the land around them was being territorialised by the climate change project. KFCP staff received huge benefits from their work, but the villagers were not supported in building their livelihood at the local level.

Secondly, imposing new techniques drawn from alien knowledge was understood as a source of injustice as local knowledge and culture were not being recognised by the KFCP staff. In the views of many villagers, the KFCP was following in the footsteps of the many (failed) conservation and other projects that had impacted on the village since at least 2006. On the other hand, one TPK (Activity Management Team) village staff member for the KFCP project told me that though many programmes had been instituted in the village in the past – MRP,
Wetland, Bos Mawas, CARE (International Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere), WWF Indonesia, University of Palangkaraya and the World Bank village structure programme (PMPN); when the KFCP appeared in 2009, it formulated a new approach by giving responsibility for peat forest land rehabilitation to local people. It seemed, therefore, to be claiming to offer more recognition to local norms than previous interventions.

However, international actors instituting foreign projects in the village were not seen as the only sources of injustice. One older man in Mentangai Hulu, Usman (pseudonym), explained how state laws and policies have also instigated injustice:

...then they made the Mega Rice Project, they made migration programs, they invited Javanese people here; Bapak Suharto wanted new settlements for Javanese people and created the Mega Rice Project. But what happened, we had to sacrifice our customary lands, state forest land, and natural species. (17 May 2012)

Usman had struggled for an independent Kalimantan in the past and volunteered for Walhi (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup – Friends of the Earth Indonesia) and the YPD. He was the handel head of his family, claiming that he has the right to about 75 hectares of land. In his claim, injustice is related to the New Order government policies and its state-centred approach, which stressed development at all costs. In Central Kalimantan, state policies and development programmes were generally felt to be sources of injustice since they either legitimised land appropriation, destruction of nature or marginalisation of indigenous groups in the political structure or from their lands. This view gave reason to question aims of the conservation projects. Different projects and organisations (Bos Mawas, CARE, Wetland and now the KFCP) were considered interlopers in Ngaju territory. Another source, also opposed to the KFCP presence in the village and connected to the YPD, said that villagers were afraid that their forests would be categorised as protected forest (KPHL), which would restrict their access to land and forests.

It has to be noted that most of the village functionaries did not see the KFCP in this light, talking of it as a source of money and employment to the villagers. The village elite – especially those who received salaries from the KFCP – claimed that Mursian was a provocateur, responsible for blocking village access to work and money offered by the REDD+ pilot project (he was reported to the police when a meeting ended in chaos). However, in 2013, the village head, who had signed all the papers between the KFCP and the village and had supported the project, told me that the KFCP could leave the village as it did not bring income to the villagers. This village head owned land in the village and had moved there when participating in the village head elections, and some claimed that he had played money politics during the elections (see Aspinall on money politics, 2014).12 The village officials (kaur) were local residents, however, and had been chosen in musyawarah meetings, though some said that only a few participated in those meetings. The head of BPD was one of Mursian’s close relatives, but he was the one to report Mursian to the police forces after the conflict on May 3. In 2013 when I visited the village, the village head and villagers had been approached by oil palm companies who wanted to procure licences to establish palm oil plantations on their land, and this situation could have influenced the village head’s change of view towards the KFCP. The village elite in particular seemed to seek benefits from outside interventions, such as palm oil companies or the KFCP, and they were satisfied as long as they could gain something from them.

In terms of the second of Sikor’s dimensions of justice – participation – the villagers had been encouraged to conduct customary land mapping by some NGOs and the local government, a project backed by the new regulations.13 However, this was not supported by the village head because it gave rise to increased contestation over land ownership and natural resources. The KFCP, like other REDD+ projects, legitimated its initiative by reference to poverty alleviation and forest well-being, but the techniques employed to tackle these matters raised questions of sovereignty not only in terms of territorial rights but also with regard to knowledge and cultural practices (Escobar, 2008). As mentioned by Howell (2013: 151–152), REDD+ is no longer only about forests; it...
has become a social programme in the sense that it is seen as a tool for providing well-being through monetary benefits. This underpins the KFCP claim that it is a participatory and bottom-up project aimed at simultaneously restoring peat land, reforesting deforested lands and alleviating poverty. Yet the project followed other conservation projects that had made similar promises but also had failed in the eyes of the villagers. Different notions of justice and underlying values continue to give rise to disputes and struggles, enhanced by legacies of suspicion that followed from the previous attempts to order ‘incapable’ villagers to conserve nature.

