

# Defenestration: deconstructing the frame-in relation in Ungarinyin<sup>☆</sup>

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## Abstract

The Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran) has one single complex-clause construction for expressing reported speech (‘say’), that can also signal reported thought (‘think’) and attribute intentions (‘want’). By demonstrating which formal and functional distinctions are essential to the interpretation of this Ungarinyin construction, the present paper aims to contribute to understanding the exact nature of the syntactic relation involved in reported speech constructions. Following the account of McGregor (1994; 1997; 2008), I analyse the clausal syntax of reported speech constructions as a dedicated syntactic relation, separate from more familiar clausal relations such as coordination and subordination. I call this relation the ‘frame-in’ construction.

Subsequently, I compare the conventionalised reported speech construction in Ungarinyin to a variety of more loosely integrated non-conventionalised or semi-conventionalised strategies for expressing speech and thought attribution in the language. Collectively I refer to these strategies as examples of ‘defenestration’, constructions without the typical marking of the syntactic frame-in relation, while expressing the meaning associated with a regular frame-in construction. Instances of defenestration differ from syntactic frame-in in that they express the meaning of a frame-in construction through transparent compositional means.

I argue that types of defenestration show remarkable regularities in Ungarinyin, and, tentatively, cross-linguistically, which has consequences for the analysis of indexicality and iconicity in syntax and presents a new context for analysing the syntax of reported speech constructions in relation to multimodal features, particularly for the category of free (in)direct speech and ‘zero quotatives’.

*Keywords:* reported speech, quotation, free (in)direct speech, insubordination, Ungarinyin

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## 1. Introduction

2 The syntax of reported speech is profoundly strange (McGregor, 1994; De Roeck, 1994; Vandelanotte,  
3 2008; Vandelanotte and Davidse, 2009; Buchstaller, 2014; D’Arcy, 2015). The English direct speech con-  
4 struction, as in (1a), shares features with asyndetic conjunction as in (2a), and indirect speech in (1b) has  
5 formal correspondences to complement constructions, as in (2b). But the structures in (1) and (2) also differ  
6 from each other remarkably with respect to their pragmatic, semantic and syntactic properties.

7 (1) a. Mary said: “John has fed the dog”

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- 8           b. Mary said (that) John fed the dog  
9   (2)   a. The door opened. Mary entered  
10       b. Mary made sure (that) John fed the dog

11       If we acknowledge that reported speech constructions do not correspond to any other common syntactic  
12 relation (as I argue in section 2), there are two obvious conclusions: (1) reported speech involves a syntactic  
13 relation that is *different* from any other syntactic relation, it constitutes a syntactic class in its own right;  
14 or (2) reported speech cannot be defined in syntactic terms, it does not involve a single syntactic relation.

15       The second position is taken by D’Arcy (2015), who concludes, citing Buchstaller’s (2014) observation  
16 that “‘quotation’ as a whole is not easily captured via general syntactic parameters” (Buchstaller, 2014:  
17 42):

18       ‘That this view resonates across the field of quotative scholarship is conveyed by the fact that  
19 researchers are increasingly turning to alternative analyses to account for the structure, meaning,  
20 and interpretation of quotation, particularly when considered through a cross-linguistic lens.  
21 [...] [T]he primary view is no longer one that privileges syntax as the sole structure-building  
22 component of the grammar and that restricts the semantic one to an independent interpretive  
23 role. Rather, syntactic structure and semantic interpretations are increasingly seen as derivative  
24 of, and determined by, context. In this approach, discourse function, semantics, and pragmatics  
25 come to the fore’ (D’Arcy, 2015: 46).

26       Although I agree with D’Arcy’s (2015), presumably uncontroversial, remark that syntax is not the  
27 ‘sole structure-building component of the grammar’ I would strongly object to the conclusion that the  
28 phenomenon of reported speech is therefore determined by context.<sup>1</sup> Instead, I would like to defend the  
29 position, first explicitly formulated in McGregor (1994), that the syntactic properties of reported speech  
30 build a specific syntactic relation in their own right, that can stand alongside more traditional syntactic  
31 relations such as complementation, coordination etc.

32       This proposal is immediately confronted with two problems: First, as Buchstaller (2014) remarks, there is  
33 is a great variety of structures in the languages of the world that can express the proposed syntactic relation  
34 and these, at least partially, correspond to syntactic structures associated with other syntactic relations. I  
35 believe this situation is actually not much different from that of many other types of syntactic categories,  
36 but the attested function-form diversity does pose specific requirements on our theory of syntax. I propose  
37 that the constructionist (Goldberg, 1995; 2006; Croft, 2001) approach explored in section 4 meets these  
38 requirements and can account for the observed phenomena. Second, as D’Arcy (2015) indicates, in many  
39 languages, matrix clauses apparently marking reported speech, are often left out, as in (3).

- 40   (3)   John entered the room. “Has this dog been fed already?” No answer.

41       Even though no clausal element in (3) indicates that John asks the question whether the dog has been  
42 fed, this clearly is the interpretation of the second clause above: the clause represented between quotation  
43 marks in (3) carries a function that is similar to the element between quotation marks in (1a) and that, e.g.,  
44 the second clause in (2a) has not.<sup>2</sup> This phenomenon has received wide attention under the label of ‘free  
45 (in)direct speech’ (Bally, 1912; Lips, 1926; Vološinov, 1973; Eckhardt, 2012; Maier, 2015; Gallai, 2016), and  
46 in interactional linguistics under the label of ‘zero quotatives’ (Mathis and Yule, 1994).

47       In order to explain the presence versus absence of matrix clauses in the expression of the proposed  
48 syntactic relations involved in reported speech, we need a principled view of structural optionality in syntax.  
49 I suggest that this can be gained if we build on existing analyses of insubordination and extra-sentential

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<sup>1</sup>D’Arcy (2015) appears to ascribe the above view to Buchstaller (2014), which, in my interpretation, misrepresents the position cited. Buchstaller (2014) follows the above statement by introducing semantically based constructionist definitions of reported speech, thereby proposing a syntactic analysis.

<sup>2</sup>Assuming that written language is always secondary to spoken language this similarity in meaning cannot be attributed to the quotation marks (for further arguments defending this position, see Saka, 2006).

50 dependency (Evans, 2007; 2009; Mithun, 2008; Verstraete et al., 2012; D’Hertefelt and Verstraete, 2014) and  
51 optionality in grammar (McGregor, 2013).

52 The article is organised as follows: in section 2 I first list some of the properties that set apart the meaning  
53 and structure of reported speech (section 2.1), and in section 2.2 I introduce the proposal by Rumsey (1982)  
54 and McGregor (1994) to describe the syntax of reported speech as a syntactic relation in its own right. Section  
55 3 presents the main case study dealt with in this article, reported speech constructions in the Australian  
56 Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran). The language is particularly relevant for our purposes, since  
57 it contains only a single (but multi-functional) reported speech construction, resulting in minimal variation  
58 in the expression of the syntactic relation involved in reported speech. Section 3.1 provides some typological  
59 background on the language and section 3.2 introduces the form and interpretations of the construction.  
60 Section 3.3 suggests why Ungarinyin presents a useful case study for examining the structural expression of  
61 the frame-in relation. After considering these theoretical and empirical observations, section 4 provides a  
62 comprehensive definition of the syntactic relation involved in reported speech constructions, a relation I call  
63 FRAME-IN. Section 5 discusses how this definition can account for the idiosyncracies observed in reported  
64 speech. Having defined the frame-in relation within a constructionist approach it becomes possible to ask the  
65 question of how to treat the meaning of a frame-in construction when elements of its semantic representation  
66 are not expressed by clausal constructions. I refer to this phenomenon as DEFENESTRATION and illustrate  
67 it on the basis of Ungarinyin in section 6. Section 6.1 describes the conditions under which defenestration  
68 occurs in Ungarinyin and section 6.2 distinguishes two types of defenestration, INTERNAL and EXTERNAL.  
69 The phenomenon of defenestration is related back to the discussion about multimodality and grammar in  
70 the concluding section 7, which discusses some implications of defenestration for the conceptualisation of  
71 grammar more generally.

## 72 2. The syntactic exceptionality of reported speech

### 73 2.1. Introduction

74 Reported speech constructions display a range of idiosyncratic properties, cf. the list of features in (4).  
75 The properties (4a-4h) are based on McGregor (1994: 66–68), who uses these to demonstrate that reported  
76 speech constructions do not involve a regular type of coordination/parataxis or subordination/hypotaxis.  
77 Properties (4i-4n) have been added based on additional sources, and the labels in (4) are mine.

- 78 (4) a. DEPENDENCE INDETERMINACY: ‘It is not clear that the say clause in indirect speech is the main  
79 clause, the other dependent on it’ (McGregor, 1994: 66, also cf. De Roeck, 1994; Vandelanotte,  
80 2008);
- 81 b. PROMINENT SUBORDINATION: Indirect speech does not generally show signs of reduced discourse  
82 status (encoding backgrounded, given, presupposed information), which makes it unlikely that  
83 they should be analysed as dependent clauses (which commonly do have a lower discourse status)  
84 (McGregor, 1994: 67, also cf. Verstraete, 2011);
- 85 c. STABLE SEMANTIC RELATIONS: Changing the order of the clauses in (English) direct speech  
86 (as in ‘direct quote preposing’ Hooper and Thompson, 1973: 467) does not affect the semantic  
87 relations between them, which is atypical for parataxis and the order of the clauses in indirect  
88 speech is mostly rigid, which is atypical for hypotaxis (McGregor, 1994: 67-68);
- 89 d. INTERPOLATION: ‘In (English) direct speech, the clause of speech may be interpolated within  
90 the reported clause. [...] Such interpolations are not permitted in paratactic combinations of  
91 clauses’ (McGregor, 1994: 68);
- 92 e. DEICTIC SHIFT: ‘The fact that the deictic centre of a direct quote remains that of the reported  
93 utterance, but shifts to that of the present speech situation in indirect quotation goes unexplained  
94 [under traditional accounts of reported speech]’ (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Vandelanotte,  
95 2004a; Vandelanotte and Davidse, 2009; Nikitina, 2012; Evans, 2013);

