“Call him earth”: On Philo’s Allegorization of Adam in the *Legum allegoriae*

1. Introduction

Our conference received its title, “Where are you, Adam?” from Gen 3:9. From Philo’s perspective it is an apt choice, for to him God’s question really covers the whole chain of biblical events from the creation of the human being to the deportation from Paradise. His exegesis of the question (*Legum allegoriae* 3.51 ff.) is in many ways connected with his allegorical interpretation of those events which form the main substance of this essay.

But before analyzing that interpretation it is warranted, first, to take a look at a few preliminaries concerning Philo’s allegorical interpretations of the two biblical accounts of the creation of the human being and, second, make some observations about the character of Adam in Philo in general and in *Legum allegoriae* in particular. Thirdly, the background and aim of this paper are specified.

1.1 Philo and the Double Creation of the Human Being

David T. Runia has made an important observation about the various Philonic exegeses of the two creation accounts of the human being in Gen 1:26–27 and 2:7: there is a difference between Philo’s *running* commentaries (*Quaestiones in Genesim*, *De opificio mundi* and *Leg.* 1–2) and the interpretations presented elsewhere.¹

¹ David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill 1986) 335. Another way to put this is to speak of differences in the interpretation of these verses as the *primary* biblical lemmas vs. as *secondary* ones—the latter meaning their use for the purpose of explaining some other, primary one; see David T. Runia, “The Structure of Philo’s Allegorical Treatises: A Review of Two Recent Studies and Some Additional Comments,” *VC* 38 (1984) 209–256, p. 238. See also his as “Further
In the latter, Philo tends to harmonize the biblical accounts so that both the human created “according to the image of God” and the “breath of life” are related to the highest part of the soul, i.e., the mind (νοῦς), while the dust of the earth represents the bodily realm more generally (e.g., Her. 56–58), if it is not omitted (e.g., Plant. 19). But in the running commentaries, where more attention is paid to explaining the biblical details, Philo considers the entity of Gen 2:7 to be different from the one of Gen 1:27.2

Furthermore, there is a difference between the interpretations of Gen 2:7 in the running commentaries: In QG 1.4 and Opif. 134 Philo takes Gen 1:27 as a description of the creation of a noetic type and Gen 2:7 as a reference to the coming together of body and soul: based on the latter verse he in both passages (as also, e.g., in QG 1.51) says that the human being is composed of “earth/earthlike essence and divine spirit,” i.e., the dust and the breath.3 In Leg. the situation is different: the entity of Gen 1:27 is referred to as “the heavenly human” or “the heavenly mind,” whereas the one of 2:7

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2 Philo’s main genres are the three Pentateuchal commentary series (see, e.g., James Royse, “The Works of Philo,” in: Adam Kamesar (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) 32–64. Their general differences can be summarized as follows: The Quaestiones (primary lemmas from Genesis and Exodus; preserved mainly in an early Armenian translation) proceeds on a verse by verse basis, and a literal interpretation is as a rule followed by the deeper (allegorical) meaning, whereas in the Exposition of the Law (Genesis—Deuteronomy), the most exoteric series of the three, Philo paints with a broad brush. He retells and elaborates on the biblical text, but he also gives allegorical (incl. arithmological) interpretations. Genesis 1–3 are covered in Opif., the first treatise of the Exposition. The third series is the Allegorical Commentary (Genesis) where the literal level is chiefly just the starting point for Philo’s allegories. Legum allegoriae is the first of the eighteen surviving treatises in this series, which most clearly has esoteric features. This treatise, which in its surviving form is about the same length as Genesis, deals with Genesis 2–3. Two of its original four books (covering Gen 3:1b–8a and 3:20–23) have been lost except for a few fragments.

3 In Opif. §§ 134–135 is the section comparing the humans of Gen 1:27 and 2:7. But see §§ 25, 69 for a somewhat different interpretation of 1:27 and §139 for the tendency of harmonizing 1:27 and 2:7b.
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is—NB. before the reception of God’s breath—called “the earthly human” and “the earthly mind.” It is important to note that in *Leg.* 1 the divine inbreathing is not interpreted by Philo as meaning the soul’s entering the body.

And there is one more distinction to be made within the running commentary of Genesis 2–3 in *Leg.*, and that is the difference between protological and universal allegory: The former kind of interpretation maintains the protological orientation of the biblical text, whereas universalization occurs when Philo ignores the protological context and derives general truths from the text, be they ethical, anthropological or theological. Philo himself does not explicitly mention any exegetical or hermeneutical categories corresponding to the two levels, between which he moves very smoothly. Nevertheless, I find this distinction vital for understanding his allegories. For at least my own experience is that because of the protological nature of the biblical story there is a tendency for the reader to take also the interpretations as protological by default even when a closer reading shows them to

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5 But cf. the opening statement of his exegesis of Gen 4:12 at *QG* 1.72: “This too is a universal saying” (λόγιον καθόλου κατά τον μειούμενον in surviving Greek fragments of the passage). This is followed by a purely universal interpretation where Cain’s “groaning and trembling” applies to “every evildoer.”
be universal. As will be seen below, Philo’s allegorization of Gen 2:7 in *Leg.* 1 only barely deals with the *creation* of the human being.⁶

1.2 Adam in Philo and the Legum Allegoriae

The question of the individuality vs. genericness of Adam is always present when we examine interpretations of Genesis 2–3. Philo does not discuss Adam as a real, flesh-and-blood person in the *Allegorical Commentary*; the situation is rather similar in the *Quaestiones*. But in the *Exposition of the Law* (in practice in its first treatise, the *De opificio mundi*) Philo to a greater extent goes along with and retells the biblical narrative and can, e.g., speak of the “first human being who was born from the earth, the original ancestor of our entire kind” (§136).⁷ Yet in *Opif.* too the first human

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⁶ These unique features of *Leg.* 1.31–42 (and the exegesis building on it later in the treatise) are usually not acknowledged in scholarship (certain important exceptions are noted below). This is the reason for the fairly limited interaction in this paper with earlier research—most notably Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation* (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America 1983) and David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill 1986)—where Philo’s interpretation of Gen 2:7 in *Leg.* 1 is taken to concern the *creation* of the human being. David T. Runia, *On the Creation*, 322 rightly criticizes “most commentators” for harmonizing Philo’s interpretations of Gen 2:7 at *Opif.* 134–135 and *Leg.* 1.31–32, but he speaks of “[t]he νοῦς becom[ing] incarnated” at *Leg.* 1.31 (*Philo and Timaeus*, 264, 335, *al*.; similarly Tobin, *The Creation of Man*, 111 and Folker Siegert, “Philo and the New Testament,” in: Adam Kamesar (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Philo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) 175–209, p. 190). Erwin R. Goodenough, “Philo on Immortality,” *HTR* 39 (1946) 86–108, p. 94 correctly sees that “the man made of clay is not the physical body” in *Leg.* 1, but when he says it is “the lower mind,” he does not have much to support him. (It is in Clement of Alexandria, *Exc. ex Theodoto* 3.50.1 that we find such exegesis of Gen 2:7 as might be interpreted that way.) It also seems that the differences between the interpretations of Gen 2:7 as the *main* lemma vs. a secondary one have not received the attention they deserve.

⁷ Tr. Runia, *On the Creation*, as all quotations from *Opif*; similarly, e.g., *Virt.* 203, *QG* 1.21. and *Mut.* 63 which is an exceptional passage within the *Allegorical Commentary*: Philo calls Adam in the context of the name-giving in Gen 2:19 “a man of wisdom, the founder of the human race.”
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being can be said to be “[i]n many respects . . . more a type than a real person.”

The proper name Adam appears 47 times in the Allegorical Commentary and twice in the Quaestiones, whereas it does not occur at all in the Exposition. Apart from the 24 occurrences of Adam in Leg., the remaining 25 can be briefly characterized as follows. In four instances Philo gives no interpretation of the character of Adam. There are two positive characterizations and four neutral ones. But the main role of Adam in Philo’s allegories is negative. He represents the wicked person (Cher. 1), the mind which has caught the incurable sickness of folly (Cher. 10), sensuality (Cher. 54), voluntary moral failure (Post. 10) as well as evil generally (Congr. 171). In three instances the “sons of Adam” in Deut. 32:8 are interpreted as the “children of the earth” or “earthly characters” and, ultimately, identified with vice (Post. 89–91, Plant. 59–60, Congr. 58; five occurrences of Adam in total). In the remaining five mentions of the name Philo refers to Adam’s relationship with the earth: he is simply a “mass of earth” (Somn. 2.70) or the man moulded out of the earth (Plant. 34) to be called the “earthly mind” (§46). This last appellation, of key importance in Leg. 1, is also used of Adam in Her. 52–53.

8 Runia, On the Creation, 333.
9 One MS. has the name at Opif. 149, but see Runia, On the Creation, 351.
10 This rough outline by no means does justice to what Philo has to say about Adam and what Adam represents to him, as I only discuss the passages (and their vicinity) where the name Adam appears. For further information, see, e.g., the indices of biblical passages and that of names in vol. 10 of Philo’s works in the Loeb Classical Library.
11 Cher. 54; Post. 34, 124 and Conf. 169.
12 Mut. 63 (see n. 7) and QG 1.21, both on Gen 2:19. In the latter Philo calls Adam “the first earth-born noble man” and “wise.”
13 In Cher. 57 and Her. 257 Adam stands for the mind, i.e., the highest part of the soul, in Somn. 1.192 human beings in general. In QG 1.53 Philo says, “when God formed the first mind, he called it Adam.” Here Eve means the faculty of sense-perception, but only the tunics of skin of Gen 3:21 denote the physical body.
14 See also Antti Laato’s article in this volume.
As for Adam in *Leg.*, Philo’s Septuagintal text agrees with ours in that he too finds the proper name for the first time at Gen 2:16 (*Leg.* 1.90). But, as is natural in the light of the biblical narrative, for Philo this is not the first time this entity is referred to. The naming of Adam prompts him to ask who this character is, and his answer runs, “Perchance, then, he means to give you the name of the human that was moulded (τοῦ πλαστοῦ, from Gen 2:7 ἔπλασεν)” (ibid.).

The uncertainty is rhetorical; in practice Philo shows no signs of doubt that the Adam of Gen 2:16 is indeed the entity first mentioned in 2:7. Instead, he repeats the distinction made earlier in *Leg.* 1.31 when he continues (ibid.),

“Call him earth,” he says, for that is the meaning of “Adam,” so that when you hear the word “Adam” you must make up your mind that it is the earthly and corruptible (γῆινον καὶ φθαρτόν) mind; for the one after the image is not earthly but heavenly.