Ngajus justified their resistance to the KFCP by saying that: (i) the villagers had customarily distributed rights to land and natural resources in an equal manner and these customs should not be contravened. The KFCP did not share financial rewards equally – neither among the villagers, nor between the institution and the villagers; therefore, it contravened their values of sharing and equality. (ii) Their sovereignty was threatened because the KFCP was a top-down initiative forcing new technologies of reforestation and knowledge on the village. (iii) Even if the KFCP had promised that they would not intervene in local land rights, there was a fear that the territory would become a natural conservation area, thereby restricting peoples’ access to land and forest resources. (iv) The money offered as payment for work was felt to be unfair because it did not always cover the labour performed (if seedlings died) and it was not equal to the work load.

Signe Howell (2014) has discussed the same case, explaining that the KFCP staff held the view that villagers who resisted the project did it for individual reasons and interests, and on the basis of misinformation. Howell sees this as the outcome of ‘REDD with its unclear formulations and unspecific operational tasks [that] can easily give rise to conflicting perceptions of what a project should entail’ (2014: 16). However, I would argue that even though REDD+ had a clear formulation (market-based or development aid), conflicting views would still be raised in the village if different notions of justice, the undermining values and a top-down approach prevailed.

Global connections and universal principles of justice

The KFCP project has met with resistance not only in the village of Mentangai Hulu and among Kapuas activists but also from the environmental NGOs in Indonesia whose campaigns in Australia and Indonesia link up with those of European NGOs. This resistance, coupled with the difficulties the project faced in the field and in Australia, resulted in the KFCP’s terminating all activities in July 2013. Some environmental NGOs have celebrated the decision as a substantial victory, one that indicates that NGOs have become big players in the climate change debate in Indonesia. Global collaborations and alliances are perceived as making the difference, as I describe below.

The Indonesian environmental movement and the Indigenous Peoples’ Movement emerged during the time of New Order dictatorship that built upon the massacre of almost half a million ‘communists’ and peasant organisation members (BTI) across the country. Political activism was considered potentially subversive, and thus, environmental activism and speaking out for environmental sustainability became a channel to voice not only environmental but also political concerns in the 1970s and 1980s (see Peluso et al., 2008). In Indonesia, environmental justice NGOs (as opposed to conservationist NGOs) were founded in the 1980s, with legal advocacy and grassroots work as their main focus. The 1980s and 1990s saw mobilisations of movements in Indonesia which relied on what Tsing calls the ‘universalizing rhetorics of rights and justice’ (2005: 5). As noted by Peluso et al. (2008), the Indonesian environmental movement has experienced shifting alliances, tensions and relations with other agrarian movements and state institutions over time, linking transnational, national and local arenas.

In the 1990s, many NGO and student or peasant activists went underground because open political activism was dangerous. The New Order government was strongly development oriented, legitimating violent land appropriation on the basis of economic growth. It was difficult to resist state-led development projects, but struggles intensified over the course of the 1990s, and the environmental
A. Lounela

justice movement formed diverse alliances with government actors (e.g. the Ministry of the Environment) and other agrarian and peasant movements, ultimately impacting on environmental policies in the country (Peluso et al., 2008). After 1998, environmental activists could freely gather and participate in the public debates over forest and land rights. However, they also became more dependent on donor agencies (Lounela, 2001; Hadiz, 2011).

During my first research trip to Central Kalimantan in 2012, I spent a week in the city of Kapuas where I visited YPD. The YPD is an NGO that is located in the district of Kapuas which has its roots in the period of the MRP. It is a member of Walhi, actively communicates with it and is therefore part of the international environmental movement. YPD was a principal actor in the debate over the legitimacy of the KFCP and (in)justices related to its activities. The director explained its history and his involvement in the foundation of the organisation:

I was moved [tergugah] to accompany [mendampingi] them [Dayaks in the villages] because I myself saw the destruction. I saw how they tried to stop forest fires. They cried in their own gardens; seeing that, I wanted to cry too. That made me understand that these people had to be helped, and they wanted a local organization to help them; this is the background to why I have been a director of the YPD for the last 12 years . . . we brought them rice seeds because women found it difficult to feed their families . . . and the movement to resist the MRP emerged. Some people had the courage to stop the [MRP] workers: ‘Don’t destroy our gardens,’ they said. But first we trained them with community organizers [CO]. I couldn’t do it here [Kapuas], I had to be in Palangkaraya [capital city], because I was chased by the police, especially if we gathered . . . yeah, I was chased, I never settled at one place; in 3–4 hours I had to move again and search for a new place. This all happened because we were against the MRP; one just had to avoid meeting village heads and sub-district heads. (Interview, 11 May 2012)