- 96 f. NON-CLAUSAL SIGNALLING: ‘[C]lauses of speech may be omitted without affecting the character  
97 of the quote as a quote [...]. The reported piece is often uttered with a special voice quality. This  
98 phenomenon cannot happen elsewhere in parataxis’ (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Blythe, 2009);
- 99 g. MULTIPLE CLAUSE RELATIONALITY: ‘A clause of speech may frame another clause, or a syntagm  
100 of clauses, i.e. a complex sentence. It may also frame a set of complex sentences corresponding  
101 to a paragraph’ (McGregor, 1994: 68);
- 102 h. ISLAND CONSTRAINT VIOLATIONS: As the sentence ‘Who did you say would come?’ shows, a wh-  
103 argument from the message clause may occur in the say-clause, which is atypical for hypotactic  
104 constructions (McGregor, 1994: 68, also cf. Dor, 2005, and example (32));
- 105 i. SUB-CLAUSAL QUOTES: The quoted element can be smaller than a clause (i.e. the reverse of the  
106 property of multiple clause relationality in 4g);<sup>3</sup>
- 107 j. ATYPICAL TRANSITIVITY PATTERNS: There is great language-internal and cross-linguistic vari-  
108 ation in the extent to which markers of transitivity, such as ergative case and object-markers  
109 are found with in reported speech constructions (Munro, 1982; Rumsey, 1994; 2010; Buchstaller,  
110 2014);
- 111 k. RECURRENT MODAL EFFECTS: Across languages it has been found that highlighting a matrix  
112 clause in a reported speech construction (i.e. the first clauses in 1) can either imply that the  
113 speaker does *not* take responsibility for the meaning expressed in the reported message clause  
114 (i.e. the second clauses in 1), or *strengthen* commitment, depending on the tense and person  
115 properties involved (Vandelanotte, 2004b; Cornillie, 2009; Spronck, 2015c);
- 116 l. RECURRENT EVIDENTIAL EFFECTS: As Haßler (2002; 2010) points out, expressing conflicting  
117 attitudinal evaluations in a declarative construction can prompt the interpretation that the  
118 content describes a reported message. For example, the combination of ‘surprisingly’ and ‘of  
119 course’ in ‘Surprisingly, he is, of course, “delighted to meet us” ’ signals ‘He said that he was  
120 delighted to meet us’ (these examples were initially constructed in French, also cf. Banfield, 1982:  
121 215);
- 122 m. POLYFUNCTIONALITY: Cross-linguistically, reported speech constructions tend to develop a re-  
123 markable range of functions, ranging from complex clauses expressing ‘thinking’, ‘wanting’, ‘caus-  
124 ing’, ‘beginning’ etc., to more grammatical markers, such as complementisers (Rumsey, 1990;  
125 Reesink, 1993; van der Voort, 2002; Güldemann, 2008; Chappel, 2012; Matic and Pakendorf,  
126 2013, Pascual, 2014: ch. 4, Spronck, 2016);
- 127 n. ‘SEMI-CONVENTIONAL’ MULTIMODALITY: Alongside exceptional prosodic and other acoustic fea-  
128 tures (4f), reported speech is often accompanied by recurrent multimodal signals, such as iconic  
129 gesturing and eye-gaze (Blackwell et al., 2015; Stec et al., 2015).

130 Despite all these exceptional properties, no languages have been found that do not show some dedicated  
131 strategy for expressing reported speech, or that cannot signal the meaning associated with a reported speech  
132 construction as in (1) (see Cristofaro, 2013).

## 133 2.2. Rumsey’s and McGregor’s notion of syntactic framing

134 The properties in (4) are highly diverse. Most relate to syntactic features (4a, 4c, 4d, 4g, 4h, 4i), some  
135 are more traditionally pragmatic (4b, 4e, 4k, 4l), or lexico-semantic (4j, 4m), or concern general structural  
136 features of reported speech (4f, 4n). The high number of formal features makes it unlikely that any one  
137 pragmatic or lexico-semantic analysis can explain all of the properties in (4), but approaching reported  
138 speech as simply a formally idiosyncratic phenomenon is equally insufficient, if its exceptional pragmatics  
139 and semantics are not accounted for.

140 Observations such as those in (4) lead McGregor (1994; 1997; 2008) to conclude that the relation between  
141 the (clausal) elements involved in reported speech constructions should be recognised as a syntactic class in

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<sup>3</sup>I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this additional property.

142 its own right, with a specific set of associated semantic and pragmatic functions. Following Rumsey (1982;  
143 1990), McGregor (1994) labels this syntactic relation ‘framing’.<sup>4</sup> Without intending to contest any aspect  
144 of the analysis put forward by McGregor (1994ff.), I will refer to the syntactic relation involved in reported  
145 speech constructions with the minimally different term FRAME-IN RELATION, in order to avoid confusion  
146 with more familiar, non-syntactic interpretations of ‘framing’.<sup>5</sup> Discussing examples from the Australian  
147 Aboriginal language Gooniyandi (Bunaban), McGregor (1997) describes the frame-in relation as follows:

148 ‘the interclausal relationship involved in reported speech constructions can be modeled as per  
149 the relationship between a picture and its frame. [...] [The framing clause] delineates the clause  
150 from the surrounding clauses, and indicates that it is to be viewed and evaluated [...] as a  
151 demonstration, rather than a description. [...] Viewing a clause as a demonstration represents a  
152 type of modification that clause expresses. [...] [This type of modification] belongs in the same  
153 category as other propositional modifiers such as *tharri* ‘mistakenly believe’, *yiganyi* ‘uncertain,  
154 possibly’, *marlami* ‘no’, *mangarri* ‘no, not’, *minyjiirra* ‘true’, etc. The difference is that whereas  
155 these particles modify the proposition by indicating the speaker’s evaluation of its truth or falsity,  
156 reporting modifies the proposition by indicating its evidential status’ (McGregor, 1994: 77-78).

157 Based on this description, the frame-in relation is characterised by five features:

- 158 (5) a. frame-in involves a delineating element and a delineated element;  
159 b. the delineated element under frame-in stands out from the surrounding discourse;  
160 c. frame-in indicates that the delimited clause is not descriptive, but to be interpreted as a ‘demon-  
161 stration’ (in the sense of Clark and Gerrig, 1990);  
162 d. frame-in involves a sentential modification relation between the delimiting and the delimited  
163 element;  
164 e. this modification relation has an evidential meaning.

165 As I aim to demonstrate in section 5.2, this definition of frame-in indeed does allow us to explain the  
166 properties of reported speech in (4), but in order to apply the notion of frame-in consistently, each of the  
167 features in (5) requires additional motivation and specification. Before turning to this task in section 4,  
168 however, I would like to provide a detailed case study of the minimum of empirical facts a frame-in relation  
169 has to account for in section 3.

### 170 3. Frame-in in a language without a direct-indirect speech opposition

171 In this section I will introduce a particularly transparent type of reported speech construction in the  
172 Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin (Worrorran, McGregor and Rumsey, 2009). Section 3.1 sketches  
173 the broad typological profile of the language and section 3.2 outlines the form and functions of Ungarinyin  
174 reported speech. Apart from examples cited from published sources, the data in these sections are based  
175 on original field recordings by the author, consisting of spontaneous narrative discourse and dialogues. In  
176 order to homogenise the spelling throughout, all examples have been transliterated to the orthography used  
177 in Spronck (2015b).

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<sup>4</sup>Silverstein (1976) also uses the term ‘framing’ in referring to the matrix clause of reported speech, but provides insufficient illustration to determine if the notion is to be interpreted in the grammatical sense of the later authors.

<sup>5</sup>Note that ‘framing’ in the syntactic sense of McGregor (1994ff.) is not related to the interpretation of ‘frame’ in the sense of Goffman (1974). A Goffmanian concept that more accurately approaches the meaning of ‘framing’ as used here, is that of ‘keying’ (Goffman, 1974: 48ff; also cf. Besnier, 1993), but I will not directly draw on this literature in this article.

178 3.1. *Ungarinyin*

179 Ungarinyin is a non-configurational and head-marking language, traditionally spoken in the central  
 180 western Kimberley region of North Western Australia (Rumsey, 1982; Spronck, 2015b: ch. 2). In accordance  
 181 with this typological profile the language has limited case morphology (even though it can optionally express  
 182 genitive, dative, instrumental, commitative and locative case) and an extensive verbal inflectional template  
 183 (Nichols, 1986), as illustrated in (6).<sup>6</sup>

(6)	IMP-	O-	S-	FUT/- IRR-	DEFS-	-root-	-REFL	-PRS/PST/ -OPT	-DU/ -PAUC	-CONT	-Dir	-IO
	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6

185 As shown above, subject and object arguments are obligatorily marked as prefixes, whereas indirect  
 186 objects are cross-referenced as suffixes.<sup>7</sup> Verbal constructions in Ungarinyin often combine an inflecting  
 187 verb as in (6) with a verbal particle (a ‘coverb’). These mostly contribute grammatical (inflecting verb) and  
 188 lexical meaning (coverb) to the complex verb construction. Ungarinyin has noun classes, which are marked  
 189 through agreement patterns and on demonstratives and, like in other Australian languages, word order is  
 190 often variable. Subordinate clauses have a relatively wide range of functions and few formal distinctions (cf.  
 191 Hale, 1976; Nordlinger, 2006).<sup>8</sup>

192 Ungarinyin is highly endangered, and currently remains to be spoken by an estimated two dozen speakers,  
 193 but several highly motivated individuals in the Ngarinyin community are pushing for revitalisation of the  
 194 language.

195 3.2. *The Ungarinyin frame-in construction*

196 While Ungarinyin discourse mostly consists of simple clauses or subordinate clauses with a general subor-  
 197 dinating suffix *-ngarri*, the language has one frequent complex clause construction. This is the construction  
 198 used to express reported speech, as illustrated in (7).

199 (7) [[ *mindī-mīndī*      *mangkay ngīma*      ] *amara*      ]  
 200 [[ *mindī-mīndī*      *mangkay ngā<sub>1</sub>-y<sub>2</sub>i-ma* ] *a<sub>1</sub>-ma-ra*      ]  
 201 [[ *n<sub>m</sub>.ANAPH-REDUP* remain    1sg-FUT-DO ] 3msg-do-PST ]

202 ‘I will stay here’, he said’ or: ‘He said (that) he would stay there’  
 203 ‘I want to stay here’, he thought’ or: ‘He thought (that) he would stay there’  
 204 ‘He wanted to stay here’ or: ‘I want to stay here’, he said’ or: ‘He said (that) he wanted to stay  
 205 there’<sup>9</sup>

206 In (7), the reported clause is indicated by the inner square brackets, the matrix clause appears to the  
 right of the reported clause and the frame-in relation is symbolised by the outer square brackets.<sup>10</sup> This can  
 be schematically represented as in (8).

<sup>6</sup>For a fuller discussion of this template and the categories in (6) not further mentioned here, see Spronck (2015b: 43ff).

<sup>7</sup>For this reason verbal constructions are clearly marked for transitivity. In exceptional cases, an intransitive verb can be transitivised by a person suffix in position +6, which can then refer to a direct object (Spronck, 2015b: 48).

<sup>8</sup>For further details about Ungarinyin grammar, see Rumsey (1982), Coate and Oates (1970) and Spronck (2015b: ch. 2).

<sup>9</sup>All glosses in this article follow the Leipzig glossing rules standard, except the following: AMBIPHoric pronoun; ANAPHoric pronoun; AV, actor voice (Saaroa); CONTinuitive aspect; CORE, core case (Saaroa); COS, change of state (Saaroa); DECLarative mood (Kwaza); DEFS, definite subject; DUal number; EVIDential (Saaroa); IO, indirect object; ITRV, iterative aspect; LOCation (Saaroa); *n<sub>m</sub>*, neuter gender m; *n<sub>w</sub>*, neuter gender w; Object; PAUCal; PROXimal; REDUPLICATION; Singular (Kwaza); Subject; SUBordinate; TEMPoral (Saaroa). The subscript numbers in morphemic glosses of Ungarinyin examples signal morphophonemic alternations, described by Rumsey (1982: 17–30).