At this point I will give, without any comments but as an appetizer, the text which Philo above refers to, the beginning of his interpretation of Gen 2:7 in *Leg.* 1.31–32. Having quoted the verse he writes:

There are two types of humans; the one a heavenly human, the other an earthly. The heavenly human, because he has come into

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15 Unless indicated otherwise, the translations of Philo’s texts are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, where *Leg.* is translated by G. H. Whitaker. Significant emendations are mentioned.

16 The beginning of this quotation is perplexing: κάλει δή, φησίν, αὐτὸν γῆν. This reads exactly like a typical Philonic quotation from the Pentateuch; there are 68 occurrences of φησίν in *Leg.* alone. Placing it in the middle of a direct quotation is usual (e.g., 1.25, 47, 51, 65, 72, 77, 81). The only place where Adam is called earth is Gen 3:19, but he is there addressed in the 2nd person singular (γῆ εἶ), which does not fit Philo’s quotational formula here.

17 The extensive use of quotation marks here aims at differentiating the *explanandum* (the biblical text) from Philo’s *explanatio*. I have placed in quotation marks also three expressions in which Philo, while maintaining a direct reference to the text of Gen 2:7, makes some changes to the vocabulary (“moulded work,” “from earth” and “breath”).

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being according to “the image of God,” does not partake of corruptible and, in a word, earthlike substance; but the earthly one is compacted out of incoherent matter, which [Moses] has called “dust.” For this reason he says that the heavenly human was not “moulded,” but was stamped with “the image of God”; while the earthly is a “moulded work” of the Artificer, but not His offspring.

(32) We must regard the human “from earth” to be mind which is entering, but has not yet entered, the body. This mind is in fact earthlike, and corruptible, were not God to “breath” to it a power of true “life.” Then it “becomes”—no longer is it being “moulded”—“a soul,” not an idle and imperfectly formed soul, but one which is, verily, intellectual and “alive.” For he says, “the human being became a living soul.”

1.3 The Background and Aim of This Paper

I have argued elsewhere that transmigration of souls, i.e., reincarnation, was a fundamental part of Philo’s views of the soul. In this he followed Plato. I identified as the major driving force of reincarnation the love of body. This, for its part, is directly related to what I have called the corporealization of the mind defined as a phenomenon whereby the mind (or soul) orientates towards, and desires to experience, the world of matter in general and a physical body of its own in particular. What connects this to Adam specifically is that the concept of corporealization is based on Philo’s interpretation of Gen 3:19 (Adam’s having to return to earth) in QG 1.51 and Leg. 3.252–253. The core idea of corporealization is illustrated by Philo’s words (Leg. 3.252), “having forsaken the wisdom of heaven, is he not now ranked with things earthly (γεώδεσι) and incohesive (ἀσυστάτοις)?”

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18 Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo. Many scholars since the 16th century have seen Philo as endorsing reincarnation. The scholarship of the last century or so is characterized by a broad array of opinions but also a virtually complete lack of debate. My study was the first one to specifically address the question.

19 The major exception is that in Philo human souls cannot be reborn as animals like in the Platonic scheme (e.g., Tim. 42c, Phaedrus 249b).

20 See Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo, 70–79.
In connection with his description of the mind’s corporealization, Philo also introduces a rare change in the text of Gen 3:19. The LXX has ἕως τοῦ ἀποστρέψαι σε εἰς τὴν γῆν (“until you return to the earth”) expressing the time until which Adam’s laborious life lasts, but Philo in Leg. 3.252 reads, μέχρι ἀποστρέψεις εἰς τὴν γῆν, which on both philological and contextual grounds should be interpreted to mean, “as long as you return to earth.”

Given the totality of direct and indirect evidence on Philo’s position on reincarnation, it is in my view obvious that the doctrine is being referred to here. The love of body has been identified by David Winston as one original cause of the soul’s incarnation in Philo. It is, however, somewhat difficult to think of incarnating souls as body-lovers before being embodied, and it does seem that the original incarnation was not caused by this love, nor was it a punishment. Instead, if we postulate some kind of ur-transgression in Philo (as I think we must), its timing is not before but after the original incarnation, caused by the lures of the corporeal environment. And this is where the corporealization of the mind has a strong explanatory power as the major driving force of re-incarnation in Philo. I suggest that the mind’s fall and rise in Philo’s thought can be schematically presented in six stages:

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21 Idem, 76–77. The linguistic evidence includes the observation that, as a rule, Philo expresses “as long as” with μέχρι (vel sim.) and the indicative, while ἄν with the subjunctive are used to convey the meaning “until.” All the translations of the LXX are from A New Translation of the Septuagint (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) (NETS).

22 David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press 1985) 34–36. Winston joins those scholars who think Philo accepts transmigration (pp. 39, 42) but here he is addressing the question of why the soul incarnates in the first place.

23 I will return to this issue in the discussion of the concept of the death of the soul (below, pp. 269).

24 For the causes of incarnation in Philo and the model, see Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo, 44–81.
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(1) incorporeal existence with God;
(2) incarnation;
(3) corporealization of the mind, i.e., the transgression;
(4) reincarnation until the prerequisites of salvation are met;
(5) liberation from reincarnation; and,
(6) eternal incorporeal existence with God.

In this paper I extend my analysis of the corporealization of the mind to the *Legum Allegoriae* more generally by looking at Philo’s interpretations of biblical verses related to Adam that have some essential connection to that notion—i.e., being or becoming earthly in Philo’s own terminology. I will also be looking at the reverse phenomenon, the means and prerequisites for the soul to discontinue its state of corporealization, i.e., becoming heavenly. My aims are to show that in Philo’s universal allegorization of Genesis 2–3

1. Adam is intimately connected to both stages (3) and (4), and,
2. both the breath of life and Paradise are interpreted as a salvific act of grace represented by stage (5). This ends the state of corporealization by turning the “earthly” mind back to a “heavenly” one.

2 Philo’s Interpretation of God’s Question in Gen 3:9

The interpretation of the question “Where are you, Adam?” (Gen 3:9) in *Leg. 3.52* can be seen as a key nexus within *Leg.*, and I use it in this paper as my “lookout tower” from which to zoom in on other Adam-related Philonic passages which it alludes to. I will focus on the second of Philo’s three interpretations of God’s inquiry.²⁵

²⁵ The first interpretation (3.51) is that we may read God’s words not as a question but as a declaration: “Thou art in a place.” This highlights the human inferiority in contrast to God who cannot be said to be in a place, “for He is not contained but contains the universe.” The third interpretation (3.53–55) also has links to other
According to it, the meaning is, “Where have you arrived (ποῦ γέγονας), O soul?” I quote Philo’s elaboration in its entirety, also in Greek because of the importance of the verbal connections to other passages. I print the key terms in bold:

In the place of how great goods, what evils have you chosen for yourself? When God had invited you to participate in virtue, are you going after wickedness, and when He had provided for your enjoyment the tree of life, that is of wisdom whereby you should have power to live, did you gorge yourself with ignorance and corruption, preferring misery, the soul’s death, to happiness, the true life?

This passage is loaded with allusions to Philo’s allegorical interpretations of several other verses of Genesis 2–3. He recapitulates here some of the most important themes of not only Leg. but his Allegorical Commentary more generally. He does this in an extremely concise manner, and it is not easy to comment on this text while at the same time trying to hold back a flood of Philonic intricacies from inundating the reader. Thus I will proceed with the following steps. I will first outline some of the main elements of the Philonic context and background of Leg. 3.52 (section 2.1). Second, I will point out in more detail the connections of this passage to some of the most important other passages within Leg. (2.2). I will then present some complementary viewpoints related mainly to the question of the universality vs. protologicality of Leg. 1.31–32 parts of Leg. The gist is that the hiding Adam represents the wicked, placeless and unstable soul.

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(2.3). Finally, I will discuss some tradition-historical links to Plato’s Timaeus and the book of Wisdom (2.4) before the summary and conclusions (section 3).

2.1 The Philonic Context and Background of Leg. 3.52
The biblical Paradise narrative is a protological account. By way of a myth, it tells us what happened in the dawn of the human race. But in his universal understanding of the story, Philo is first and foremost engaged in developing his grand allegory of the soul in which the basic fabric is ethical: shunning the passions and pleasures and keeping the senses under the control of the mind, i.e., living the life of virtue. Into this fabric he weaves anthropological strands by, e.g., discussing the nature of the different parts of the soul, and also some soteriological ones by sometimes declaring but mostly only implying where the life of virtue will lead. But when it comes to individual eschatology, all we have are hints—especially regarding the post-mortem consequences of failing to live the life of virtue. Fortunately for us, Philo is usually quite consistent with his hints.

To begin with a natural question: How come Adam the “earthly mind” represents the wicked (or more generally, imperfect) soul already at his creation in Gen 2:7? That does not fit the six-stage model. My answer is that because Philo subjects most of Genesis 2–3 to a universalizing allegorization, we should not try to extract his protological views from it. In other words, save for a few isolated statements (see below), his interpretation of Gen 2:7 in Leg. 1.31–

27 To be sure, protological issues are discussed in Leg., the most important being (1) how and why the human makeup came to be what it is in terms of, first and foremost, the mind (Adam), sense-perception (Eve) and body, and (2) the ur-transgression and its consequences. E.g., 2.24 is a clearly protological passage on how “the completeness of the whole soul” was the reason for God’s creating sense-perception as a helper to the mind (exegesis of Gen 2:18, 21).
42 is does not concern the creation of the first human being or that of the human race.  

By contrast, Leg. 3.52 seems a perfectly protological passage, describing Adam’s wrong choice and its dire consequences. Indeed, we may compare it with two definitely protological passages from the Exposition of the Law and find clear connections:

Opif. 152 (ex. Gen 2:23): "this desire [between the first man and woman] also gave rise to bodily pleasure, which is the starting-point of wicked and law-breaking deeds, and on its account they

Virt. 205 (no specific lemma cited): "he eagerly chose the false, shameful and evil things disregarding those that are good and excellent and true, on which account he fittingly exchanged an immortal life for a mortal one and, forfeiting

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28 Scholars who are nearest to my position are those who have seen here a combination of creation and salvation, Gerhard Sellin even mentioning, in his comments on Leg. 1.32, the option that only salvation is meant: "Philo spricht hier eigentlich gar nicht oder nicht nur vom vergangenen Schöpfungsakt, sondern von einer jeweils möglichen Inspiration, also von einem soteriologischen Vorgang" (Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung von 1 Korinther 15 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1986] 104–5). Other scholars with similar views (to be discussed below) are Joseph Pascher, who in Η ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ ΟΔΟΣ: Der Königsweg zur Wiedergeburt und Vergöttung bei Philon von Alexandrea (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Bd. 17, Heft 3 & 4, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 1931) 127 writes: "Die Perikope ist eine seltsame Mischung von Schöpfungs- und Erlösungslehre," and Karl-Gustav Sandelin, who in Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Weisheit in 1. Korinther 15 (diss. Åbo Akademi University, Åbo 1976) 35 comments Pascher’s words just cited by saying they are said "mit Recht," although he also has some reservations.