YPD took many risks when resisting state development projects during the New Order era as it was an offence that could lead to imprisonment. This history of student activism and resistance towards the state seemed to be reflected in the difficulty the NGO had in connection and collaborating with the village elite in Mentangai Hulu. The question became one of fostering better relations with the village elite and the villagers and creating further cadres there. YPD extends its activities to villages such as Mentangai Hulu through local cadres of which there were four active men and at least two women in the village at the time who communicated actively through Facebook and the Borneo Climate network. However, the BPD, village head and village officials were extremely suspicious about its activities, while the customary head collaborated with it when it came to customary land mapping or similar issues. When I spent a week in YPD office in May 2012, I was amazed by how well this organisation was connected with national and international NGOs and actors; there was a constant flow of visitors from Jakarta to Australia to the villages in the district.

YPD started work with climate change issues in 2007 after the Bali meeting (COP 13). In an interview in 2012, its director expressed the view that the organisation could accept REDD+ if REDD+ accepted the territorial rights of indigenous groups and if the local people were permitted to manage the carbon estates themselves. Thus, it is not unconditionally against the markets as a solution but rather questions who are the real rights holders, a position which resembles that of the Indonesian environmental movement in the 1990s which stressed the rights discourse along with issues of environmental protection (Tsing, 2005: 206).

The YPD was very active in the KFCP case. Members of its staff travelled to Australia to take part in an NGO campaign over KFCP activities in Kalimantan, which was organised by Walhi, and raised considerable discussion in Australia. In 2011, the YPD wrote a letter to an Australian delegation visiting the KFCP site, demanding that Australia withhold funding for the project as long as there was (i) biased reporting of the KFCP process; (ii) lack of recognition and respect for customary (indigenous) rights; (iii) lack of recognition for customary Dayak wisdom; (iv) disregard for the bigger picture of destruction; (v) absence of effective consultation and engagement; (vi) exclusion of community input to the project and activity design; (vii)
a lack of understanding of both REDD+ and carbon; (viii) no account taken of lessons learned (from the village); (ix) no confidence in the international NGOs contracted to implement the pilot project; and (x) no confidence in the community facilitator.18 This statement reflects the international rights discourse that demands recognition of rights (one dimension of justice mentioned by Sikor) but does not question the existence of carbon trading and the monetisation of nature per se. In this way, its arguments differ from those raised by Walhi, even though they are both part of the same network and collaborate in their advocacy of problematising REDD+ projects.

Walhi, an environmental justice network, states that REDD+ is a false solution as it is a market-based carbon trading scheme, which does not benefit local communities and countermands or transforms their cultural values (interview, May 2012). It has six members in central Kalimantan (some of them working with REDD+ and some not). Even though Walhi does not accept market-based mechanisms, its members could do so, and some did. In May 2012, in Jakarta, I had a long conversation with a Walhi staff member who was a Ngaju Dayak from Central Kalimantan. In his view, REDD+ did not impact on the main problems in Indonesia: land tenure security, and access to land and its control. However, my interlocutor also said that recognition underlies all these matters. If indigenous groups and their rights are recognised, then land rights and land tenure security could be assured.

Sunderlin et al. (2014) argue that land tenure security is the main problem in most of the Southern countries, where REDD+ projects are implemented. Thus, recognition of the rights of the local communities (primary right holders) is a main dimension of justice and underlines many of the REDD+-related conflicts. However, their study also shows that Indonesia experiences more land tenure insecurity, and there is more external interventions and use of forests than in Brazil, Cameroon, Tanzania and Vietnam, where many REDD+ projects are implemented (Sunderlin et al. 2014: 41). I would suggest that REDD+ pilot projects face particular difficulties in Indonesia, and especially in Central Kalimantan, because of external forest land-users that compete with local communities and unclear land rights policies and enforcement of those policies by national and local governments.