<sup>10</sup>Note that in order to increase readability, the bracket notation used in (7) and all the example sentences below is not exhaustive in that the matrix clause is not individually indicated, i.e. in (7) a second set of inner brackets could be added as follows: [[ *mindī-mīndī mangkay ngīma* ] [ *amara* ]]. Since in all the examples used here, any element within the frame-in relation that is not a reported clause belongs to the matrix clause, this means that the matrix clause is formed by all words within the outer brackets and outside the inner brackets in the example sentences. In the schematic representations in (8), (12) and (14) the matrix clause is explicitly marked by inner brackets with subscript labels.

207 (8) [ [ ... ]<sub>reported clause</sub> [ *-ma-* ]<sub>matrix clause</sub> ]<sub>frame-in construction</sub>

208 As the translations in (7) suggest, the Ungarinyin frame-in construction can receive multiple interpre-  
 209 tations. In addition to regular reported speech, the construction may also express reported thought, and  
 210 the lexical meaning of ‘to want’ in matrix position, which I label ‘reported intentionality’. However, within  
 211 the skeleton construction represented in (8), several semantic or structural elements may be specified that  
 212 prompt an interpretation of the construction as either reported speech, reported thought or reported in-  
 213 tentionality. The reported speech meaning in (9a–9b) is brought out by the overt reference to a reported  
 214 addressee (9a), an introductory phrase specifying that the following clause involves a speech event, or a  
 215 sound symbolic reported ‘message’, indicating that the reported clause reflects an utterance, vocalisation or  
 216 call (9b).

217 (9) a. [ [ *koj ba* ] *budmanangka* ]  
 [ [ *koj ba<sub>2</sub>-a* ] *burr-ma-nangka* ]  
 [ [ drink IMP-GO ] 3pl.S-do-3sg.IO ]

218 ‘“Come drink,” they say to him’ (090812JENGPDi, 1:10-1:12)

219 b. *wurla wurla nyengarri* [ [ *wak wak* ] *nyuma* ]  
*wurla wurla nya<sub>2</sub>-y<sub>2</sub>i-ø-ngarri* [ [ *wak wak* ] *nya<sub>2</sub>-ma-ø* ]  
 talk talk 3fsg-BE-PRS-SUB [ [ caw caw ] 3fsg-do-PRS ]

220 ‘She says: “Wak, wak!” ’ (100722-02NGUS, 2:30-2:32)

221 A reported thought interpretation, as in (10), is predominantly suggested by the *absence* of a reported ad-  
 222 dressee in the matrix clause, or, as in this instance, a preceding clause introducing the frame-in construction  
 223 as describing a reported thought event.

224 (10) *nini e* [ [ *kunya nguma kanda* ] *ama* ]  
*ni-ni a<sub>1</sub>-y<sub>2</sub>i-ø* [ [ *kunya nga<sub>1</sub>-iy-ma kanda* ] *a<sub>1</sub>-ma-ø* ]  
 think-REDUP 3msg-BE-PRS [ [ what 1sg-FUT-do n<sub>w</sub>.PROX ] 3msg-do-PRS ]

225 ‘He is thinking. “What can I do here?” he thinks’ (090813AJMJSMPDm, 2:01-2:02)

226 Interpretations of reported intentionality as in (11) impose the most restrictions on the Ungarinyin  
 227 frame-in construction: for a ‘want’ interpretation as in (11a), the subject of the embedded clause has to  
 228 have a first person singular value, whether the subject of the matrix clause is singular or plural and the  
 229 embedded main verb requires future tense marking. A special instance of reported intentionality is formed  
 230 by examples as in (11b), in which the embedded subject is not a first person singular form, and the matrix  
 231 verb has an oblique suffix that is coreferential with the subject of the embedded clause. This interpretation  
 232 is more accurately described as ‘indirect causation’.

233 (11) a. [ [ *ngurr ngimanangka* ] *budmara* ]  
 [ [ *ngurr nga<sub>1</sub>-iy-ma-nangka* ] *burr-ma-ra* ]  
 [ [ hit 1sg.S-FUT-DO-3sg.O ] 3pl-do-PST ]

234 ‘They wanted to hit it’ (100903-24NGUN, 8:56-8:58)

235 b. [ [ *yinda wandij irrora* ] *amarerndu* ]  
 [ [ *yinda wandij irr-w<sub>1</sub>u-ra* ] *a<sub>1</sub>-ma-ra-rndu* ]  
 [ [ spear make 3pl.O:3msg.S.FUT-ACT.ON-1sg.IO ] 3msg.S-do-PST-3pl.IO ]

236 ‘He wanted them to make him a spear’, or: ‘He forced them to make him a spear’ [lit.: ‘“They  
 237 will make a spear for me”, he did with respect to them’] (Rumsey, 1982: 162)

238 The schematic representations in (12) summarise the cues for each of the interpretations illustrated above  
 239 (in addition to the regular grammatical glosses, ‘RepAddr’ stands for ‘reported addressee’ and for reasons of

240 space, the subscripts ‘reported clause’ and ‘matrix clause’ have been abbreviated to ‘reported’ and ‘matrix’).  
 241 Note that none of the features in (12) conclusively *mark* the construction for the respective interpretation:  
 242 in all instances a reported speech or thought interpretation remains possible.

243	(12)	a.	[ [ ... ] <sub>reported</sub> [ - <i>ma-</i> + IO <sub>RepAddr</sub> ] <sub>matrix</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → SPEECH
244		b.	[ [ ... ] <sub>reported</sub> [ - <i>ma-</i> ] <sub>matrix</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → THOUGHT
245		c.	[ [ ... S <sub>i</sub> + FUT ] <sub>reported</sub> [ S <sub>i</sub> - <i>ma-</i> ] <sub>matrix</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → INTENTION
246		d.	[ [ ... S <sub>j</sub> + FUT ] <sub>reported</sub> [ S <sub>i</sub> - <i>ma-</i> + IO <sub>j</sub> ] <sub>matrix</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → CAUSATION

247 For completeness, (13) shows two further instances of Ungarinyin reported speech constructions. The  
 248 naming interpretation in (13a) has a reported ‘clause’ that is entirely formed by a name, but otherwise  
 249 differs little from regular reported speech. The construction in (13b) is quite distinctive, as it shows the  
 250 matrix clause interjecting the reported clause, which is otherwise unattested. It necessarily also includes the  
 251 epistemic modal clitic *-karra* ‘maybe’, in which case it reports an utterance, thought or belief on behalf of  
 252 a reported speaker/cognisant that the speaker in the current speech moment holds untrue.

253	(13)	a.	$\left[ \begin{array}{l} \textit{malyangga} \quad \left[ \textit{junba jandu jirri} \right] \textit{ngarrkumanangka} \\ \textit{malyan-nga} \quad \left[ \textit{junba jandu jirri} \right] \textit{ngarr-w}_2 \textit{a}_2 \textit{-ma-}\textit{\emptyset-nangka} \\ \text{for.nothing-ONLY} \left[ \text{dance designer m.ANAPH} \right] \text{1pl.INCL.S-IRR-do-PRS-3sg.IO} \end{array} \right]$
254			‘We don’t just call him ‘corroboree designer’ for nothing’ (Coate, 1966: 106, lines 39-40)
255		b.	$\left[ \left[ \textit{goannakarra} \right] \textit{ngamara} \left[ \textit{nyalangkun kuno} \right] \right]$ $\left[ \left[ \textit{goannakarra} \right] \textit{nga}_1 \textit{-ma-ra} \left[ \textit{nya}_1 \textit{-langkun kuno} \right] \right]$ $\left[ \left[ \textit{goanna-MAYBE} \right] \text{1sg-do-PST} \left[ \textit{fsg-head} \quad \textit{n}_w \textit{-DIST} \right] \right]$

256 ‘I thought it was a goanna’s head over there’ (100903-30NGUN, 0:47-0:49)

257 The schematic representation of (13a) in (14a) shows the similarity between this interpretation and the  
 258 one in (12a). The construction in (13b), represented in (14b), is analysed in detail in Spronck (2015a) and  
 259 I will not further discuss it here.

260	(14)	a.	[ [ ... ] <sub>reported</sub> [ - <i>ma-</i> + IO <sub>ObjectNamed</sub> ] <sub>matrix clause</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → NAMING
261		b.	[ [ ... ] <sub>reported fragment 1</sub> [ - <i>ma-</i> ] <sub>matrix</sub> [ ... ] <sub>reported fragment 2</sub> ] <sub>frame-in</sub> → MISTAKEN BELIEF

262 A full discussion of the constructional status of the structures schematically represented in (12) and  
 263 (14) lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but note that the interpretation of any of the examples  
 264 in (7-11) remains a dynamic process: individual features within an Ungarinyin frame-in construction can  
 265 never fully disambiguate its function as either ‘say’, ‘think’ or ‘want’, and although a construction with the  
 266 properties in, e.g., (12c) can involve reported intentions, it could equally be interpreted as reported speech or  
 267 thought, and Ungarinyin speakers in fact frequently translate instances of this structural type as such. In the  
 268 analysis of Rumsey (1990), the Ungarinyin language and the ideology in which it is embedded do not sharply  
 269 distinguish between treating language as external (as in speech) and internal (as in thought or intention),  
 270 and I believe this to be true: despite my best efforts over many years I have never been able to elicit or  
 271 attest a spontaneously produced instance in which Ungarinyin contrasts, e.g., a ‘saying’ interpretation with  
 272 a ‘wanting’ interpretation, of the type ‘x *said* that he would come, but he *wanted* to stay home’, or an  
 273 opposition between speech and thought, as in ‘x thought *p* but said *p*’. In the absence of such oppositions,  
 274 there is no evidence that Ungarinyin speakers perceive ambiguity between these meanings.<sup>11</sup>

275 For our present purposes, however, this question is tangential. What is relevant about the schematic  
 276 representation in (12) and (14a) is, first, that the constructions they illustrate share the general form

<sup>11</sup>Resolving the matter of monsemy/polysemy in Ungarinyin reported speech, thought and intentionality is further complicated by the fact that in the contact language, Aboriginal English, the verb ‘reckon’, which shares a similar range in meaning, is dominantly used. Although language consultants are familiar with the distinction of ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘want’ in (Australian) English, most spontaneous English translations of example sentences by Ungarinyin speakers are therefore also ambiguous.



277 represented in (8),<sup>12</sup> and therefore at least *allow* an interpretation of reported speech or thought. Second,  
278 the interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in construction, and the structural features they are associated  
279 with are not equal, but form an implicational hierarchy, as in (15).