29 Runia, On the Creation, 359 calls Virt. 205 “[a] very similar formulation” to Opif. 152 and characterizes Leg. 3.52 as “[e]xactly the same interpretation of the paradise story in these terms,” i.e., those of εὐδαιμονία and κακοδαιμονία. The Virt. passage contains many verbal links to Plato’s description of the process of reincarnation in Timaeus 42bc (for an analysis, see Yli-Karjanmaa, "Philo of Alexandria," in Harold Tarrant, François Renaud, Dirk Baltzly and Danielle A. Layne Moore [eds], A Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity [Leiden: Brill, forthcoming]). A fourth passage, very similar especially to Leg. 3.52, is QG 1.45 (also ex. Gen 3:9); e.g., “Giving up immortality and a blessed life, you have gone over to death and unhappiness, in which you have been buried.”
exchange the life of immortality and well-being (εὐδαιμονίας) for the life of mortality and misfortune (κακοδαιμονίας)."

Indeed, *Leg.* 3.52 too *can* be read protologically, not least because in the Philonic way of thinking, where the life in the body on earth represents a temporary state of degradation, some sort of original fall is in any case implied. Yet I would maintain that a reader who has read all of *Leg.* that precedes it is inclined to take another line of interpretation soon to be discussed. One important thing is that the culpability lies in the *wrong choice* made by the human mind. While *Leg.* 3.52 wears the garb of biblical protologicality, it is, in actual substance and when closely read, a universal characterization of the self-induced human plight. Additionally, by telling us what Adam forfeited, it also reveals what the fallen soul can look forward to if it manages to put an end to its state of death, i.e., corporealization.

### 2.2 Allusions in *Leg.* 3.52 to Allegorical Interpretations of Genesis 2–3

Elsewhere in *Leg.*

It is warranted to first note that the positive and negative elements in *Leg.* 3.52 appear in clear pairs and can be juxtaposed as follows:

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<th>goods</th>
<th>vs.</th>
<th>evils</th>
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<tr>
<td>virtue</td>
<td>vs.</td>
<td>wickedness</td>
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<tr>
<td>“tree of life,” i.e., wisdom</td>
<td>vs.</td>
<td>ignorance and corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>leading to power to live</td>
<td>vs.</td>
<td>misery, the soul’s death</td>
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<tr>
<td>happiness, the true life</td>
<td>vs.</td>
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If these elements are placed in the six-stage model, it is clear that the negative ones belong to the stages of corporealization (3) and reincarnation (4). In locating the positive ones it is not really possible to differentiate between the stages (1) to (2) and (5) to (6), because these elements are equally present in the state from which the mind fell and the one to which it should aspire to return.

I will next go over some of the key expressions of *Leg.* 3.52 related to Philo’s understanding of the character of Adam and his allegorical significance as the corporealized mind.

1. The Invitation to Virtue. Philo admonishes Adam, “God had invited you to participate in virtue”: καλέσαντός σε τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς μετουσίαν ἀρετῆς. One might think that the referent of this is to be found in Gen 2:15 (the man was to “till and keep” the orchard) or even 2:16–17 (which trees to eat and not to eat from). However, what Philo is alluding to is his own universal interpretation of the breath of life of Gen 2:7. This is clear based on the very similar expression in *Leg.* 1.34 where Philo tells us why it was the “earth-born and body-loving” and not the heavenly human that God considered worthy of the breath:

   God loves to give, and so bestows good things on all, also those who are not perfect, at the same time encouraging them to a zeal for virtue and a participation in it (προκαλούμενος αὐτούς εἰς μετουσίαν καὶ ζηλον ἀρετῆς) by displaying his overflowing wealth.

This is a good example of the fact that we cannot hope to accurately determine the protologicality vs. universality of *Leg.* 3.52 without taking into account the allusions it contains. The universality of the breath of life is discussed in more detail below.

2. The True Life. As we saw (p. 259), Philo states in 1.32, “This mind is in fact earthlike, and corruptible, were not God to ‘breath’ to it a power of true life (δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς).” In *Leg.* 1.35 Philo then gives one of his answers to the question why the recipient of the breath was the earthly and not the heavenly human: Nobody who has not been granted experience in virtue, i.e., “one into whom true life (ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς) has not been ‘breathed,”’
can be held *accountable* his or her wrong actions. Again, a connection between the breath of life and virtue is implied. Philo here also equates the inexperience in virtue with inexperience in *good* (τὸ ἁγαθόν) resulting from God’s (hypothetically) having “failed to breathe into him any conception (ἐννοίαν) of it.” Thus the breath of life seems best understood as something that makes the soul *capable* of virtue.\(^{31}\) The *true life* and the *life of virtue* (see below) are thus hardly distinguishable.\(^{32}\)

**3. The Life of the Tree: Wisdom that Enables the Soul to Live.**

The centrality of the concept of *life* to Philo’s allegorization of Adam’s adventures is manifest in its three occurrences in *Leg.* 3.52.\(^{33}\) The two remaining ones are contained in his characterization of the tree of life: it is really one “of wisdom whereby you should have power to live.”\(^{34}\) If we look up Philo’s interpretation of the tree of life in *Leg.* (1.56, 59, 61), we find it intertwined with that of Paradise (1.43–54). Both represent virtue planted in the soul, Paradise also wisdom and “the right principle” (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος). In his exegesis of Gen 2:8 in *Leg.* 1.43 ff. Philo first

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\(^{31}\) Cf. Gregory Sterling’s statement, based on *Plant.* 17–23 (where Philo refers to Gen 1:27, 2:7 and Ex 31:3): “The inbreathing of the θεῖον πνεῦμα is thus the anthropological basis for the reception of σοφία” (“‘Wisdom among the Perfect:’ Creation Traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” *NT* 37 [1995] 355–384, p. 375). Regarding *Leg.* 1.36–38 (and *Det.* 86–90) he states (ibid.), “Philo thus understands the inbreathed divine image to be the human possibility of experiencing the divine.” In a footnote he refers to Wis 9:9–18, “where wisdom offers the [same] possibility.” However, there it is especially God’s *will* that is being spoken of (vv. 13, 17). But there are points of contact with Philo and Wis in this matter, and these are discussed below (2.4.2). Sterling notes that Philo is discussing Gen 2:7 in *Leg.* 1, and speaks (p. 376) of “Philo’s exegetical treatments of creation” in this context, but he too seems to understand what Philo writes quite universally (and not protologically).

\(^{32}\) These notions are found many times especially in the *Allegorical Commentary* and the *Quaestiones.* See, e.g., *Det.* 48–49, 70; *Post.* 45; *Her.* 292; *Fug.* 55; *Mut.* 213, *Somn.* 2.64, 2.235; *Spec.* 2.170; *QG* 1.16, 1.70, 4.46, 4.240.

\(^{33}\) According to my observations, the concept of life is used almost exclusively in an ethical sense in this treatise.

\(^{34}\) This motif is also visible in *Sir* 24:12–17 and *1 Enoch* 24:4–25:6, 32:3–6; in the present book, see the articles by Aschim and Böttrich, respectively.
connects the pleasance with “the sublime and heavenly wisdom”
(ἡ μετάρσιος καὶ οὐράνιος σοφία) and states that God’s planting it
means that the “earthly wisdom (ἐπίγειον σοφίαν) is a copy of this
as of an archetype.” He soon (1.45) identifies this with God’s sowing
and planting the “earthly virtue (ἐπίγειόν ἀρετήν) into the race of
mortals” and explicitly states that “virtue is figuratively called ‘pleasance’” (ibid.). Later in 1.79 he states, “God sowed in the
earthborn human (τῷ γηγενεῖ) good sense and virtue.”

With regard to the concept of right principle we may note Philo’s
words in 1.46:

And the planting of the pleasance is “towards rising (κατὰ ἀνατολάς),” for the right principle does not set, nor is it quenched,
but its nature is ever to “rise” (ἀνατέλλειν) and . . . so virtue also,
when it has risen (ἀνατείλας) in the soul, illumines (ἐναυγάζει) its
mist and disperses its deep darkness.35

Given these statements, the intimate connection of virtue to the
breath of life and the use of the epithet “earthborn” of Adam
already in the exegesis of Gen 2:7 at Leg. 1.33, it is in my view clear
that in the Philonic allegory the tree of life, Paradise and the breath
of life converge to a large degree: their primary referent is the life
of virtue, i.e., the true life. Thus the original fall must in the Philonic
way of thinking be seen to mean, first and foremost, the rejection of
virtue.36 This is clear in Leg. 3.52, but it appears also in the key
passage on the corporealization of the mind (Leg. 3.252) already
quoted (p. 259): the “foolish mind” has “forsaken the wisdom of
heaven”—and in addition, it “has indeed always been facing away

35 For ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος see Leg. 1.45–46, 92–93; 3.2, 80, 106, 147–148, 150, 168, 222,
251, 252. It is almost always equated with virtue.
36 The available evidence does not allow us to infer if there was in Philo’s view some
kind of collective, original sin in the Christian sense of the concept or if each soul
goes through the six-stage model independently. It seems the sages may be able to
skip stages (3) and (4) (see, e.g., Conf. 77–78), but if some souls were created better,
Philo does not tell us.
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from the right principle."\textsuperscript{37} The connection between virtue and rationality, implied by the fact that the breath of life also makes the earthly mind “intellectual” (νοερός, \textit{Leg.} 1.32), appears also in 3.251: “irrational . . . is the wicked person with the right principle cut out of him.”\textsuperscript{38}

4. The Death of the Soul. The rejection of virtue is also at the very heart of this Philonic notion. By mentioning it in \textit{Leg.} 3.52 Philo refers, no doubt, to his detailed description of it at \textit{Leg.} 1.105–108. The lemma there is Gen 2:17, more specifically the grim prospect of “dying by death.” A key definition of the death of the soul is \textit{dying to the life of virtue} (1.107), which, in the light of the foregoing, alerts us to asking: is the loss of the “breath of life” now in some sense being spoken of? We may try to answer this question by analyzing the extent to which the death of the soul is the opposite of the notions which the “breath” represents. In \textit{Leg.} 3.52 its antagonism with the “true life” is clear.