One of Walhi’s most important techniques is ‘capacity building’. A Jakarta activist explained this to me in the following terms: ‘people who have right, but don’t have capacity, will not become anything’. Walhi, therefore, is against REDD+, partly because it thinks that people do not have the capacity to fully understand it. Consequently, it shares information through different media, educates and has close connections with the villagers (whom it refers to as cadres), and invites them to speak in seminars and to the media so that they may ‘gain the capacity’ to say publicly what they think. I was told: ‘People have the right to speak out. If you agree with somebody or you don’t agree, you have the right to say so’. This lack of capacity to speak out and formulate well-grounded opinions on the part of the people whose lives are most affected by innovations makes REDD+ unacceptable. In the activist’s view, Northern countries should make emission reductions in their own countries as long as the capacity to understand and have impact is absent among the people in the South.

In an interview I had with the Director of the Central Kalimantan Walhi, he claimed that forests have other values besides those of the market and that people who have cultural dependence on forest and land ecosystems should be granted their territorial rights. He further asserted that one way to reduce the high quantity of carbon emissions in Indonesia is to stop land and forest conversion.

Walhi’s discourse on land rights, and access and control over land and forests, was an emergent discourse among the Ngaju Dayaks who were eager to conduct participatory mapping. However, probably even more Ngaju Dayaks stressed distributive justice: claiming that economic benefits should be higher, equally shared between the villagers and the KFCP, and among the villagers. In this, they differed from Walhi, which was against the monetisation of nature per se, and therefore the distribution of money to the villagers. On the other hand, some villagers connected to YPD and Walhi argued that it would be better if there were no project at all if it causes feelings of injustice, if it becomes a cause of disharmony, in the village.
Civil society actors in Indonesia can be divided between those who talk of justice and rights-based climate change mitigation and those who consider monetary rewards and an economic approach integral to REDD+. When it comes to REDD+, the main division lies between those who accept the market-based approach (such as YPD) and those who do not (such as Walhi). However, NGOs can differ in their claims for justice in different situations and yet still collaborate.

Some concluding ideas

This article has focused on climate change disputes raised by the KFCP pilot project in Central Kalimantan. I have explored the claims – and justifications for these claims – presented in arenas ranging from the local to the national level. This has indicated that political action taken by local Ngaju people connects with the environmental movement but also draws from the customary principles of justice, thereby demonstrating the plurality of legal orders and justice principles in Indonesia (Bowen, 2003; Lounela, 2009).

Early in this article I asked: What kinds of political action are being taken in the course of the dispute? How do the parties justify their positions in this conflict situation? What are the main arguments being presented in the dispute? How does justice figure in the arguments at different levels?

First, at the village level, political activities range from local demonstrations, negotiation meetings and gatherings to participatory mapping. Some Ngaju Dayaks have connections with advocacy NGOs such as Walhi, but their activities were considered egoistic by the village elite, of whom many gained economic benefits from the REDD+ project. Those connected to NGOs gave speeches in the seminars and launched Internet campaigns. Ngaju people travelled to a range of different forums and places to voice their resistance (seminars, meetings, NGO offices) in both local and national arenas. Some villagers became very active on the Internet and in social media (funded by donors), which is one reason why the dispute became prominent – even globally so. I did not hear many voices supporting the KFCP even in the village, except those of the head of BPD, village staff (kaur), and TP and TPK staff, and, if it concerned customary ritual or customary land, the customary head. Those who opposed the KFCP project and were connected to NGOs who were vocal and their voices were heard in the national and global arenas in 2012 and 2013. Shifting alliances and collaborations occurred and positions changed, pointing to rapid changes to which local people, generally, had difficulties in responding.

Second, also at the village level, justifications that promoted justice in terms of recognition (of territorial and cultural rights) had roots in the environmental movement and its rights-based discourse. Land tenure security is highly problematic in Indonesia (see Sunderlin et al. 2014). Recognition of territorial and cultural rights provided the strongest base for collaboration with the NGOs because Ngajus could easily claim indigenous identity and point to their customary rights to land. However, claiming indigenous identity also had its drawbacks at the national level since in the NGO discourse, indigenous groups are mostly understood to adhere to customs of collective cooperation (gotong royong and a non-monetary understanding of nature) (see Henley and Davidson 2008 adat formation in Indonesia).