280 (15) speech / thought > naming / intention > causation

281 Like in English, a reported addressee often remains implicit in Ungarinyin, meaning that any instance  
282 of a frame-in construction (with or without an expressed reported addressee) can either receive a reported  
283 speech or thought interpretation. The hierarchy in (15) suggests that this is not the same for all other  
284 functions illustrated above, however: if a reported clause is interpreted as a name, it could be interpreted as  
285 a naming instantiation of the frame-in construction, but also as reported speech or thought. Similarly, if a  
286 future tense and first person subject are used in the reported clause of an Ungarinyin frame-in construction  
287 (as represented in 12c), it can be translated as ‘want’, but nothing prevents it from being interpreted as  
288 a reported utterance or thought. Similarly, a causation interpretation can arise if the structural features  
289 in (12d) are present, but *only then*, while reported speech and thought interpretations can apply to all  
290 instantiations of the frame-in construction (and, as indicated, indirect causation also involves a meaning of  
291 intention).

### 292 3.3. Ungarinyin as a case study of frame-in

293 The Ungarinyin frame-in construction was first noted in Rumsey (1982) for its polyfunctionality and  
294 relative rigidity.<sup>13</sup> It has three properties that render it particularly useful as a case study for examining  
295 the meaning and structural variability of frame-in syntax. First of all, while the polyfunctionality of the  
296 Ungarinyin construction is striking, the absence of a clear opposition between reported speech and thought  
297 is not uncommon in the languages of the world, and as Romaine and Lange (1991) demonstrate, even exists  
298 in English. Many languages in fact take the polyfunctionality much further than Ungarinyin, such as the  
299 Brazilian language Kwaza (isolate) in (16).

- 300 (16) a. *ʃa kwi-’ni-da-ki*  
already drink-CAUS-1S-DEC  
301 ‘I already let (him) drink’ (lit., ±: ‘I already said: ‘let him drink!’ ’)
- 302 b. *hadai-’ni-da-ki*  
hack-CAUS-1S-DEC  
303 ‘I cut myself (by accident)’<sup>14</sup> (van der Voort, 2002: 320)

304 The Kwaza example in (16a) resembles the Ungarinyin indirect causation type in (11b), and, as the  
305 literal translation illustrates, (16a) similarly allows an interpretation of reported speech. Example (16b),  
306 however, can ‘hardly be interpreted as quotative on semantic grounds’, as van der Voort (2002: 320) writes.  
307 Even though formally both examples in (16) appear to be equivalent, only (16a) can plausibly interpreted  
308 as a frame-in construction. Example (16b) likely diachronically originated as a frame-in construction, but  
309 cannot synchronically be interpreted as reported speech.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>The mistaken belief construction represented in (14b) is different in this respect: it cannot be interpreted as an unmodified instantiation of the construction in (8), in that it simply specifies elements within the construction schema in (8). This motivates my interpretation that only (14b) is a syntactically separate frame-in construction in Ungarinyin, while all other examples represent different instantiation types of the frame-in construction in (8), but a full discussion of this distinction lies beyond the scope of the present article.

<sup>13</sup>More detailed discussions can be found in Rumsey (1990; 2001) and Spronck (2015b: ch. 3).

<sup>14</sup>The meaning ‘by accident’ derives from the absence of a reflexive morpheme. With a reflexive (16b) would mean ‘I cut myself on purpose’ (van der Voort, 2002: 320).

<sup>15</sup>Cases of reported speech constructions developing grammatical meanings (apparently) unrelated to reported speech and thought, such as direct causation and aspectual, modal or complementiser functions are remarkably wide-spread. For relevant examples from three separate continents, see, for example, Larson (1978); Reesink (1993); Güldemann (2008), as well as the other references under (4m) above.

310 The Ungarinyin frame-in construction is different in this respect: despite its wide-ranging functions,  
311 none of its interpretations *exclude* reported speech or thought, and, as I will demonstrate in section 4, all  
312 interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in construction can be captured within a single definition. Therefore,  
313 the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is a reliable indicator of the frame-in relation: it shows a consistent  
314 connection between form and function.

315 Second, the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is the *only* complex clause construction in the language  
316 that signals the frame-in relation.<sup>16</sup> The diversity of reported speech constructions, for example, in English,  
317 distinguishing direct speech (1a) and indirect speech (1b), in addition to strategies such as adverbial clauses  
318 with ‘allegedly’, and variations of these, can cloud the semantic commonalities between them. Distinctions  
319 *between* types of reported speech constructions are often used to show to what extent the current speaker  
320 approves of the reported message, marking it as true/false, or relating it without expressing commitment,  
321 a classification that falls along a cline allowing varying degrees of mixing the perspectives of speakers and  
322 reported speakers/cognisers (De Roeck, 1994; Bugaeva, 2008; Evans, 2013).<sup>17</sup> Ungarinyin has a single  
323 rigid constructional format for its frame-in construction: while elsewhere word order in the language is  
324 syntactically relatively unconstrained, in a frame-in construction a matrix clause consistently follows a  
325 reported clause, as represented in (8). The dependencies between these clauses, as signalled by deictics such  
326 as tense and person features, do not vary, i.e. the language does not display a direct speech-indirect speech  
327 opposition (Rumsey, 1982: 158). This removes a range of potentially obfuscating semantic and structural  
328 oppositions we may find in other languages.

329 Third, the expression of the frame-in relation is relatively regular. For example, in Capell (1972), a  
330 published collection of Ungarinyin short stories, 62 % of the frame-in constructions have been translated  
331 into English with a construction that either has an alternative order between the reported and matrix  
332 clause, contains a different speech verb in the matrix clause, or does not contain a regular matrix clause at  
333 all (Spronck, 2015b: 79). The Ungarinyin frame-in construction in all these instances is consistently of the  
334 type in (8).

335 Studying the Ungarinyin frame-in construction allows us, therefore, to assume a maximum bond between  
336 meaning and form, which will enable us to much more easily identify instances in which this bond is  
337 (apparently) violated.

#### 338 4. A definition of syntactic frame-in

339 Despite the great diversity of forms with which it is expressed cross-linguistically, reported speech is a  
340 feature of any known language. Taking the Ungarinyin frame-in construction as benchmark of the semantic  
341 properties of frame-in we minimally need to account for, in this section I will attempt to characterise it in  
342 semantic, typologically valid terms.<sup>18</sup>

343 As per the observations in sections 2 and 3, a comprehensive definition of frame-in cannot be based on  
344 notions such as interclausal dependency, perspective or even speech, since the involvement of these notions  
345 vary within and across languages. It should nonetheless be made clear, however, how such notions relate  
346 to a general definition of frame-in. The definition I propose will be introduced in section 4.1, along with  
347 a motivation for its main components. After this section, readers who are not concerned with the formal  
348 details of the proposed definition may want to skip forward to section 5 in which the implications of the  
349 definition of frame-in for Ungarinyin as well as for the exceptional features of reported speech listed in (4) are  
350 explored. Section 4.2 provides a formalisation of the definition of frame-in, and more detailed argumentation  
351 for its respective components.

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<sup>16</sup>As indicated, the exception to this claim is the mistaken belief construction in (13b), represented in (14b), which is both formally and semantically highly distinctive (Spronck, 2015a).

<sup>17</sup>A related discussion associated with the direct-indirect speech opposition concerns the degree of ‘verbatimness’ implied by a direct speech construction (for a detailed summary of this debate, see Vandelanotte, 2009: 118-130), which has led to a re-labelling of reported speech to ‘constructed discourse’ in parts of the literature on the grounds that reported speech constructions even in English often do not reflect actual locutions (cf. Tannen, 2007, also see Spronck, 2015b: 76).

<sup>18</sup>And typological categories can only be defined in semantic terms if we are to meaningfully interpret the syntactic patterns they are expressed by (cf. Croft, 2001; Haspelmath, 2010).

352 4.1. *Syntactic frame-in*

353 The definition of frame-in I would like to propose is that in (17). It involves three components: a dual  
354 semantic structure, a semiotic interpretation and a stance meaning.

- 355 (17) Frame-in consists of
- |     |   |                 |
|-----|---|-----------------|
| 356 | a. an element M and an element R;   | STRUCTURE       |
| 357 | b. a linguistic sign that is a symbol/index, and one that is a symbol/icon; | SEMIOTIC STATUS |
| 358 | c. an evidential and a modal meaning.                                       | STANCE          |

359 The features in (17) reinterpret and slightly add to the ones McGregor (1994) proposes, as summarised  
360 in (5). A synthesis of these features is presented in (18).

- 361 (18) a. frame-in involves two elements, a delineating element M and a delineated element R;
- 362 b. M and R both have a distinct semiotic status: that of an index and an icon, respectively. The  
363 iconic status of R accounts for its interpretation as a single discourse unit and lends it prominence  
364 relative to the surrounding discourse, which shows less semiotic complexity;
- 365 c. the interpretation of R as a non-descriptive demonstration results from its semiotic status as an  
366 icon;
- 367 d. frame-in involves a *double* modification relation;
- 368 e. this modification relation can be deconstructed as a combination of an evidential meaning and  
369 a modal meaning.

370 Each of these features are further examined in section 4.2 and illustrated for Ungarinyin from section 5. A  
371 comparison between the features in (18) and (5) above demonstrates that the definition of frame-in proposed  
372 here remains close to the original proposal in McGregor (1994). If the reader has a sufficient impression of  
373 the semantics of frame-in on the basis of the above description s/he may wish to skip forward to section 5.  
374 If so, two clarifications need to be made: first, for a general appreciation of frame-in, the notion of ‘icon’ in  
375 (17) and (18) can be read as ‘demonstration’ in the sense of Clark and Gerrig (1990) and McGregor (1994)  
376 (although my own interpretation slightly deviates from this characterisation). Second, following Jakobson  
377 (1957), I understand both evidentiality (Haßler, 2010) and modality as deictic categories in that they index  
378 an evidential participant and a modal participant, respectively, which stands in a conventional relation to  
379 the expressed proposition. The duality of M and R, the iconic status of R and the indexicality of the  
380 evidential/modal meaning inherent in frame-in are the minimal assumptions made in the discussion in the  
381 following sections about the expression of frame-in through conventional constructional or optional and/or  
382 extra-linguistic means.

383 Below, section 4.2 defends each of the aspects of the definition of frame-in in more detail, discussing the  
384 dichotomy of M and R (section 4.2.1), the status of M as an index (section 4.2.2), of R as an icon (section  
385 4.2.3), and of both as symbols (4.2.4), and the contribution of evidentiality to frame-in (section 4.2.5) and of  
386 modality (section 4.2.6). The final section takes a broader look at the framework the definition of frame-in  
387 sets out, addressing the notion of ‘participant’ in evidential and modal meaning (section 4.2.7).

388 4.2. *Detailed argumentation*

389 In order to define frame-in as precisely as possible, I would like to propose the formalisation as in (19).<sup>19</sup>

390 (19) 
$$t_0 \langle {}^p P_s^{E^s} \rangle \quad [ M \langle {}^p P_n^{E^{ns}} \rangle \quad [ R \langle (p) E^n \rangle ] ]$$

	SYMBOL	SYMBOL
	INDEX	ICON

---

<sup>19</sup>The definition in (19) refines the proposal in Spronck (2012: 110), which suggested the formula ‘[[SOURCE construction] (modal value) [MESSAGE construction]]<sub>evidential value</sub>’ to characterise reported speech constructions.