In \textit{Leg.} 1.107–108 Philo speaks of how the death of the soul comes to an end. If I am at all on the right track, we should be able to find here significant connections to what the “breath of life” means to Philo. And this is what Philo says: the soul can stop being dead by \textit{dying again}, this time \textit{to the life of wickedness}: “[S]hould we die, the soul lives forthwith its own proper life (τῆς ψυχῆς ζωσής τὸν ἰδιον βίον), and is released from the body, the baneful corpse to which it was tied.” This passage has usually been understood to refer to ordinary physical death, but that would in fact not make sense.\textsuperscript{39} This makes the reference to the release from the body all

\textsuperscript{37} ὁ ἄφρων νοῦς ἀπέστραπται μὲν ἀεὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. This expression is part of Philo’s elaboration on the time limit μέχρι ἀποστρέψεις in Gen 3:19 discussed above (p. 260).
\textsuperscript{38} Cf. also 4Q504 f8R 4–5: “You breathed [the breath of life] into his nostrils, [and filled him] with understanding and knowledge.”
\textsuperscript{39} There are three main reasons: (1) Philo has just (1.107) said that the dead soul “is alive only to [the life] of wickedness,” and so that is the only life with respect to which it \textit{can} die. (2) The sentence “should we die . . .” is the second part of a μὲν–δὲ structure whose first part runs, “now that we live, the soul is dead and has been entombed in the body as in a sepulcher.” Surely then the dying takes the soul away
the more noteworthy. We may compare the genitive absolute τῆς ψυχῆς ζωῆς to ψυχήν ζῶσαν in Gen 2:7, which is the basis of “the true life” in Philo’s allegory and is also prominent in his description of the effects of the breath of life in 1.32: “Then it ‘becomes’—no longer is it being ‘moulded’—a soul, not an idle and imperfectly formed soul, but one which is, verily, intellectual and ‘alive.’ For he says, ‘the human being became a living soul.’” The soul’s being “alive” reads most naturally as a description of its virtuous state.

In addition to the concepts of life and death, those of virtue and vice naturally connect Philo’s interpretations of the “breath of life” and “dying by death.” We remember that in Leg. 3.52 “evils” and “wickedness,” i.e., κακά and κακία are presented as the opposites of “goods” and “virtue,” i.e., ἀγαθά and ἀρετή. Wickedness and evil are absent from Philo’s exegesis of Gen 2:7, but implied by, e.g., the discussion of accountability (see point 2 on the true life). The death of the soul means its living the life of wickedness, and so its dying to that life must mean the triumph of virtue.

There is a further link between Philo’s exegeses of Gen 2:7 and 2:17 in Leg. 1. As for the former, Philo at 1.32 says, “We must regard the human from earth to be mind which is entering, but has not yet entered, the body,” and, as already mentioned, he calls Adam “body-loving” in 1.33. Compare this with 1.106 where he says that the death of the soul is “almost the antithesis” of physical death: “The latter is a separation of the body and soul that had been in combination, the former, on the other hand, the coming together (σύνοδος) of the two.” Now we know that σύνοδος was “[a]
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technical term for the union of soul and body in Platonic tradition." And by separately stating that the biblical dying by death does not mean physical death he implies that this too would be a possible interpretation of the situation that his allegory speaks to. The death of the soul is thus something that happens to an already incarnate soul. To me, the interpretation of least resistance is to see this than as a reference to re-incarnation. That the death of the soul is also a called the “penalty-death” (1.107), fits very well.

But why is the Philonic Adam, i.e., the dead soul who can be morally rekindled by God’s “breath of life,” presented as if being on the verge of embodiment? The biblical basis is the words τὸν


42 Given the mirror-image character of the soul’s “own death” and its “own life,” the commencement of the latter, too, takes (or at least can take) place during the incarnation. Cf. QG 1.93: “And since earth is a place of wretchedness, even that heavenly human is a mixture consisting of soul and body; and from his birth until his end he is nothing else than a corpse-bearer.” A contradiction might be seen here with being “released from the body, the baneful corpse” in Leg. 1.108. However, just as the “coming together” of body and soul in 1.106 is a veiled reference to punitive reincarnation, so in 1.108 the gist is the freedom from further embodiments.

43 εἰσκρινόμενον σώματι, οὔπω δ’ εἰσκεκριμένον. Whitaker’s translation here is "mingling with, but not yet blended with, the body;" Tobin’s (The Creation of Man, 111), “a mind mingled with, but not completely blended with, body.” Both are problematic in the light of the Greek (also according to Sellin, Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten, 104 n. 89). Already Whitaker’s “mingling” and “blended” do not reflect correctly the semantic field of εἰσκρίνω (‘enroll’, ‘admit’, ‘cause to enter’, pass. ‘enter into’, ‘penetrate’), and Tobin’s past participle “mingled” for the present-tense form takes us even further from Philo’s text. Moreover, it is hard to understand what the partial blendedness (or partial entrance), implied by Tobin’s translation would mean. His statement that Leg. 1.32 does not “refer to the earthly mind alone but to the whole earthly man composed of body and soul” (ibid., emphasis original) does not find confirmation in Philo’s text. As for the verb εἰσκρίνω, Philo uses it only twice elsewhere and in both cases in the passive to refer to the mind’s (Somn. 1.31) or soul’s (Plant. 14) entrance into the body. Using the words εἰσκρίνω and εἴσκρισις for the soul’s incarnation also seems to belong to Platonist tradition (it is so used by
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ἄνθρωπον and ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς. He transforms them in Leg. 1.32 into “the human out of the earth” (ἄνθρωπον δὲ τὸν ἐκ γῆς). This is now his explanandum, while the expression “entering, but . . . not yet entered, the body” starts the explanatio. Given Philo’s endorsement of reincarnation, he thus seems to be speaking of the soul in its inter-incarnational state. I am at present unable to see why he wants to do that, but there are at least three additional hints that this is indeed what he means. (1) Precisely such a soul Philo calls “body-loving” (φιλοσώματος like in Leg. 1.33; from Plato, Phaedo 68b) also in his locus classicus on reincarnation, Somn. 1.138–139. (2) Philo’s “the human out of the earth” is close to how Plato describes the souls, about to be reborn, who have emerged from their underground journey in the hereafter in the concluding myth of the Republic: τὰς [ψυχὰς] ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας (614e) and, in particular, τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς γῆς (619d). (3) The first

Alcinous, Porphyry, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus and Simplicius). Origen (Comm. in Jn 6.14.85, Cels. 1.32.33) and Epiphanius (Pan. 3.91.15) use them about re-incarnation only.

44 A similar statement about incarnation, but now apparently protological, also occurs at Leg. 2.22. Philo comments that in Gen 2:21 Moses is speaking of a “naked” mind “not yet bound (μήπω ἐνδεδεμένου)” to a body. But here Philo speaks of the mind’s powers and is about “to indicate the origin (γένεσις) of active sense-perception.” Cf. n. 27 above. In Leg. 1.39–40 the senses are already existing; they are (the earthliest) part of the soul in the Stoic view which Philo often applies so their existence does not in itself mean that an embodied soul is discussed.

45 “Of these souls some, those that are closest to the earth and lovers of the body, are descending to be fast bound in mortal bodies, while others are ascending, having again been separated (from the body) according to the numbers and periods determined by nature. Of these last some, longing for the familiar and accustomed ways of mortal life, hurry back again, while others, pronouncing that life great folly, call the body a prison and a tomb but escaping from it as though from a dungeon or a grave are lifted up on light wings to the ether and range the heights for ever.” (Tr. Whitaker with emendations; for “having again been separated (from the body)” (διακριθεῖσα πάλιν) he has as “being selected for return.”

46 Whitaker’s “man made out of the earth” is based on a natural assumption but runs the risk of eliminating the very allusion Philo wants to make.

47 Plato’s only instance of the adjective “heavenly” in the Republic (619e) concerns the inter-incarnational journey of the other souls whose path had taken them to heaven. In addition 619b has curious verbal connections (γῆς, βίου, μεταξύ,
thing Philo says about the incarnating mind is that it is “earthlike” (γεώδης), using an adjective which Plato applies in his explanation of why a body-loving (ἐρωστικός) soul reincarnates: it is “interpenetrated . . . with the corporeal (σωματοειδοῦς) which . . . is burdensome and heavy and earthly (γεώδες) and visible” (Phaedo 81bc).

5. Ignorance. This quality is presented as the opposite of the wisdom represented by the tree of life. But it has more to tell us than just reminding that the transgression meant the loss of wisdom. Let us look at the train of thought that starts in Leg. 3.28. Philo has been engaged in interpreting Gen 3:8 from the outset of Leg. 3. He now begins to clarify the question, where Adam, “the wicked person” and “the exile from virtue” (3.1), hides himself. To ἄγων, τελευτήσεις . . . εἰς), and 619e thematic links (calling the afterlife a road, either τροχεία or λεία), to Leg. 3.253.

Sandelin’s suggestion that with his language of “entrance” Philo in Leg. 1.32 refers to, in effect, the mind’s corporealization is worth noting but ultimately not convincing. He first identifies what Philo in Leg. 1.93, 95 calls the “neutral (μέσος) mind” with the mind entering the body: it has not yet fallen prey to the body, “obwohl er in einer Verbindung mit dem Körper steht” (Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Weisheit, 34). He refers to Leg. 1.103 f., where, however, Philo no longer utilizes the concept of neutral mind but instead discusses the wicked person’s need for a body, and I fail to see any connection to 1.32. Sandelin goes on to suggest that the mind that has entered the body (1.32) is one that has been defeated by, and tightly bound to, the body which has now turned into a grave (1.106; i.e., the corporealized mind in my terminology). I think the meanings of εἰσκρίνω are difficult to reconcile with this interpretation (see n. 44). In my view both 1.32 and 1.106 mention incarnation in a concrete sense. Sellin for his part (Die Streit um die Auferstehung, 108) is held captive by his view that protology is also involved: “Der irdische Nous ist also nach All 1 32 als ein solcher mit πνοή erfüllt, der noch nicht vom Körper gebunden ist. Er ist noch frei, sich dem Himmel oder der Erde anheimzugeben.” This statement overlooks the fact that whatever understanding of Leg. 1.31–32 we come up with, it should also be applicable to 3.252–253, where the actual cause for the mind’s earthiness is given.

Cf. Adam’s prayer in Sefer Raziel ha-Malakh cited in Töyrylä’s article in the forthcoming volume SRB 8: “For from the moment I ate from the tree of knowledge and transgressed against your words, my wisdom was taken from me and I am ignorant and stupid, with no understanding of what is going to happen.”