Distribution justice was one dimension of the dispute, demonstrating that values underlying the notions of distribution justice differed. REDD+ draws inspiration for its argument from a neoliberal capitalist model that proposes the monetisation of nature (Howell, 2013). In line with the ecosystem services framework, it is based on a utilitarian notion of justice regarding distribution and specific knowledge and values about nature–society relations (Sikor, 2013a,b: 13). Thus, values in the local context are being contested by neoliberal values, underlying the ecosystem services framework, that revalorise forests, their management and related practices by imposing monetary value on them (Sikor, 2010: 248).

The KFCP considered that any level of economic return for the village population would motivate individuals to conserve forests, while those Ngajus who were not part of the village elite seemed to be more concerned with their social relations (harmony) and status (being treated in a fair manner). The villagers would have probably been motivated to collaborate.
with the KFCP if the organisation had recognised their cultural values and their social relations (with people and entities that included trees and other nature products) and social status (equality with KFCP staff, government officials, etc.). The villagers, however, backed by environmental NGOs, resisted universalising capitalist principles with customary norms of equality, sharing and solidarity; money in their cosmology should benefit all and in an equal manner, and financial compensation should be equivalent to their work load and participation. Furthermore, they held that all villagers should have equal access to activities, economic benefits and positions as a mark of their solidarity (sharing) with each other: this is the basis of their social relations and positions (see Gibson and Sillander, 2011).

People in Mentangai Hulu felt that they were not equal to the KFCP project people in terms of decision making and social relations, and they did not try to negotiate with the KFCP staff. Here, it seems to me, the dispute differs from the forest land dispute I observed in Central Java, where people would compromise and accept solutions offered by the state and forestry officials in the long run. In the Javanese context, local values such as being refined (halus), maintaining harmony (rukun) and working voluntarily for the benefit of the community (gotong royong) were strengthened and utilised by the New Order state to exercise power and order (Pemberton 1994: 7; Lounela, 2009). However, during my research on upland state forest land conflict in Java (2003–2004), these values were framed in everyday village life and also by the state apparatus resulting in inactivity and restraint – rather than voicing injustice – thereby leading to compromises and unchanging power positions (Lounela, 2009: 154–155).

Among the Ngajus, equality, sharing and solidarity were main values used to justify resistance to the REDD+ project. The REDD+ intervention comprised performance-based and cost-effective nature management in which economic benefits would compensate their participation in emission reduction through forest rehabilitation and canal blocking. This market-based approach was an inherently individualist, top-down imposition; its view of justice related to the economic benefit received by each individual in exchange for the work performed at certain time, and with specific results, evaluated and rewarded by money according to unified standards set by the KFCP. This neoliberal model causes tensions when it articulates with local perceptions of the management of nature and social relations that have not been separated in local practices (see also Howell 2014: 18).

Interestingly, unlike in Java, public outcry was not seen improper practice by Ngajus in Mentangai Hulu; rather, highly valued warrior discourse could be found among the Ngaju young men (perhaps among the elders too), and it was commonly approved. Thus, in a way, being active and resisting the project, maintaining autonomy (refusing outside intervention), were themselves values or representations of action and, simultaneously, actions that were publicly evaluated and approved (Graeber, 2001: 58–59). Probably for this reason, NGOs found it relatively easy to connect with some young men in the villages in Central Kalimantan. I would argue that both parties benefited from the common campaigns forming fragile collaborations that emerged at specific moments (see Tsing, 2005), though sometimes their conceptions of justice differed. However, the NGOs rejecting REDD+ had difficulties forming alliances at the national and global level. Rejecting REDD+ as a market-based approach was not popular among national NGOs in Indonesia, with the exception of Friends of the Earth Indonesia and a few others. A final potential source of conflict is that while it is true that Northern NGOs often promote the view that climate change mechanisms should benefit local people and at the same time rehabilitate nature, their conception of justice is based on Western perceptions of just ways to reduce emissions – focused on financial compensation. Local notions of justice, in this case, emphasise cultural values such as harmony and sharing, to bring security; therefore, according to those values, any monetary benefits should also be distributed and shared. These competing and conflicting principles of justice ultimately derailed the project, creating barriers between the claims and activities of the KFCP and those of the Ngaju Dayaks.