391 This formula consists of three main components: the two elements M and R, which share a frame-in  
 392 relation as in (20), a specification of the semiotic status of M and R as in (21) and a definition of evidentiality  
 393 as a relation between a narrated event  ${}_pE^n$ , a narrated speech event  ${}_pE^{ns}$  and a current speech event  ${}_pE^s$   
 394 (22a) and a definition of modality, as a relation between a narrated event  ${}_pE^n$ , a narrated participant  $P^n$   
 395 and a speech participant  $P^s$  (22b).

396 (20) [ M [ R ] ]

397 (21) [ M            [ R ] ]  
           SYMBOL        SYMBOL  
           INDEX         ICON

398 (22) a.  ${}_pE^n{}_pE^{ns}/{}_pE^s$  (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)  
 399        b.  ${}_pE^nP^n/P^s$  (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)

400 In the formula in (19) all variables which represent the evidential meaning and modal meaning are placed  
 401 between crooked brackets  $< >$ , the current speech event/speech moment is symbolised by  $t_0$  and the formula  
 402 in (22a) is slightly modified, as per (Spronck, 2015c).

403 The formula in (19) states that a frame-in construction consists of an element R, which symbolically  
 404 represents a narrated event and its participants (if relevant) and is interpreted as an icon. R is within the  
 405 scope of an element M, which specifies the participants in the narrated speech event, and is understood to  
 406 have an indexical relation between R and the current speech event. The combination of these properties  
 407 builds an evidential and a modal meaning in the sense of Jakobson (1957).

#### 408 4.2.1. *Frame-in consists of two elements*

409 While in most familiar languages M is expressed as a matrix clause and R as an embedded clause, both  
 410 may consist of sub-clausal structures. My understanding of M is synonymous with what Güldemann (2008:  
 411 1) labels a ‘quotative index’:

412 ‘A quotative index is a segmentally discrete linguistic expression which is used by the reporter  
 413 for the orientation of the audience to signal in his/her discourse the occurrence of an adjacent  
 414 representation of reported discourse’ (Güldemann, 2008: 11).<sup>20</sup>

415 For my present purposes, M, as a ‘segmentally discrete linguistic expression’, may be a morpheme, clitic,  
 416 particle or clause. Semantically, M has scope over R in the sense of Boye (2012: 183), in that the meaning  
 417 of M applies to the meaning of R. As such M serves to delineate and ‘mark off’ R ‘from the surrounding  
 418 linguistic context’ (McGregor, 1997: 66).

419 The dichotomy analysis takes R as a single unit, which avoids questions about, e.g., the valency of the  
 420 matrix verb (cf. Munro, 1982; Rumsey, 1994). Whereas the availability and status of an object argument  
 421 is often ambiguous with a saying verb, the semantic properties of its grammatical subject are much more  
 422 consistent. For example, Anscombe (2015: 108) defines the class of locutionary speech verbs (e.g. *dire*  
 423 ‘say’) on the basis of their requirement of having a locutor as their subject argument (also cf. Dor, 2005).  
 424 In our approach, a speech verb and its subject argument are likely candidates for expressing M, because  
 425 they are consistent with the function of M, but the status of M or R does not depend on the properties of  
 426 a speech verb.

---

<sup>20</sup>In Güldemann’s (2008) carefully constructed definitions, the term ‘reporter’ and ‘audience’ are technical terms referring to the speaker and the addressee in the current speech situation, and ‘reported discourse’ is defined as cited below. The provision that the quotative index (= M) is segmentally discrete is one I follow, although I understand this discreteness mostly in semantic terms. Like Güldemann (2008), ‘I exclude purely suprasegmental features of intonation, pitch, etc., which are also capable of marking a string of signs as a quote’ (Güldemann, 2008: 11). This decision motivates and guides much of the approach to ‘defenestration’ from section 6. Also note that Güldemann (2008) states that the word ‘quotative’ is not to be understood in the sense of ‘quotative evidentiality’, since the latter ‘pertains to a different functional domain’ (Güldemann, 2008: 10). Morphologically and paradigmatically this is certainly the case, but in this article I side with authors who argue that semantically evidentiality is fundamental to our understanding of frame-in syntax.

427 4.2.2. *M is an indexical element*

428 I believe that Gldemann’s (2008) characterisation of M as an index, in the Peircian sense, is particularly  
429 apt, since the function of M is to point to a speech situation that is separate from the current speech moment.  
430 It usually introduces the reported speaker, and potentially the reported addressee as deictic elements or non-  
431 specific/non-specified referents.<sup>21</sup> These indexical properties are further assigned by the evidential meaning  
432 that permeates a frame-in construction.

433 4.2.3. *R is an iconic element*

434 R is ‘to be viewed as a demonstration’ (McGregor, 1997: 66; Clark and Gerrig, 1990) ‘rather than  
435 a description’ (McGregor, 1997: 252). Unlike Clark and Gerrig (1990), who only discuss direct speech  
436 constructions, McGregor (1994; 1997) extends this analysis to other types of reported speech constructions  
437 as well, which is an interpretation I will follow here. In line with Recanati (2001) and De Brabanter (2017),  
438 I qualify this demonstration in Peircian semiotic terms as an icon.<sup>22</sup>

439 In my interpretation, the iconic mode of language does not simply consist of a ‘less arbitrary’ type of  
440 sign (such as onomatopoeia), but serves to indicate that the object talked about is to be understood as  
441 an element of the symbolic landscape, rather than a conceptualisation of experience (Spronck, submitted).  
442 This interpretation of a linguistic icon allows the term to be applied to other aspects of discourse, such as  
443 information structure (see Spronck, submitted).

444 I propose that the information status of R does not have to be taken as a defining feature of frame-in but  
445 that it falls out from its semiotic status. As an icon, R introduces information in the current speech context  
446 that should be seen as emblematic for a projected non-current speech event, which lends it a discursive  
447 salience that is unusual for embedded clauses.

448 4.2.4. *M and R are symbols*

449 As Jakobson (1980: 11) insists, in the original Peircian interpretation of symbols, icons and indices these  
450 are not separate classes of signs, but naturally co-occurring modes. As elements of language, M and R  
451 both necessarily also consist of a symbolic mode, i.e. of formal elements whose connection to meaning is  
452 conventional and arbitrary. However, the semiotic hybridity of M and R is more central to the definition  
453 of frame-in than this generalisation: the ability of, especially, R to be interpreted as both an icon and a  
454 symbol, is a defining feature of frame-in.

455 Mistaken belief constructions such as (13b) show this hybridity particularly clearly: the information R  
456 expresses can also be commented on and used in the current speech moment as being, e.g., false in the  
457 estimation of the current speaker. This suggests that in some ways, R can be a regular linguistic sign, i.e.  
458 a symbol, that is used and not simply mentioned (cf. Saka, 1998). In my interpretation, the distinction  
459 between direct speech and indirect speech could be seen as signalling different degrees of mixing the iconic  
460 and symbolic properties of R: direct speech is mostly iconic (cf. Clark and Gerrig’s (1990) analysis that  
461 only direct speech is a demonstration), while indirect speech allows for symbolic interpretation.

462 4.2.5. *Frame-in consists of a evidential meaning*

463 In the analysis of McGregor (1994), M serves as a modifier casting R as a demonstration, a modification  
464 type McGregor (1994) characterises as evidentiality. In this view, the relation between M and R parallels  
465 that of the enclitic evidential marker =*ami* in the Saaroa (Austronesian, Kananavu-Saaroa) example in  
466 (23).

---

<sup>21</sup>Many authors make a sharp distinction between reported speech constructions introducing specific reported speak-  
ers/cognisers and ‘hearsay’ constructions of the type ‘they (non-specific) say’/‘it is said’, labelling one, e.g., ‘quotative’ and the  
other ‘reportative’, although such labels are by no means used consistently. I do not think this is a valid distinction to qualify  
entire classes of reported speech constructions, since they deal with easily defined deictic properties of M.

<sup>22</sup>Clark and Gerrig (1990) do not directly state that demonstrations and icons are the same theoretical construct, but do  
point out that the two concepts share similarities (Clark and Gerrig, 1990: 765, footnote 3).

467 (23) *uka'a=cu=ami ka vutukulhu m-aa isana*  
 468 *NEG=COS=EVID CORE fish AV-be:LOC/TEMP there*  
 'It is said that there is no fish over there' (Pan, 2015: 345)

469 The morpheme =*ami* cliticises on the first constituent of a clause (Pan, 2015: 345), and has scope over,  
 470 i.e. modifies, the entire clause. Example (23) would be fully grammatical without the enclitic =*ami*, but it  
 471 contributes the important meaning that the clause is to be attributed to some non-specific speaker and is  
 472 not a statement by the current speaker herself.

473 I agree that frame-in constructions necessarily involve a meaning of evidentiality (Spronck, 2015a), and  
 474 therefore share features with evidential constructions as in (23),<sup>23</sup> but I would like to propose a minimally  
 475 different analysis to the one McGregor (1994) puts forward: M does not *modify* R in the conventional  
 476 interpretation of that term. M and R have a mutual dependency within a frame-in construction, and  
 477 the semantic elements involved in this mutual dependence relation build an evidential meaning (also cf.  
 478 Spronck, 2012). For lack of a better term, we may call this a modification relation, but if so, it is a  
 479 *mutual* modification relation in which M modifies R just as much as R modifies M. Following the analysis  
 480 of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957), the evidential meaning is the one represented between the top set of  
 481 hooked brackets < > in (19). The definition of evidentiality alone is shown in (24).

482 (24)  ${}_pE^n{}_pE^{ns}/{}_pE^s$  (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)

- 483 (25) a.  ${}_pE^n$ : the narrated event, and the participants involved in it (i.e. the reported content)  
 484 b.  ${}_pE^{ns}$ : the narrated speech event, and the participants involved in it (i.e. the reported speaker  
 485 and addressee)  
 486 c.  ${}_pE^s$ : the current speech event, the participants involved in it (i.e. the speaker and addressee)

487 In the pioneering account of Jakobson (1957), evidentiality consists of three variables: a narrated event,  
 488 i.e. something talked about, roughly equivalent to a proposition; a narrated speech event, an evidential  
 489 situation in which the current speaker (claims to have) witnessed what s/he reports on; and the current  
 490 speech event. The deictic dependence on the current speech event, which Jakobson (1957) symbolises with  
 491 a forward slash /, qualifies the category as a 'shifter' (for further discussion, see Spronck, 2015c).

492 The three variables of the evidential meaning seamlessly map onto the M-R structure of the frame-in  
 493 relation, as in (26).

494 (26)  $t_0<{}_pE^s> [ M<{}_pE^{ns}> [ R<({}_p)E^n> ] ]$

495 The meaning of R corresponds to the narrated event, that of M to the narrated speech event and these  
 496 have a deictic relation to the current speech event  $t_0$ .