The verse runs, “And both Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God in the midst of the timber of the orchard.”
condense his explanation: hiding “in the midst of the timber” suggests him the human mind in “the centre of what we may call the garden of the whole soul.” And what hiding in the mind means is that “he who runs away from God takes refuge in himself.” And this is very bad, because it represents the opposite of the right opinion (3.31) of “refer[ring] all things to God” (3.29). This delusional self-sufficiency (typically οἴησις in Philo) is “akin to boorish ignorance (ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας συγγενές)” (3.33). This, I think, is the background against which the reference to ignorance in Leg. 3.52 should be seen.

Up to Leg. 3.36 the main connecting thought is the contrast between the right and wrong opinion, to illustrate which Philo uses two secondary lemmas, Ex 22:1–2 at 3.32–35 to discuss οἴησις, and Deut 27:15 at 3.36 to deal with another false opinion, now about God’s nature, linked with “the soul’s sore malady of ignorance.” At 3.37 Philo takes yet another secondary lemma, Ex 2:12 and chooses a different way to interpret Adam’s hiding: “That the wicked person sinks down into his own incoherent (σποράδα) mind as he strives to avoid Him that is, we shall learn from Moses who ‘struck the Egyptian and hid him in the sand.’” In Philo’s interpretation (3.37–38), the hiding of the dead Egyptian—who represents the things of the body, the pleasures and human passion—ends up meaning, “this man has hidden himself in himself.”

But what links Adam’s ignorance to his corporealization? We would gain much additional light from the now lost original second book of Leg. (covering Gen 3:1b–8a, i.e., including the act of transgression). We have already seen the connections between ignorance, the wrong opinion, the mind’s taking refuge in itself, its

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51 Pace Whitaker’s “has been hidden away in himself” for ἀποκέκρυπται εἰς ἑαυτον. I think we must take the meaning as middle and not passive. There is really no place for the all-wise Moses as the implied agent of the wicked person’s shunning God. Cf. Leg. 3.1 where “the exile from virtue has by incurring such exile hidden himself from God (ἀποκέκρυπται θεόν)” (tr. Whitaker).

52 I think it is likely that Philo inverts the situation to the effect that the tree of knowledge of good and evil turns out to be an epitome of ignorance. Cf. “did you gorge yourself (ἐνεφορήθης) with ignorance” in Leg. 3.52.
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hiding and its deportation from virtue. But there is another link, the sand. It represents the Egyptian’s becoming hidden in his “incoherent (σποράδι) and unstable mind, devoid of contact and union with the noble” (3.38). This sentence points to Philo’s interpretations of both Gen 2:7 and 3:19 in the following way. As we saw (p. 259), the earthly human is, according to Philo, “compacted out of incoherent matter (σποράδος ὑλης), which [Moses] has called ‘dust.’” We cannot take this at face value. In Philo’s thought the incorporeal mind cannot consist of “matter” any more than it can be “earthly” in a concrete sense. Thus we should understand him meaning the incoherent and matter-oriented, i.e., corporealized mind, which connects very well with incoherent sand being the symbol of the wicked mind in 3.37–38—and with Adam’s being “ranked with things earthly (γεώδεσι) and incohesive (ἀσύστατοις)” in 3.252.

53 ἐν τῷ σποράδι καὶ πεφορημένῳ νῷ, δς συμφυΐας καὶ ἑνώσεως τῆς πρὸς καλὸν ἑστέρηται. I think Mangey’s conjecture συμπεφορημένῳ accepted by Whitaker is unnecessary. Cf. Congr. 58, where the name of Eliphaz (which means, “God hath dispersed (διέσπειρεν) me”; see §56) inspires Philo to introduce, as a tertiary biblical lemma, Deut. 32:8: “when the Highest divided the nations, when He dispersed (διέσπειρεν) the sons of Adam.” This, so Philo, is said about bad souls (φαῦλοι) and means that

He drove away all the earthly characters (γηίνους τρόπους), who have no real desire to look on any heaven-sent good, and made them homeless and cityless (ἀοίκους καὶ ἀπόλις), scattered (σποράδας) in very truth. [The bad person is] unstable and scattered (σπείρεται), driven about on every side (πάνῃ φορούμενος) … Three things to note: (1) the connection between σπόρας and (δια)σπείρω, and (2) the additional connection to Philo’s views of Adam’s “hiding” formed by the adjectives ἄοικος and ἄπολις which twice characterize him in Leg. 3.2–3. (3) The theme of banishment dominates the section Congr. 57–59. In §§ 57, 59 Philo states that God banishes the wicked souls to the land of the impious, which is not the mythical Hades but the life of the wicked in the body. For a fuller treatment, see Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo, 65–66.

54 Note that ὑλη is a philosophical word for matter used from Aristotle onwards (LSJ).

55 In Fug. 9 Philo sees a parallelism between “matter devoid of quality (ἀποιος ὑλη)” and an “ignorant and untutored soul (ἀμαθῆς ψυχῆ καὶ ἀπαιδαγώγητος).”

56 That dust and sand could plausibly be called ἀσύστατος is testified to by Plato, who in Timaeus 61a discusses the two states of the element earth: it can be either
There is a further, more direct but also more speculative connection between ignorance and incohesive substances: the word ἄμαθος. This is an epic form of ἄμμος (‘sand’). Although Philo never uses the word himself, I cannot imagine his having been ignorant about it.57 This word demonstrates the plausibility of assuming a connotative connection between ἄμαθία (ignorance) and ἄμμος and, by extension, sporadic materials like the dust of Gen 2:7, which Philo in Leg. 1.31 connects to the corporealization of the mind in the way just described. The word ἄμαθία appears at the end of Leg. 3.36, just 10 and 27 words before σπόρας and ἄμμος, respectively, and it is in my view probable that either it provided the impulse for Philo to quote Ex 2:12 with the hiding in sand, or he intentionally ended his exegesis of Deut 27:15 with a reference to ignorance in anticipation of the following secondary, “sandy” lemma.

As the final point regarding ignorance, it is warranted to see what the hiding, ignorant mind’s being “devoid of contact and union with the noble” at 3.38 is related to: the words ἑνώσεως τῆς πρὸς καλὸν seem to have a link to the breath of life. We already saw that in Leg. 1.35 Philo refers to the breath as conception of good (ἀγαθοῦ) which God inbreathe (p. 267). In 1.36 he starts examining the nature of the inbreathing in more detail: “that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind, that which is inhaled is the breath.” He then (1.37) states: “A union (ἕνωσις) of the three comes about as God projects the power that proceeds from Himself through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject;” this then enables the soul to “conceive of God” (1.38). The adjectives καλὸς and ἀγαθὸς are not full synonyms but close enough so that Leg. 3.38 can be plausibly read together with 1.35–

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57 It appears once in Homer (Il. 5.587), whom Philo knew well. Furthermore, there are the words ψάμμος (used by Philo a few times) and ψάμαθος (20 occurrences in Homer, six in Euripides etc.) which also mean sand.
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38. Philo certainly does not use καλός in an aesthetic sense here; cf. his allusion to God’s planting the pleasance in 1.49: “God sows and plants noble qualities (τὰ καλά) in the soul.” And since this is presented in parallel to his view that “it becomes God to plant and to build virtues in the soul” (1.48), we can again on good grounds see both the breath of life and Paradise in the background; the mind hiding in the “sand” is “breathless” and corporealized.

To sum up: At first sight Leg. 3.52 simply provides us with a summary of Adam’s failure to live up to his high calling. But beneath the surface we also find a network of allusions to concepts that refer to the human mind’s corporealization which makes it liable to reincarnation. However, this state is not irrevocable: God’s “breath of life” can enliven the dead soul to live the true life of virtue.

2.3 Further Viewpoints about the Universality vs. Protologicality of Leg. 1.31–42

There is noteworthy similarity between Philo’s words in Leg. 1.31 (“there are two [διττά] types of humans”) and Leg. 1.105 (“death is of two kinds [διττός]”). The statements come right (§31) or soon (§105) after Philo has quoted his main biblical lemma in which only one human/death is mentioned, so they serve to guide the audience to taking a wider perspective, to distance themselves from the biblical narrative. In so doing they prepare the ground for the universal allegorization that is to follow in each case.

However, it is warranted to also acknowledge the protological elements in the exegesis of Gen 2:7 in Leg. 1. The clearest such statement is in 1.34 where God “created (ἐδημιούργησεν) no soul barren of good, even if the exercise of it be to some impossible.” This is in harmony with what we noted Philo saying in 1.35; all

58 See, e.g., Plato, Republic 505ab for an example of the proximity of the concepts.
59 Here is another point that reminds us of the need to take the whole Philonic allegory of the biblical Paradise story universally, if nothing specifically points to protology: the garden is within the soul. In this scheme there is (literally) no place for a first human being.
Souls have the ability to be virtuous; otherwise they could not be held accountable. It is worth noting how thin the protological strand is compared to the universalizing material—and how little use it makes of the text of Gen 2:7. Philo’s moving between the two types of allegory happens without warning. In 1.34 he starts the explanation at the universal level by referring to “also those who are not perfect” as the recipients of the call to virtue, and concludes it in the protological the way discussed.\(^{60}\) If we try to summarize Philo’s main point, we might say that the ability to be virtuous is a power that was given to each soul at the beginning, but it is also something that they may get back in case they have lost it.

The question of the type of allegory becomes acute when Philo conditions the mind’s earthlikeness, “were not God to breath (ἐι μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν) to it a power of true life” (1.32). The combination here, the present indicative (ἐστί) in the apodosis and the aorist optative in the protasis, belongs to the “less frequent . . . but no less ‘regular’” ones, the reference being “to general present time.”\(^{61}\) Philo is thus saying that Adam is earthlike unless and until God breaths the power of true life to him, not that Adam would have remained earthlike, had God not breathed the breath of life into him.\(^{62}\) And we noted above that in his exegesis of Gen 2:16 at Leg. 1.90 Philo calls Adam “the earthly and corruptible mind”—as if the

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\(^{60}\) In between there are examples from the natural world of God’s overflowing abundance even in cases where no great benefit follows: “He rains upon the sea” corresponds to why the heavenly human does not need the “breath of life,” whereas God’s “caus[ing] springs to gush forth in the depths of the desert” seems to refer souls that are so wicked that they cannot (for the time being, at least) be the recipients of the “breath.”


\(^{62}\) This is the problem with Sterling's translation, “This earthly mind is in reality also corruptible, except God breathed into (ἐμπνεύσειεν) it a power of true life.” (“Wisdom among the Perfect,” 364). Sellin, *Die Streit um die Auferstehung*, 104 n. 90 criticizes Heinemann’s translation in L. Cohn, I. Heinemann et al., *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in deutscher Übersetzung* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1909–64) vol. 3, p. 27 for this same reason, i.e., making the option of God’s not inbreathing the breath unreal.
breath had had no effect! This observation alone should deter us from attempting a protological reading of Philo’s view of the breath of life. It is also worthwhile noticing that since in the biblical narrative there is no ambiguity about the breathing taking place we must conclude that Philo wants to introduce contingency. An understanding of Philo’s text in which contingency has no role is thus likely to miss something.