Notes

1 ‘The United Nations claims that the main aim of the ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD)’ mechanism is to make forests more valuable standing than they would be cut down by creating a financial value for the carbon stored in the trees. Once this carbon is standardized and quantified, REDD+ will allow polluters to purchase cheap carbon offsets (or ‘pollution licences’) from countries in the South instead of reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions at source.’ (retrieved from http://www.carbontradewatch.org/issues/redd.html – 29 July 2014).

2 As Bowen notes, John Rawls focuses on developing universal principles of justice in his notion of ‘public justice’ (or ‘political conception of justice’ when it is written as a law, Rawls, 1971). In John Rawls’ formulation, there is one basic ‘political conception of justice’, and its first principle is that every people has a right to freedom which cannot be trumped by any other conception of justice or rights (truth) (Rawls, 1971: 3). This is what Bowen claims as the Euro-American principle of justice (Bowen, 2003: 265) http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/09/20/almost-half-of-norways-climate-and-forest-aid-remains-unspent/.

3 Profil Desa Mantangai Hulu (year unknown), verbal communication with customary head of Mentangai Hulu.

4 In 2008, the Central Kalimantan government inaugurated legislation (Perda Provinsi Kalimantan Tengah Nomor 1 Tahun 2008), which defines the role of mantir adat as comprising both the customary head of the village and part of the bigger customary governance structure (damang).

5 See Duncan 2007 on how the decentralisation of decision-making and governance system may affect Dayak groups outside of Java.

6 Tsing (2005: 27) defines the concept ‘frontier’ as follows: ‘Built from historical models of European conquest, frontiers create wilderness so that some – and not others – may reap its rewards. Frontiers are deregulated because they arise in the interstitial spaces made by collaborations among legitimate and illegitimate partners: armies and bandits; gangsters and corporations; builders and despoilers. They confuse the boundaries of law and theft, governance and violence, use and destruction’.

7 Peluso’s article on rubber and the commodification of nature provides an excellent analysis of how nature is seen and conceptualised in different ways at different times and places, hence her concept ‘situated political ecology’. Rubber is a prime example of how a natural product that has had a bloody past in colonial Latin America and Africa, today is considered almost local and beneficial both economically and ecologically in Kalimantan, Indonesia. See Peluso (2012): What’s Nature Got To Do With It? A Situated Historical Perspective on Socio-natural Commodities.

8 Intervention by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia on Climate Change, at the G-20 Leaders Summit, 25 September 2009, Pittsburgh, PA.

9 Indonesia has received US$35 million from Norway through UN agencies. Much is still unspent. This is due to the preparation phase and slow progress; forest aid is result based. http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/09/20/almost-half-of-norways-climate-and-forest-aid-remains-unspent/ retrieved 17 December 2014.


11 Mursian’s opponents claimed he was a staff member of the YPD, but he himself said he just volunteered for them sometimes; actually, the YPD did not have staff in the villages, though there were cadres that collaborated with the NGO(s).


13 In 2009, the Central Kalimantan Governor Teras Nanang inaugurated a Governor’s Regulation on customary land titling (Pergub 13/2009); this regulation was revised by the new Governor’s Regulation 3/2012. The basic principle is the same: a customary institution led by Damang can legalise a certain amount of customary land through a customary titling system. There are numerous legal uncertainties in this arrangement.

14 Actually, some people had appropriated large areas of land when the village head started to pass out land ownership letters to anybody in 2005, with compensation being provided by the MRP project. A new notion – ayungku (the first person possessive pronoun ‘mine’) – was mentioned to me many times, and claims of ownership (mine) were debated and questioned.

15 Walhi is an environmental non-governmental organisation and has been part of the Friends of the Earth international since 1989. It has 479 members in 28 provinces in Indonesia. It was founded in 1980, being the oldest and largest environmental organisation in Indonesia.

16 In Indonesia, climate change became a big issue after the Bali Climate Change Conference (COP 13) in 2007 which attracted more than 10,000 participants – including some civil society actors interviewed during this research project. http://unfccc.int/meetings/bali_dec_2007/meeting/6319.php retrieved on 29 May 2013. COP 13 instigated REDD+ as one of the principal mechanisms for helping to rid the atmosphere of carbon emissions. For most of the Indonesian environmental NGOs, this meeting was the turning point in their environmental and climate change work, though some had already started work with the issue.

17 This view resembles that of the Indigenous Peoples Movement (AMAN-Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago), which holds that indigenous groups could develop their own REDD+ model (interview with AMAN 8 May 2013).


References

Climate change disputes and justice