#### 497 4.2.6. *Frame-in consists of a modal meaning*

498 In his definition of reported speech, Güldemann (2008) points out another aspect of frame-in (emphasis  
 499 added):

500 'Reported discourse is the representation of a spoken or mental text from which *the reporter dis-*  
 501 *tances him-/herself* by indicating that it is produced by a source of consciousness in a pragmatic  
 502 and deictic setting that is different from that of the immediate discourse' (Güldemann, 2008: 6)

<sup>23</sup>The literature on morphological evidentiality has frequently pointed out distinctions between periphrastic reported speech (i.e. a multi-word construction) and morphemes indicating reportativity (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004). In addition, several authors have commented on the exceptional status of reported evidentials as opposed to, e.g., visual or inferential evidentiality: reportative evidentials seem to be more frequent in the languages of the world, and have the widest range of application (cf. AnderBois, 2014; Hengeveld and Hattner, 2015). Despite the many differences between the meaning of evidential morphemes in languages in which the category has grammaticalised, Brugman and Macaulay (2015) find that the presence of a 'source' is the only semantic property that all descriptions of evidentiality in the literature have in common. This function is reflected in the definition in (24). But even if one would object to calling this meaning an 'evidential meaning', it should be uncontroversial that Jakobson's definition of evidentiality at least captures the semantics of reported speech as a multi-word construction.

503 The notion of ‘distancing’ is a contentious one. As Vandelanotte (2004b) shows, (English) reported  
 504 speech constructions differ markedly in the degree to which they express ‘distance’ with respect to the  
 505 narrated event: if M is highly subjectivising, in that it contains present tense and a first person referent  
 506 (Verstraete, 2001), the interpretational effect is rather one of commitment strengthening, i.e. *reducing*  
 507 distance (see Vandelanotte, 2004b; 2009), whereas when M is objectivising, viz. contains past tense and/or  
 508 a third person referent, the interpretation is often one of ‘I am reporting this, but cannot vouch for the  
 509 truth of the narrated event’. In the African languages Güldemann (2008) discusses, the person and tense  
 510 values of M are often invariant, which means that this semantic notion of ‘distance’ can be taken a single  
 511 parameter. But Vandelanotte’s (2004) observations demonstrate that attributing the content of R to the  
 512 referent of M and expressing/implying an attitude towards R are two *separate* features. The first function  
 513 is expressed through the evidential meaning of frame-in, the second one corresponds to the meaning of an  
 514 other verbal category in Jakobson (1957), that of ‘mood’.<sup>24</sup> The definition in (27) shows the Jakobsonian  
 515 representation of mood.

516 (27)  ${}_pE^n P^n / P^s$  (cf. Jakobson, 1957: 135)

517 (28) a.  ${}_pE^n$ : the participants involved in the narrated event, an event talked about

518 b.  $P^n$ : narrated speech participants, participants talked about/to

519 c.  $P^s$ : speech participants, the participant talking/being addressed

520 In words: a modal meaning involves a narrated event, a narrated participant (i.e. something talked  
 521 about, a proposition) who stands in a relation to the event talked about and a deictic relation with the  
 522 current speech participant, more particularly the current speaker. This confines the modal meaning in  
 523 reported speech to the class of speaker-related modality (Verstraete, 2002; 2007). The function of the  
 524 narrated participant is to anchor an evaluative attitude with respect to the narrated event. In the absence  
 525 of an explicit modal element, the specific value of this variable is left to be inferred but the idea that the  
 526 reporting speaker may or may not concur with the reported message is crucial for the definition of reported  
 527 speech.

528 The availability of the variable further accounts for an ambiguity that may be illustrated by the English  
 529 example in (29).

530 (29) He said he would stay there, but I won’t

531 The ‘but I won’t’ in (29) may either mean ‘I will not say that’ or ‘I will not stay’, i.e. in traditional  
 532 terms, the clause either has scope over an elided element that corresponds to the embedded proposition of the  
 533 preceding sentence or to this sentence as a whole. In our analysis, this means that the ‘I’ in the coordinated  
 534 clause is either coreferential with the subject participant of the (evidential) narrated speech event or with  
 535 (modal) narrated speech participant. While Ungarinyin does not allow elision of verbal elements in a similar  
 536 way to English (cf. Rumsey, 1990), the contrast between the evidential  ${}_pE^n$  and modal  $P^{ns}$  can be brought  
 537 out clearly in the language as well through the use of the discourse connective *aka* ‘not so’ in (30).

538 (30) a. *koj ba budmanangka*  
*koj ba<sub>2</sub>-a burr-ma-ø-nangka*  
 drink IMP-GO 3pl.S-do-PRS-3sg.IO

539 b. *aka wa warda wanko* *kokoj kudirri*  
*aka wa warda wanka<sub>2</sub>-w<sub>1</sub>u* *ko-koj kurr-y<sub>2</sub>i-irri*  
 NOT.SO NEG like 3n<sub>w</sub>sg.O:1sg.S:IRR-ACT.ON REDUP-drink 2pl-BE-DU

540 *amarndirri jinda*  
*a<sub>1</sub>-ma-ø-rndu-rrri jinda*  
 3msg-do-PRS-3pl.IO-DU m.PROX

<sup>24</sup>For our present purposes, I consider the labels ‘mood’ and ‘modal’ as synonymous. The observation that frame-in includes a modal meaning corresponds to much of the evidence Frajzyngier (1991) adduces to demonstrate that complementation expresses a type of modality.

541 “Drink,” they say. “No I don’t like it. You two can drink,” he tells them two’

542 (090812JENGPD<sub>i</sub>, 1:10-1:17)

543 Example (30) comes from a story in which the narrator discusses a fictional conversation between a group  
544 of people enticing the protagonist to drink, which the protagonist rejects. Line (30a) represents the frame-in  
545 construction *koj ba budmanangka* ‘“Drink!” they say to him’ and (30b) shows the protagonist’s response.  
546 Significantly, this response starts with *aka* ‘not so’, contrasting the imperative *koj ba* ‘drink!’ as an event  
547 that according to the subjects referents of M in (30a) has to occur, but the reported speaker of (30b) rejects.  
548 In order to achieve this interpretation Ungarinyin also requires us to distinguish between the referents of M  
549 as the participants *speaking* in (30a), and as those responsible for the embedded imperative mood, i.e. to  
550 dissociate  ${}_pE^{ns}$  from  $P^{ns}$ . If such a dissociation was not involved, the first clause in (30b) could not mean  
551 ‘No, I do not like to drink’: it would have to mean ‘No, I do not like saying “Drink!”’

#### 552 4.2.7. The modal-evidential meaning in frame-in involves grammatical participation

553 In the definitions of evidentiality and modality in (24) and (27) one slight modification has been made:  
554 the original definition of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) states that the grammatical category signifies three  
555 events but presents these ‘abstracting from the participants’ involved in them, i.e. leaving out the pre-posed  
556 subscript ‘p’ from the E-variables.

557 Bringing out the participant variables that are implicit in the representation in Jakobson (1957) fits  
558 within a broader framework in which grammatical categories such as aspect, mood and evidentiality are  
559 classified according to indexical participant types (Spronck, 2016; ms). For our present purposes, however,  
560 understanding the interaction between the evidential participant values and the modal participant values  
561 is central to the definition of frame-in: M roughly specifies the participants in the narrated speech event  
562 ( ${}_pE^{ns}$ ), and the pragmatic interaction between the participants in the narrated speech event as indicated by  
563 M and the participants in the current speech event ( $t_0 < {}_pE^s >$ ), correspond to the deictic relation between  
564  $E^{ns}/E^s$  in Jakobson (1957). R specifies the narrated event ( ${}_pE^n$ ). This event commonly introduces one or  
565 more participants in full clauses with a regular argument structure. But narrated events need not necessarily  
566 represent full clauses (for example, when R only consists of an interjection or a discourse fragment). For  
567 this reason, the participants in the narrated event in R are placed between round brackets. As Vandelanotte  
568 (2009) demonstrates, person values, such as first person subjects in R can suggest disagreement with R on  
569 behalf of the current speaker (a construction type he labels ‘distancing indirect speech’).

570 For every narrated speech event there is at least one evidential participant and at least one modal  
571 participant, and the same applies to the current speech event. The main distinction between participants  
572 in the evidential structure and in the modal structure is that evidentiality is about the events themselves,  
573 i.e. the evidential participants are understood in relation to a bounded space and time and this is essential  
574 to the interpretation of evidentiality. Mood is primarily about modal participants: modal participants are  
575 not semantically embedded in an event, but understood only in relation to the narrated event ( ${}_pE^n$ ), i.e.  
576 the content towards which the modal participants hold a modal attitude. In reported speech, the modal  
577 participants are paired with evidential participants, and thereby become linked to the events represented  
578 by the evidential structure: a modal narrated speech participant in (19) expresses an attitude towards the  
579 narrated speech event. This participant will normally have the same referential value as the evidential  
580 participant in this event (e.g. the reported speaker ( ${}_pE^{ns}$ ), expressing, e.g., a narrated event ( $P^{ns}$ ) s/he  
581 holds true) or evaluates as possible or necessary. The  $P^s$  value signals how the current speaker evaluates  
582 either  $E^n$  or  $E^{ns}$ .<sup>25</sup> Gralow (1986) describes such a case for Coreguaje (Tucanoan, Western Tucanoan): ‘The  
583 enclitic *-bi* [counter expectation, SS] can occur within a quotation. In that case it may be used either from  
584 the narrator’s point of view, relating to the whole text, or merely from the point of view of the character

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<sup>25</sup>A Gricean default assumption is that if the modal value of  $P^{ns}$  and/or  $P^s$  are left unspecified, unlike in constructions as in (13b), the interpretation is generally that the current speaker vouches for the veridicality of the narrated event, or, at least, does not contest it (cf. Verstraete, 2007). This implicature is probably closely related to the modal status of assertions as statements that ‘the current speaker holds true’, a type of implicature that, Wierzbicka (2006) points out, is typical for English, but may not be valid for many other languages.



585 who is speaking at the moment. There is no overt discrimination between the two cases' (Gralow, 1986:  
586 166). In order to allow for this type of flexibility in the interpretation of embedded modal meanings, a  
587 model of frame-in requires the modal narrated speech participant to be available as a separate variable:  
588 modal attitudes of the (evidential) subject participant in the narrated speech event may be dissociated  
589 from those of the (modal) narrated speech participant, and modal attitudes of the current speaker may  
590 be contrasted to those of the narrated speech participant. Following Evans (2006), the complexity of such  
591 multiple-perspective meanings is increasingly receiving typological attention (e.g. San Roque and Bergqvist,  
592 2015, also see Spronck, 2015c).