If and when the possibility of receiving the power of true life is realized, a significant change takes place in the soul. First of all we may note that it is transferred from “being moulded” to “becoming” (1.32). The former is of course related to the earthly human by the verb πλάσσω used in Gen 2:7, but what about the latter? That verb too, γίνομαι, appears in 2:7: Adam “became” a living soul—so, whence the distinction? The answer is that in Leg. 1.31–32 there is a systematic antagonism between γεγονώς, γέννημα, κατ’ εἰκόνα, and τετυπῶσθαι — used of the heavenly human — and ἐπάγη, πλάσμα, and πεπλάσθαι concerning the earthly one. In fact, this antagonism gives us good grounds to state that in Philo’s exegesis...

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63 Sandelin, Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Weisheit, 33 calls this “eine merkwürdige Diskrepanz.” But he expects Philo’s allegory to follow a chronology, and in my view this expectation is the cause of the discrepancy. It also forces Sandelin to assume that the breath of life was very weak and that the νοῦς was “auch nach der Einhauchung bei der Schöpfung vergänglich” (p. 37). Referring to Pascher (Ἡ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ ΟΔΟΣ, 131) he posits “eine zweite Einhauchung” (ibid.) which brings about the mind’s true life, freedom from the body etc., i.e., it enables the mind to reach “dieselbe Stellung wie der himmlische Mensch, der nach dem Abbild des Abbildes Gottes geschaffen worden ist” (ibid.). But in fact Pascher’s remark “[d]ie zweite Erteilung des Pneuma is die Erlösung” pertains to Iranian religion; he apparently presents it as a phenomenon comparable to the correspondence between creation and salvation in Philo’s interpretation of Gen 2:7 in Leg. 1. It would be natural to connect the statement that “He created no soul barren of good” to a protological “breath of life” (in which case the virtue-endowing “breath” would be the second one”), but we need to be clear on the fact that Philo himself does not speak of two different “breaths.”

64 Philo apparently saw resemblance (being an image or a stamp) and being an offspring as closely related. Cf. Leg. 1.10: “for at about the age of fourteen we are able to produce offspring like ourselves (τὸ ὅμοιον γεννᾶν).”
the breath of life turns the earthly human into a heavenly one.\textsuperscript{65}

Compare especially the following expressions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The heavenly human \textit{(Leg. 1.31)}</th>
<th>The earthly human after receiving the breath of life \textit{(Leg. 1.32)}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- κατ’ εἰκόνα γεγονώς</td>
<td>- γίνεται (νοεράν καὶ ζώσαν ὄντως)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- κατ’ εἰκόνα τετυπώσθαι</td>
<td>- οὐκ ἀδιατύπωτον (ἐτύπωσε ἐν 1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- φθαρτής + γεώδους οὐσίας ἀμέτοχος</td>
<td>- οὐκ ἀργόν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- οὐ πεπλάσθαι</td>
<td>- οὐκέτι πλάττεται</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But is the idea that the post-breath earthly human is the same as (or equal to) the heavenly human applicable in the rest of Philo’s interpretation of Gen 2:7? It is particularly challenging for this interpretation that in \textit{Leg.} 1.42 Philo discusses the \textit{distinction} between “breath” (πνοή) and “spirit” (πνεῦμα), connecting the former with the earthly mind and the latter with the after-the-image mind. However, his language is not very determined here (“implying a difference,” “might be said”). Based on 1.33, 37 I think Philo means that πνεῦμα \textit{is called} πνοή in Gen 2:7.\textsuperscript{66} My impression

\textsuperscript{65} Cf. Sandelin, \textit{Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Weisheit}, 31: “Mann kann also sagen, dass Gott durch das Einhauchen der Kraft des wahrhaftigen Lebens den νοῦς γεώδης irgendwie dem himmlischen Menschen ähnlich macht.” Sellin, \textit{Die Streit um die Auferstehung}, 106 similarly writes, “Die Pneuma-Inspiration macht den Erdmenschen (Typ des Sterblichen) zum Himmelsmenschen (Typ des Unsterblichen).” But when he continues, “Die Urmenschlehre in All [=Leg.] ist also soteriologisch angelegt,” he is not able to let go of the protological understanding of \textit{Leg.} 1.31–32. But he rightly notes the similar ways in which the heavenly human and the earthly, post-breath human are described, including ἐτύπωσε in \textit{Leg.} 1.38 (pp. 105–6, 108). See below.

\textsuperscript{66} Pace, e.g., Richard A. Horsley, “How Can Some of You Say,” \textit{NT} 20 (1978) 203–31, p. 219 n. 38. My view is supported by Philo’s not always sticking to the πνοή of the biblical text but replacing it with πνεῦμα in direct quotations of Gen 2:7 in \textit{Leg.} 3.161 and \textit{Det.} 80. And he does use πνεῦμα for the πνοή of Gen 2:7 also at \textit{Leg.} 1.37, which I take as evidence of Philo’s thinking that πνεῦμα is the right \textit{biblical} category here, rather than of his inconsistency (so Sellin, \textit{Die Streit um die Auferstehung}, 107). Regarding the grammar of \textit{Leg.} 1.42 (esp. ὡς διαφορὰς οὕσης and ἀν λέγοιτο), cf. §§ 1824, 1826, 1828 and 2086c in Smyth, \textit{A Greek Grammar}. 

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is that Philo is trying to come up with some explanation for πνοή which he sees as slightly anomalous, “less substantial” as it is. The justification he offers is that “the reasoning faculty [of the after-the-image human] possesses robustness.”67 This does not make clear the reason for the difference implied, but the “mind out of matter,” which is first without the breath and then receives it, could be thought to have, at first, a lower status than the after-the-image mind, for which we have no information of an earlier, lower state.68 Admittedly, however, this is speculation.

More generally, I think it is very important to note that πνεῦμα is not a Philonic category, but a biblical one.69 What this means is that we should remember always to see “spirit” within quotation marks in Philo: πνεῦμα – when it occurs in a “spiritual” sense70 – is

67 Whitaker’s “the mind that was made out of matter must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air” is erroneous in two ways marked with italics. First, Philo does not speak of being made here (ὁ δὲ [νοῦς] ἐκ τῆς ὕλης), and second, changing the “might be said,” used about the image-mind, now into “must be said” for ἄν λέγοιτο – which is not repeated in the Greek text – is wholly arbitrary. Manuél Ceglarek (Die Rede von der Gegenwart Gottes, Christi und Geistes: Eine Untersuchung zu den Briefen des Apostels Paulus [Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 23, Bd. 911, Frankfurt: Peter Lang 2011] 135) presents both too straightforward an understanding (“der Verstand nimmt nun am göttlichen Geist teil [νοῦς πνεύματος ἄν λέγοιτο κεκοινωνηκέναι"] and contextualization (he does not notice it relates to Gen 1:27 and not 2:7).

68 I suggest connecting the image-mind with stages 1–2 of the six-stage model and the post-breath mind with stages 5–6. Thus, the once “earthly” mind will ultimately reach the “heavenly” status, since stages (1) and (6) represent the same state.

69 So also Goodenough, “Philo on Immortality,” 95. He surmises the reason to have been that “because πνεῦμα had the Stoic aura of materialism.”

70 After examining all the occurrences of πνεῦμα within the Allegorical Commentary, I conclude that almost all instances are categorizable as either references to the biblical text (Leg. 1.33, 34, 37, 42. 3.161; Det. 80, 81, 83, 84; Gig. 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 47, 53, 55; Deus 2; Agr. 44; Plant. 18, 24, 44; Her. 55, 57, 265; Fug. 186; Mut. 123) or to physical phenomena such as breathing or wind – also in metaphorical senses (Leg. 1.91, 3.14, 53, 223; Cher. 13, 37, 38; Sacr. 97; Det. 17, Post. 22, Gig. 9, 10; Deus 26, 60, 84, 98; Agr. 174; Ebr. 106; Migr. 148, 217; Her. 208; Congr. 133; Somn. 1.30, 2.13, 67, 85, 86, 143, 166). There are two examples related to the Stoic concept of cohesion (Ἐξίς Deus 35, Her. 242). In Fug. 182 the word perhaps needs to be conjecturally corrected to ῥεῦμα (which we have in the parallel in Leg.
always part of the explanandum: something to be explained, in practice, away. Thus using the words like "spirit" and πνεῦμα in descriptions of Philo's thought is not helpful: it leaves open how Philo interpreted the word.\textsuperscript{71} Not making this distinction will lead to confused and forced reconstructions of Philo's thought.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} This is the problem with statements like "Scholars do agree that Philo refers to a universal πνεῦμα θεῖον, which is given to all human beings at creation (\textit{Leg.} 1.31-38; cf. Opif. 134-147; \textit{Her.} 56; \textit{Det.} 80)" (Finny Philip, \textit{The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology: The Eschatological Bestowal of the Spirit upon Gentiles in Judaism and in the Early Development of Paul's Theology} [WUNT 2.194, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2005] 104) and "According to Philo, this divine πνεῦμα is breathed into every human soul at creation" (Robert P. Menzies, \textit{The Development of Early Christian Pneumatology with Special Reference to Luke–Acts}, JSNTSup 54 [Sheffield: JSOT 1991] 64). Here also the words "breathed into" represent Gen 2:7 and not Philo's interpretation thereof. Ceglarek's claim (\textit{Die Rede von der Gegenwart Gottes}, 134) that πνεῦμα "gehört jetzt zum Sein des Menschen und ist ein Teil seiner Natur" bears the same fault. Sterling, with statements like "the πνεῦμα/νοῦς is an unconditional part of humanity" and "Philo regularly associates πνεῦμα with νοῦς" ("Wisdom among the Perfect," 375–76) also fails to take the sobering step from the biblical category to the Philonic one.

\textsuperscript{72} E.g., Ceglarek (\textit{Die Rede von der Gegenwart Gottes}, 138–39) differentiates between "der Schöpfungsgeist" and a contingent "göttliche Geist" in Philo. As for the first one, following his discussion of \textit{Leg.} 1.33–42 Ceglarek states (p. 135) that the divine spirit
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Conversely, taking account of it will help us see more clearly what Philo is aiming at and wanting to say. This issue is naturally not restricted to πνεῦμα but to all biblical concepts which Philo does not want to use as such but has a tendency to translate into something else. One example of this is that we cannot infer anything from the fact that Philo nowhere says anything like “the breath of life can be lost.” But if we substitute, on good grounds, something like “the ability to be virtuous” for the breath, we immediately arrive at a highly central concept of Philo’s, the death of the soul.