593 The crucial point is that the grammatical participants involved in the evidential and modal meanings  
594 can be indexed through a variety of grammatical means. Pronouns are a typical strategy for doing so, but  
595 particles, adverbs and illocutionary force are no less common strategies for indexing participation.<sup>26</sup> A notion  
596 that comes close to this analysis is that of 'protagonist projection', the idea that certain lexemes presuppose  
597 a (subject) entity of a particular type (e.g. Stokke, 2013; Buckwalter, 2014). Protagonist projection has  
598 been proposed to be part of the semantics of predicates of personal taste (e.g. 'nice', 'fun', 'stupid'), which  
599 presuppose an entity whose taste it expresses (Lasersohn, 2005), and in a similar way of the semantics of  
600 epistemic modality (e.g. 'maybe', 'might') (Stephenson, 2007; Schaffer, 2009), which presuppose an entity  
601 making an epistemic evaluation. Similar analyses can be made of other elements belonging to what Potts  
602 (2007) calls the 'expressive dimension', such as interjections. Participant values in the evidential and/or  
603 modal meaning may coincide with referential persons in the current speech event or narrated (speech) event,  
604 but should not be conflated with them: they are conventionalised linguistic values that are necessarily  
605 implied by the evidential/modal semantic structure, and can be signalled by a variety of linguistic means.

## 606 5. Discussion

607 The *de facto* exceptionality of reported speech has been recognised by many syntacticians. Noting the  
608 idiosyncrasy of direct speech, Mittwoch (1985: 151) concludes: 'The only feasible solution that I can envisage  
609 is one that treats [direct speech] as syntactically *sui generis*.' However, this solution leaves the exceptionality  
610 of reported speech constructions other than direct speech unaddressed. Within Role and Reference Grammar  
611 Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 479ff) posit 'indirect speech' (defined as 'an expression of reported speech')  
612 as a separate interclausal relation type, among a range of other types. Although this includes a larger range  
613 of sentential constructions than in Mittwoch's (1985) analysis, it leaves out non-clausal types of reported  
614 speech, such as morphologically or adverbially signalled M. In Functional Discourse Grammar Hengeveld  
615 and Mackenzie (2008) analyse the representational semantics of a reported message such as "(that) Sheila  
616 is ill" as a complement or argument of the speech verb 'to say' (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 103), but  
617 the matrix clause as carrying a separate intersubjective meaning, specified at the Illocutionary Level. This  
618 dual status accounts for the idiosyncrasy of reported speech (Hengeveld and Mackenzie, 2008: 276). At  
619 the Illocutionary Level Keizer (2015: 209-210) classifies the complements of English speech verbs as either  
620 'discourse moves' ('the smallest identifiable unit of communicative behaviour Keizer, 2015: 52) or 'speech  
621 events'. This is a more flexible approach, but the analysis loosens assumptions about the relation between  
622 meaning and form, which makes it more difficult to account for the distinctive features of reported speech  
623 as a class of constructions.

624 An account that comes closest to the radical proposal by McGregor (1994) that reported speech forms  
625 a separate syntactic class, is Speas (2004), who, building on Cinque (1999) formulates an explicit proposal  
626 for the syntactic status of evidentiality, as expressed in reported speech (also see Etxepare, 2008).<sup>27</sup> As an  
627 exponent of the formal syntactic tradition, Speas (2004) posits reported speech/evidentiality as a syntactic  
628 node, without further addressing the semantics involved. From the perspective of a semiotic functionalist

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<sup>26</sup>Also see Verstraete (2000; 2007) on the interaction between modal source/authority and illocution, Bergqvist (2012) on the interaction between epistemic/evidential authority and declaratives/interrogatives.

<sup>27</sup>Speas (2004) specifically calls this syntactic node 'evidential', but the examples in the paper almost exclusively involve reported speech. This is another parallel with McGregor (1994), who makes explicit that reported speech carries an evidential meaning.

629 analysis, as represented by McGregor (1994), this is a just-so story, since it does not attempt to examine  
 630 how the meanings involved in reported speech relate to structural expression.

631 In section 5.1 I apply the definition of frame-in posited in section 4 to Ungarinyin, illustrating how the  
 632 meanings introduced map onto the Ungarinyin reported speech construction. Section 5.2 addresses each of  
 633 the exceptional features of reported speech listed in (4) and suggests how the proposed definition of frame-in  
 634 accounts for them.

### 635 5.1. Ungarinyin frame-in

636 The Ungarinyin frame-in construction in (7), repeated below as (31) for convenience, expresses the  
 637 meaning of frame-in in a conveniently transparent way.

$$638 \quad (31) \quad \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{[[ } \textit{mindi-mindi} \quad \textit{mangkay ngima} \quad \text{] } \textit{amara} \quad \text{]} \\ \text{[[ } \textit{mindi-mindi} \quad \textit{mangkay nga}_1\text{-y}_2\textit{i-ma} \text{] } \textit{a}_1\text{-ma-ra} \quad \text{]} \\ \text{[[ } \textit{n}_m\textit{.ANAPH-REDUP} \quad \textit{remain} \quad \textit{1sg-FUT-DO} \text{] } \textit{3msg-do-PST} \text{]} \end{array} \right]$$

639 ‘“I will stay here”, he said’/‘He thought (that) he would stay there’/‘He wanted to stay here’ etc.

640 The two elements M and R invariably have the same conventional order in Ungarinyin: R precedes M. In  
 641 (31), R consists of an expression of the narrated event *mindi-mindi mangkay ngima* ‘I will stay right here’,  
 642 and M of the standard matrix verb *amara* ‘he said/did’, expressing a narrated speech event with a third  
 643 person masculine subject. The current speaker produces the utterance (31) in the current speech event,  
 644 thereby completing the three event components of the evidential meaning in the sense of Jakobson (1957).

645 The indexical symbol status of M is established by its role of indexing the reported speaker. The  
 646 iconic symbol status of R is structurally signalled by its constructional appearance as a single unit, and  
 647 the observation that it frequently has a separate prosodic status (Spronck, 2015b: 87). The iconic feature  
 648 of R allows us to state the difference between the ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘want’ in more precise terms: for  
 649 ‘say’ and ‘think’ interpretations (i.e. more prototypical frame-in interpretations), R is more clearly iconic  
 650 than for ‘want’ interpretations, where R does not ‘stand for’ real world expression. Interestingly, frame-in  
 651 constructions with a speech/thought interpretation appear to show a sharper prosodic distinction between  
 652 the onset of R and M than those with a ‘want’ interpretation, possibly reflecting the lower iconic status of  
 653 the latter (Spronck, 2016: 260–262). Whether we accept this as sufficient evidence for positing the ‘want’  
 654 interpretation as a separate construction type is open to debate.<sup>28</sup>

655 The definition of frame-in brings into focus how the respective interpretations of the Ungarinyin frame-in  
 656 construction are related, and where they may differ, a question for which the relation between the modal  
 657 narrated participant P<sup>n</sup> and the evidential narrated speech participant is also relevant. In (31), the modal  
 658 meaning of frame-in is reflected by two referential elements: it involves the subject of M as the narrated  
 659 participant, but also the coreferential subject of the narrated event  ${}_{(P)}E^n$ , and, of course, the speaker in the  
 660 current speech event, completing the Jakobsonian three-way structure of mood (see section 4.2.6). In case of  
 661 a ‘want’ interpretation, two conditions need to be satisfied: the modal value of the narrated participant (‘he’,  
 662 in 31) cannot remain unspecified, it needs to be clear that the narrated participant wants the narrated event  
 663 to come about. Ungarinyin expresses this with a deontically interpreted future tense. Second, the ‘want’  
 664 interpretation of frame-in can only arise if at least the evidential and modal participants associated with  
 665 the narrated event and the narrated speech event are co-indexical (also see Spronck, 2015c). Ungarinyin  
 666 fulfills this condition with an obligatory first person referent in the narrated event  ${}_{(P)}E^n$ , which signals  
 667 coreferentiality with the subject of M.

668 Although the assumption that the entity reporting and the entity believing in the validity of the narrated  
 669 event are separable is a defining feature of frame-in, only in the mistaken belief construction in (13b) is the  
 670 dissociation between the current speaker as an evidential participant (presenting the narrated event through  
 671 a narrated speech event) and modal participant (evaluating the narrated event as untrue) made explicit.

<sup>28</sup>As indicated in section 3.3, I do not believe that Ungarinyin speaker intuitions suggest that the respective interpretations are perceived as semantic oppositions in the language, but this is an open theoretical question.

672 The definition of frame-in purports to specify a set of semantic variables that can be given values in a given  
673 construction, but all the observed variation in the interpretation of frame-in should be explainable on the  
674 basis of the semantic parameters set in section 4.

675 The components of the semantic representation of frame-in in (19) are intrinsically intertwined. As  
676 shown, the M-R dichotomy coincides with a semiotic index-icon opposition, and M also matches a narrated  
677 speech event/narrated participant complex and R a narrated event. However, the contribution of these  
678 components to the interpretation of a construction may vary independently: this was illustrated for the  
679 ‘want’ interpretation in Ungarinyin, where there the modal narrated participant is more prominent and the  
680 iconic status of R is less prominent, and the reverse analysis can be applied to the naming interpretation  
681 in (13a), in which the meaning of R as an icon is prominent, but the contribution of the modal narrated  
682 participant is mostly irrelevant.

683 The cross-linguistic hypothesis that frame-in suggests is the assumption that the value of each of the  
684 individual elements in the semantic structure identified in (19) may vary with respect to any other, resulting  
685 in a potentially wide range of constructions. The semantic range of this variation is set by the variables  
686 in (19), however, meaning that reported speech constructions (such as direct, indirect and bi-perspectival  
687 speech Evans, 2013) may be contrasted with respect to their modal or evidential value, semiotic status or  
688 simply the way in which they signal M.

### 689 5.2. Accounting for the exceptionality of reported speech

690 The definition of frame-in introduced in section 4 allows us to account for all of the idiosyncracies listed  
691 in (4).

692 First of all, several observations about the nature of the frame-in relation itself are addressed by Mc-  
693 Gregor’s (1994) original proposal that frame-in is a syntactic relation in its own right. The high degree of  
694 indeterminacy in the dependence relation matrix and reported clauses display (4a), the fact that (in En-  
695 glish) this relation can remain (relatively) stable if the order of clausal elements is changed (4c) and, again  
696 in English, that an ‘embedded’ clause can be interpolated with the matrix clause (4d), are all remarkable  
697 *because coordinate and subordinate clauses cannot normally display these features*. If we stipulate syntactic  
698 frame-in as a syntactic class in its own right, these observations can simply be seen as properties of the  
699 expression of frame-in (in English).<sup>29</sup> Within the definition of frame-in M and R *mutually define each other*,  
700 which lends them both relative autonomy and dependence. If a language expresses M and R as clausal units,  
701 relative order seems to be a likely source for pragmatically or semantically driven constructional variation,  
702 but, as the rigidity in the order of Ungarinyin frame-in constructions shows, this need not be the case.

703 Adopting frame-in as a separate syntactic relation also can more easily account for the observation that  
704 a frame-in relation may exist between multiple clauses (4g), or between a clause and a subclausal unit (4i).  
705 Frame-in casts its R as an icon, and in some languages this iconic unit may consist of several clauses, or  
706 even of a non-clausal element.