2.4 Some Tradition-historical Observations

2.4.1 The Timaeus
Philo denies that Adam becomes an “an idle (ἀργόν) and imperfectly formed (ἀδιατύπωτον) soul” as a result of the “breath of life.” His approaching the matter through negation makes me think the point is not merely to say that the soul ἐνεργός and διατύπωτος. He seems to want to specifically refer to the qualities of idleness and imperfect formation (or being imperfectly stamped). It is worth noting that also in 1.38 Philo uses partly similar language in explaining his view of what the breath of life means.

For how could the soul have conceived of God, had He not “breathed into” it and mightily laid hold of it? For the human mind would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself, so far as it was possible that the human mind should be drawn up, and stamped it is a gift received at creation and "kann auf keinerlei Weise verloren werden." But Philo does not say this. Instead, as Ceglarek also notes and we have seen above, he in Leg. 1.36–38 interprets the biblical "breath" as a giver of the ability to receive a conception of God. With regard to the second, Ceglarek appeals to Gig. 19–33 where, however, Philo identifies the visit by “God’s spirit” (Gen 6:3) with the ability to "receive a conception of the best" (§20), ultimately, of things divine (§30). Ceglarek’s distinction operates on biblical categories and so remains at the level of the explanandum.
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(ἐτύπωσε) with the powers that are within the scope of its understanding.

This is a further indication that what Philo sees the “breath” as effecting is the “heavenlification” of the soul or mind. The strong language gives us a reason to see significant soteriological implications here.

It may be noted that the combination of ἀργός and ἀδιατύπωτος occurs in the whole TLG corpus only twice, both in Philo: Leg. 1.32 and Somn. 1.29. The latter passage, however, merely reinforces the apparent fact that something unrefined is meant. However, in Opif. 65 we find a very similar expression that is much more interesting. The subject is the creation of the animal kingdom:

The most sluggish and least delineated (ἀργοτάτη καὶ ἥκιστα τετυπωμένη) type of soul has been allotted to the kind of the fishes, the most developed (ἀκριβεστάτη) and in every respect the best type has been assigned to the kind of the human beings.

I do not mean that we should simply transfer the referent of “the most sluggish and least delineated” to Leg. 1.32 and conclude that Philo is denying Adam’s becoming a fishy, or more generally, an animal-like soul. But I do suggest that before we dismiss the possibility of there being a reference to animal souls we should take a look at Platonic psychology in the Timaeus. In Plato the mind

Sandelin, Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Weisheit, 35 calls this “[eine] Beschreibung des natürlichen Menschen” and finds it “übertrieben” as such. But he goes on to refer to Joseph Pascher’s view (Η ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ ΟΔΟΣ, 129) of this passage as being about the creation of the heavenly human out of the earthly human. Sandelin partially accepts this but maintains that also the creation of the earthly human is described in Leg. 1.32, 37–38. He attributes the resulting tension to Philo’s using a tradition according to which the “breath” of Gen 2:7 was seen also as “eine Prägung (cf. Gen1,27)” and interpreted to mean the birth of a sage.

Philo is discussing which of our four constituents (body, senses, speech and mind) we can comprehend and says of the voice that it “does not produce simply just an idle sound and unshapen noise (φωνὴν ἀργὴν καὶ ἀδιατύπωτον ἦχον).” More relevant is that Mos. 2.136, Spec. 1.21 and Flacc. 148 show that ἀργός as such is a natural attribute of ὅλη in the sense of raw material.
(νοῦς) is not an appellation of the leading, rational part of the soul in the same way as it is in Philo. For instance, we read in Tim. 51e that “of mind only the gods [partake] and but a small class of humans.” And in the cycle, or perhaps rather spiral, of reincarnation the progress or otherwise of the soul in successive embodiments, i.e., either towards higher or lower forms of life, depends on νοῦς: “both then and now living creatures keep passing into one another in all these ways, as they undergo transformation by the loss or by the gain of reason and unreason (νοῦ καὶ ἄνοιας)” (92c). E.g., the souls of animals living in water derive from “the most utterly thoughtless and stupid (ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἄνοητοτάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων)” humans; they are characterized by an “extremity of witlessness (ἀμαθίας)” (92b). The reason why human souls fall into animals has to do with malfunctions in those revolutions within the soul that are the hallmark of Timaean psychology. Each of the three parts of the soul (the rational, the courageous, and the desireful) has its own motions, and the one “which remains in idleness (ἐν ἀργίᾳ) and stays with its own motions in repose, necessarily becomes weakest” (89e). And it is a characteristic of the souls that are downgraded from humans to the highest animals that the revolutions of the rational part of the soul “have been distorted by disuse (ὑπὸ ἀργίας)” (91e–92a). However, it is not only animal souls that suffer from the irrationality caused by distorted movements of the intellect: “now as in the beginning, so often as the soul is bound within a mortal body it becomes at first irrational (ἄνους)” (44b). Gradually, “the revolutions calm down . . . and thereby they render their possessor intelligent (ἔμφρονα)” (ibid.). If all goes well, a person “becomes wholly sound and faultless, having escaped the worst of maladies” (i.e., ignorance; 44c).75 If not, “after passing a lame existence in life (χωλὴν τοῦ βίου διαπορευθεὶς ζωῆν) he returns again unperfected and unreasoning (ἀτελῆς καὶ ἄνοητος) to Hades” (ibid.) before the next incarnation.

75 See Bury’s note ad loc. with a reference to 86b ff. (which should rather be to 88b: “that greatest of [the soul’s] diseases, ignorance.” Cf. Leg. 3.36 (p. 274 above).
I find these notions resonating with several ideas present in *Leg.* in a manner which is specific enough for us to assume that the *Timaeus* has made its contribution. What I especially refer to is the idea that a soul can be “unperfected and unreasoning” because of “idleness” (Plato) or “idle and imperfectly formed” and “[not] intellectual” (Philo). In Plato, these are signs of a soul which still needs to undergo further embodiments. And when we take into account what Plato says about the souls in whom the rational revolutions have fallen into disuse, “they have dragged their front limbs and their head down to the earth, and there planted them, because of their *kinship therewith* (εἰς γῆν ἐλκόμενα ὑπὸ ξυγγενείας)” (*Tim.* 91e), we can in fact say that in Philo and Plato alike souls can become earthlike, corporealized.

The opposite of this is being “heavenly.” It is worth noting that the attribute “heavenly” in *Leg.* 1.31 does not stem from Gen 2:7, nor is it derived from 1:26–27. Instead, the logic seems to be that since there are two creation accounts and this one concerns an earthly (ἐκ γῆς in Gen 2:7) entity, the first one – being the opposite of this one – had to be heavenly. Yet we should definitely not overlook the fact that *Leg.* 1.1–30 (exegesis of Gen 2:1–6) is characterized by an explicit symbolism where the biblical “heaven” represents *mind* and the “earth” stands for *sense-perception* (e.g., 1.1, 19, 21, 26). Coming right after its emphatic presentation in *Leg.* 1.19 ff., the distinction in *Leg.* 1.31 between a heavenly and an earthly human cannot be considered in isolation thereof, and we must, consequently, note the noetic connotation of the heavenly human and the sensual of the earthly one. And if we can take these

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76 Runia has shown the great importance of the *Timaeus* for Philo; his summary of “Pentateuchal texts for the explanation of which Philo calls on ideas and texts” (*Philo and Timaeus*, 354–355) from the dialogue covers 17 out of the 36 verses from Gen 2:1 to 3:23 that Philo discusses in the surviving portions of *Leg.* Note that part of this utilization of *Tim.* takes place outside *Leg.*

77 Cf. *Phaedo* 83d: “each pleasure or pain nails [the soul] as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal (ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ).” Such a soul “can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body” and eventually reincarnate because of this contamination (81c).
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as the primary orientation of the heavenly and earthly mind, respectively, they fit very well the other evidence examined above.

2.4.2 Book of Wisdom

It was already noted that Sterling refers to Wis 9:9–18 as a description of wisdom enabling the human being to experience the divine in a way reminiscent of how Philo speaks of “the inbreathed divine image” in Leg. 1.36–38.\(^78\) Worth noting in Wisdom 9 are the facts that in v. 17 wisdom and spirit are identified with each other and that in addition to wisdom enabling humans to know God’s will (vv. 13, 17), “those on earth . . . were saved by wisdom” (v. 18). Cf. 8:13: “Because of [wisdom], I will have (ἕξω) immortality” and 8:17: “in kinship with wisdom is immortality.” Such statements surely have soteriological implications.\(^79\)

There are in Wisdom of Solomon a considerable number of further points of contact with Philo’s exegesis of Gen 2:7 in Leg. At 9:2a we read, “by your wisdom [you] formed (κατασκευάσας) the human being.” Is this an allusion to the plural in Gen 1:26?\(^80\) True, it is situated between clear references to Genesis 1: “God of the fathers and Lord of mercy, who made all things by your word (ἐν λόγῳ σου)” (Wis 9:1) and “to rule over the creatures that were made by you” (Wis 9:2b). But it is warranted to see a reference to Gen 2:7 here. Apart from the identification of spirit and wisdom just discussed, the dative σοφία denotes more naturally an instrument than anything personified to whom God might speak. But nothing prevents Wis 9:2a from referring to the creation accounts of both Genesis 1 (because of its position) and 2 (because of the role of

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\(^{78}\) See n. 31. The expression quoted above is Sterling’s.


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wisdom). On the contrary, this may even be likely based on the fact such a dual reference occurs at least twice elsewhere: In Wis 10:1–2 we have the word “first-formed” (πρωτόπλαστος; cf. ἔπλασεν in Gen 2:7) and the expression “strength to rule over all things” (cf. Gen 1:28). And in Wis 15:16 we read, “For a human being made [the idols] (ἐποίησεν αὐτούς as in Gen 1:27), and one who had borrowed the spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα δεδανεισμένος) molded (ἔπλασεν) them.”

Thus spirit/wisdom can be thought to be initially involved with each human, like in Philo it was found that the ability to be virtuous is initially given to all. But there is also the possibility of losing and subsequently regaining it. In Wisdom of Solomon, this

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81 Borrowing the spirit alludes to Plato, *Timaeus* 42e–43a, where the elements of the body are borrowed (δανειζόμενοι) from the cosmos and paid back at death. I think the idea here is to remind the audience that the divine spirit is not ours but can be lost in a way comparable to losing the body at death. The original Timaean idea is referred to just a little earlier at 15:8: “he molds a futile god out of the same clay, he who a little before was born out of the earth and after a short while returns to whence he was taken, the soul’s debt that is demanded back;” tr. NETS (as all quotes from Wisdom of Solomon), except that I do not agree with the translation of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς . . . χρέος as “the soul which was lent him.” David Winston (*The Wisdom of Solomon*, 286) rightly connects this verse with *Timaeus* 42e. The unmistakable allusion to Gen 3:19 must, I think, be taken as a reference to the body originating and ending up in the earth—not because of the Timaean allusion but because in the anthropology of Wis this is the only option: the body and the soul clearly have a different origin. Cf. 7:3: “I myself, when I was born . . . fell upon the kindred (ὁμοιοπαθῆ) earth,” 8:20: “being good, I entered an undefiled body.” For the former, cf. “kinship with [earth]” in *Tim*. 91e (above, p. 286).

82 In principle, Wis 9:2a could also be translated, “with your wisdom [you] equipped a human being” (see LSJ, s. v. κατασκευάζω). But this usage seems so rare that the dative would have been understood instrumentally by default.

83 Cf. Robert P. Menzies, *The Development of Early Christian Pneumatology*, 65 n. 3: “The relationship between Spirit as the rational aspect of the soul (possessed by all) and the Spirit as the source of prophetic inspiration (possessed by only a few) is never clarified in Philo.” As for the first aspect, see above, p. 254. The second is what we are primarily dealing with here, albeit not so much in a prophetic but salvific sense (this is ultimately the case with *Gig*. 24 too, to which Menzies refers as a prophetic case (pp. 64, 66; see below). Menzies’s statement cannot be upheld. What it actually reflects are different biblical concepts in much the same way as Ceglarek’s statement cited earlier (n. 72).
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contingency of the presence of spirit/wisdom is expressed many times.

1:3–5: “For crooked thoughts separate from God, . . . wisdom will not enter a soul that plots evil or reside in a body involved in sin. For the holy spirit of discipline (παιδείας) will flee from deceit.”
7:7: “Therefore I prayed, and understanding (φρόνησις) was given to me; I called [on God], and the spirit of wisdom came to me.”
7:27: “and in every generation [wisdom] passes into holy (ὅσίας) souls and makes them friends of God and prophets.”
9:17: “Who has learned your will unless you gave wisdom, and sent your holy spirit from on high?”84

But do we really have a reason to think that Wisdom of Solomon and Legum allegoriae are both conveying the idea that God’s spirit, understood as wisdom in the light of Gen 2:7, is a prerequisite of salvation? Do we have any further grounds for seeing a mutual connection between the treatises? I believe we do. A key verse is Wis 15:11. The subject is a potter who molds gods out of clay: “he did not know the one who molded him and infused him with an active soul and breathed into him a life-giving spirit.” Let us look at the Greek and make some observations: ἠγνώσατο τὸν πλάσαντα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ἐμπνεύσαντα αὐτῷ ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν καὶ ἐμφυσήσαντα πνεῦμα ζωτικόν. The verbs πλάσσω and ἐμφυσάω come directly from Gen 2:7. That πνεῦμα and πνεῦμα are more or less interchangeable is natural and attested elsewhere, also in Philo.85 More significant is the interchangeability of the verbs ἐμφυσάω (Gen 2:7 and thrice in Leg. 1.33–36) and ἐμπνέω (fourteen occurrences in Leg. 1.32–40).86 Furthermore, ψυχήν ἐνεργοῦσαν is

84 Given that the “breath of life” makes the “earthly” mind “heavenly” in Philo, the parallel in 9:10 is worth noting. There ps.-Solomon implores, “Send [wisdom] out from the holy heavens.”
85 See above, n. 66.
86 There are no other early examples of the latter interchangeability. For late ones, see Neophytus Inclusus (12th to 13th cent.), Commentarius in Hexaemeron Genesim, 7.47 (3085.009 in the TLG) and Gennadius Scholarius (d. 1473), e.g., Quaestiones theologicae de praedestinatione divina et de anima, 2.2.12.21–22 (3195.005).
close to Philo’s ψυχήν οὐκ ἀργόν—where the last word (a contracted form of ἀεργός) is the direct opposite of ἑνεργός/ἑνεργοῦσα. To these might be added that in Wis 15:13 we are told that the potter makes his vessels and images “from earthly material (ὕλης γεώδους);” this combination may seem like a weak marker, but in fact it is only once found before Wisdom of Solomon and Philo (who has it at Leg. 3.252, a clear reference back to 1.31), in Aristotle’s De spiritu (485a15).87

Wisdom 7 also contains several elements that are of interest in our context. In 7:10 ps.-Solomon states, “I chose to have [wisdom] rather than light, because the radiance from her never rests,” and, continuing the light imagery in 7:25b, 26 he says wisdom is “an emanation (ἀπόρροια) of the pure glory of the Almighty” and “a reflection (ἀπαύγασμα) of eternal light.” These come close to what we noted Philo saying of the “sublime and heavenly wisdom,” virtue, and the right principle in Leg. 1.43–46.88 Especially noteworthy in 1.46 is that the right principle rises like the sun: it “does not set nor is quenched”; note also ἀπαύγασμα and ἐναυγάζει. Later in Leg. 1.63–64 Philo says the four cardinal virtues are symbolized by the four rivers of Paradise which are the “four effluxes (ἀπόρροιαι)” of “generic virtue,” i.e., “the wisdom of God which is full of joy and brightness and exultation, glorying and priding itself only upon God its Father.”89

To these may be added that in Wis 7:1 Adam (who is not named) is called “earth-born” (γηγενής; Leg. 1.33, 79).90 Furthermore, Wis 7:25a reads, “[wisdom] is a breath (ἀτμίς) of the

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87 This is 0086.043 in the TLG. The usage thereafter follows, apart from a single instance in Galen, the trajectory usual for the so-called verba Philonica: Clemens, Gregory of Nyssa, Eusebius, Basil of Cesarea and Didymus. See David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey (CRINT III.3, Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1993) 108–9.

88 See above, point 3 under 2.2.

89 Cf. also the way in which the rivers of Paradise are linked with wisdom in Sir 24:24–27. See Aschim’s article in this volume.

90 This word has only three other occurrences in the LXX (Ps 48:3, Prov 9:18, Jer 39:20) and a total of 25 in Philo.
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power of God,” which is close to Leg. 1.37: “God projects the power that proceeds from Himself through the mediant breath (πνεύματος) till it reaches the subject.” Also worth noting is the language of abundance in connection with wisdom in Wis 7:11–13 and in Philo’s allegorization of the “breath of life” in Leg. 1.34 and of Paradise in 1.54.

3 Summary and Conclusions

Leg. 3.52 provides us with a very concise summary of Philo’s allegorical reading of Genesis 2–3. On the one hand, one can smoothly read it as a protological description of the transgression and its consequences for Adam. On the other, the undeniable links to the mostly universal allegorizations of the various events described in Genesis 2–3 tell another story behind the protological façade. The key notion in this story is the rejection of virtue. This rejection, as Philo recapitulates at the end of Leg. 3, transfers the soul from the realm of “heaven” to that of “earth.” This transference is something that the soul does not, in ethical terms, survive: it dies, as Philo tells us at the end of Leg. 1. However, by dying again, now to the life of wickedness, the soul can experience its “own life,” i.e., “the life of virtue.” And this is the same as “the true life,” which is what Adam’s “bec[oming] a living soul” in Gen 2:7 means for Philo, as explained in Leg. 1.32. God’s breath, i.e., the call to, and the conception and the capability of, virtue, restores Adam (that is, every corporealed or body-orientated mind), to his intellectual and truly living state and stamps him with the powers of God whereby he regains his status as the heavenly offspring of God. The above synthesis, following the phases of my six-stage model, proceeds from the end of Leg. towards its beginning. This is indicative of the fact that we should not try to read Philo’s allegorizations chronologically. The timeline of the soul’s journey is not synchronized with the protology of Genesis.

Based on the observations made in this essay we can see that to say, as I did at the outset, that in the running commentaries Philo
considers the entity of Gen 2:7 to be different from the one of Gen 1:27 is inaccurate in the context of Leg. 1.31. This is because, as he sees it, 2:7 itself refers to two entities: the pre-breath mind and the post-breath one. It is the former, the “earthly” mind, that is different from the “heavenly” mind. Philo’s reference to “two types of humans” in 1.31 is not a reference to the two humans created in Gen 1:27 and 2:7. For in his description of the “earthly human” he refers exclusively to 2:7a, the dust and the moulding that concern the pre-breath human. That the “heavenly” human is linked by Philo to Gen 1:27 is obvious because of the inclusion of the references to being “in accordance with the image (of God)”. As for the status of the post-breath entity, regardless of whether we take the use of the verb γίνομαι in the characterization of the “heavenly” human κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς as a reference to the “becoming” in 2:7b, the analyses above should leave us to no uncertainty that the post-breath mind belongs to the category of the “heavenly.” Philo begins 1.32 by focusing on the “earthly” human: he calls it a “mind” and explicitly states that its condition of earthlikeness and corruptibility comes to an end upon its receiving “the power of real life.” If it is no longer “earthly” and there are only two types of humans, it must become “heavenly.” Thus my conclusion that the “breath of life” is in Philo’s allegorization an act of God which transfers the corporealized mind from its state of psychic and moral death to its own real life of virtue is to a considerable degree justified already by the internal logic of Leg. 1.31–32. Based on the fact that both Gen 1:27 and 2:7b represent to Philo the same category but 2:7a a different one, it is very understandable that he in many places harmonizes the former (e.g.,

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91 Thus the temporal dimension discernible in Gen 2:7 – first the moulding, then the breathing and the becoming – is very important for Philo.
92 That the negation οὐ γέννημα can be seen as a reference to ἐγένετο in 2:7b only serves to confirm my point. The “earthly” human belongs to the sphere of molding, not of becoming.
93 We noted above the use of τυπέω both in 1.31 about the “heavenly” human (κατ’ εἰκόνα δὲ τε τυπώσθαι θεοῦ) and in 1.38 about the post-breath mind.
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Plant. 19, Det. 83) and opposes them to the latter (Plant. 44, Her. 56–58).

The examination performed also revealed allusions to Plato’s dialogues in the Philonic exegesis: the Timaeus, the Phaedo and the Republic all play a role. The authors have similar views of the soul’s becoming allied with the earth in a way that makes it liable to reincarnate. They also agree to a significant extent about the prerequisites of salvation, although the role of God’s grace is more pronounced in Philo. The connections between Leg. and the Book of Wisdom suggest that both are drawing on common, Platonically colored Jewish tradition which includes ideas like the close links between spirit/breath, Paradise, wisdom, light and virtue and the salvific effect of these.

94 See my Reincarnation in Philo, 98.