707 Three of the features listed in (4) involve the lexical properties of verbs appearing in M, more particularly  
708 the observation that frame-in constructions may permit certain island constraint violations (4h), have atyp-  
709 ical transitivity patterns (4j) and can display a remarkable degree of polyfunctionality (4m). The definition  
710 in section 4 allows us to relate all these aspects to the evidential meaning of frame-in.

711 The concept of ‘island constraints’ stems from traditional generative grammar, where it demonstrates  
712 that ‘movement’ of elements from the underlying logical structure may be ‘blocked’ by certain units, labelled  
713 ‘syntactic islands’. A typical example is shown in (32), where in (32b) the clause ‘Mary broke the table’  
714 blocks the interrogative from moving out of the sentence ‘Dean was going to buy *what* in the supermarket’,  
715 whereas, the recursively embedding (32a) is fully acceptable.

- 716 (32) a. What did Eve say that Mary thought that Bill told her that Dean was going to buy in the  
717 supermarket?

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<sup>29</sup>Note that this does not mean that these different forms of a frame-in construction are (necessarily) fully synonymous, simply that they are all instantiations of frame-in. For example, Verhagen (2016a) finds that preposing, versus a postposing M with respect to R in Dutch and English results in subtle differences in interpretation (related to the modal meaning expressed towards R).

- 718 b. \*What did Eve say that Mary broke the table that Bill told her that Dean was going to buy in  
719 the supermarket? (Dor, 2015: 143)

720 Arguing against an explanation based on syntactic constraints, Dor (2015) explains the difference in  
721 grammaticality in (32) by stating that the predicate ‘say’ in (32a) entails the existence of an epistemic  
722 agent, as do the other matrix clause verbs, which therefore indicate that the embedded clauses involve an, in  
723 Dor’s terminology, ‘epistemic eventuality’. In (32b), however, this scope pattern is disrupted by a clause with  
724 the verb ‘to break’, which has a subject role that is not consistent with the epistemic agent type projected  
725 by the matrix verb and therefore cannot itself head a matrix clause that has scope over a construction that  
726 requires an epistemic agent.

727 If we equate the notion of ‘epistemic agent’ to the participant in the evidential narrated speech event,  
728 we can restate this analysis using the approach to frame-in I have outlined. Frame-in involves an evidential  
729 participant structure in which a reported speaker is indexed as well as a narrated speech event. Irrespective  
730 of whether we adopt a theoretical approach in which ‘what’ in the first position in (32a) is moved out of an  
731 embedded clause, it refers to some object in the narrated event E<sup>n</sup> ‘Dean will buy *x* in the supermarket’.  
732 If we interpret (32a) as a frame-in construction with a complex M ‘Eve said that Mary thought that Bill  
733 told her that’ and the R ‘Dean will buy *x* in the supermarket’, the entire complex structure in (32a) is an  
734 expression of a single semantic frame-in structure. As Dor (2015: 143) argues, (32b) does not express the  
735 participant structure required for the expression of an evidential meaning, and therefore cannot represent  
736 a frame-in construction. In English, verbs such as ‘say’, ‘think’ and ‘tell’ are lexemes that are semantically  
737 consistent with an M. English ‘break’ cannot be used to specify a narrated speech event in M.

738 This interpretation of the relation between the syntax and lexical structure of frame-in can also be applied  
739 to the observation that verbs such as ‘say’ display highly irregular transitivity patterns (4j): following the  
740 representation of Jakobson (1957) the evidential meaning consists of three events with associate participants,  
741 with clearly defined interrelations, but no shared event structure in the sense that, e.g., a participant in the  
742 narrated speech event (the reported speaker) performs an action on a participant in the narrated event (an  
743 argument in the reported message). While the semantic structure of frame-in involves multiple participants,  
744 each of the events involved (the current speech/thought event, the narrated speech/thought event and the  
745 narrated event) can be represented as mono- or even non-valent (e.g. a single speaker/cogniser and an  
746 intransitive/verbless narrated event). This semantic structure may explain the cross-linguistic variation in  
747 the valency of verbs appearing in M: the Ungarinyin root *-ma-* ‘say, think, do’ is morphologically intransitive,  
748 an English verb like ‘say’ is normally transitive.

749 The relation between the polyfunctionality of M clauses cross-linguistically and the evidential meaning  
750 of frame-in is slightly more speculative, but here the representation of evidentiality in Jakobson (1957) offers  
751 a potential avenue. Within the ‘calculus’ of verbal categories in Jakobson (1957), all other grammatical  
752 categories in the system can be derived from the event and participant structure used in evidential meaning.  
753 Within this approach, Spronck (2016) discusses a scenario of how evidential meaning may lead to modal,  
754 causal and aspectual meanings.

755 The evidential meaning further accounts for the occurrence of the deictic shift in frame-in (4e), since the  
756 deictic properties of reported speech indicate a relation between the narrated speech event and the current  
757 speech event, a relation Jakobson (1957) qualifies as a ‘shifter’. As De Roeck (1994) shows, languages differ  
758 significantly in the types of deictic elements involved in expressing this shifter relation.

759 The recurrent modal (4k) and evidential effects (4l) attested in reported speech can be characterised as  
760 specifications or highlighting of aspects of the modal and evidential semantic structure, respectively. For a  
761 fuller discussion of these effects, see Spronck (2015c).

762 With respect to the information status of R, the embedded/subordinated clause in frame-in constructions  
763 is unusually prominent (4b). I suggest that the explanation of this is two-fold: on the one hand it falls out from  
764 the semiotic status of R as an icon, which causes it to stand out from its less iconic discourse context. But,  
765 perhaps more importantly, the expectation that the ‘subordinated’ clause in a reported speech construction  
766 has a peculiar information status follows from the analysis that R represents a dependent element. Within  
767 the proposed definition of frame-in, R is not any more dependent on M than M is on R.

768 Finally, frame-in appears able to be signalled non-clausally (4f), to the extent that it seemingly can

769 involve ‘semi-conventional’ multimodality (4n). This is an aspect that requires closer examination, and I  
770 will do so in the context of the phenomenon of defenestration that I will investigate in the remainder of this  
771 paper.

## 772 6. Ungarinyin defenestration

### 773 6.1. Optionality and syntactic frame-in

774 Having defined the semantics of frame-in allows us to more closely examine the ways in which these  
775 semantic elements are structurally expressed. As indicated in section 2, the semantics of reported speech  
776 are expressed through a range of often rather idiosyncratic forms. But, specifically, I would like to address  
777 a cross-linguistic phenomenon in the expression of reported speech that so far has eluded systematic, struc-  
778 tural description: the pervasiveness of utterances that seemingly express the *meaning* of regular frame-in  
779 constructions, but do not explicitly mark elements of M, such as a reported speaker.<sup>30</sup> The core properties  
780 of frame-in identified in section 4 provide a broader perspective for such utterances, as examples of frame-in  
781 in which part of the semantic structure in (19) are left unspecified. This approach allows us to ask which  
782 elements necessarily receive structural expression in frame-in constructions, and which parts of the seman-  
783 tic structure of frame-in could be treated as ‘optional’ (cf. McGregor, 2013). Parallel to Evans’s (2007)  
784 notion of insubordination (the phenomenon in which the main clause of a subordinate clause construction  
785 is elided, either dynamically, i.e. synchronically, or as part of a diachronic process), I label instances in  
786 which essential parts of the semantic structure of the frame-in relation, typically of M, remain unexpressed  
787 or underexpressed DEFENESTRATION.<sup>31</sup> I submit that the notion of defenestration allows us to develop  
788 an integrated approach to optionality in frame-in and to more systematically evaluate the contribution of  
789 multimodality in the expression of reported speech and thought than most current approaches allow us  
790 to do. Recent proposals describing reported speech as a multimodal construction (e.g. Lampert, 2013a;b;  
791 Blackwell et al., 2015; Stec et al., 2015) capture an essential aspect of these constructions, namely, that  
792 meaning making in frame-in constructions involves a more holistic range of markers than many other simple  
793 and complex clausal constructions. But, as Stec et al. (2015) find, the multimodal signals involved in this  
794 meaning making process are loosely conventionalised at best, and are frequently omitted in the presence of  
795 contextual cues that help identify, e.g., a particular reported speaker or indicate that an utterance is to be  
796 interpreted as a reported message.

797 My main claim here will be that this type of semi-conventional or extra-linguistic signalling can only  
798 been appropriately interpreted *if we can first reliably identify what aspects of reported speech and thought*  
799 *are conventional*. For our present purposes Ungarinyin presents an ideal case study since the language has  
800 one structure for expressing reported speech that can be related (despite subtle semantic variation) to one  
801 single semantic structure, as discussed in the previous sections. In the remainder of this paper I aim to  
802 demonstrate that defenestration phenomena should not be treated as a rather random set of extra-linguistic  
803 means of expression, but as alternative ways of specifying frame-in.

### 804 6.2. Reported speech without a frame-in construction

805 The construction outlined in (8) is the only fully grammatical structure available in Ungarinyin for  
806 expressing the frame-in relation. This does not mean, however, that it is always used to express the *mean-*  
807 *ing* of frame-in. Since the Ungarinyin frame-in construction is easily identified, the phenomenon I have  
808 labelled defenestration above is therefore entirely transparent in the language: Ungarinyin defenestration  
809 is represented by any expression of reported speech, thought or intentionality that does not include a full

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<sup>30</sup>These types of utterances have been widely discussed under the label of ‘free (in)direct speech’ or ‘zero quotatives’, but both of these categories are highly problematic.

<sup>31</sup>The nod to insubordination should not be taken to imply that defenestration is (necessarily) an instance of insubordination. There are similarities, but also many differences between the phenomena described in Evans (2007) and defenestration as introduced here.

810 *-ma*-construction as in (8).<sup>32</sup> Using this practical definition of defenestration, I distinguish two basic types:  
 811 external defenestration (section 6.2.1) and internal defenestration (section 6.2.2). After outlining these, in  
 812 section 6.2.3 I briefly discuss how defenestration is interpreted and speculate that the two types correspond  
 813 to a small range of highly similar phenomena across languages.

814 *6.2.1. External defenestration: perspectivising clauses*

815 The clauses between square brackets in (33a) and (33b) represent a narrated speech event, but both  
 816 examples lack a conventional M-clause.

- 817 (33) a. *balya bungoni* [ *anjaku murlnbun kujilennyina* ] ... *ngin*  
*balya bunga<sub>2</sub>-w<sub>1</sub>u-ni* [ *anja-ku murlnbun kurr-y<sub>1</sub>ila-n-y<sub>1</sub>i-na* ] *ngin*  
 go 3pl.O:1sg.S-ACT.ON-PST [ what-DAT argue 2pl-HOLD-PRS-REFL-PAUC ] 1sg
- 818 ‘I went to them. “Why are you arguing with each other?” ... Me’<sup>33</sup>
- 819 b. *di marda ayirri* [ *ngamara ngurr ngurrumernangka* ] ...  
*di marda a<sub>1</sub>-a-ø-yirri* [ *nga<sub>1</sub>-ma-ra ngurr nga<sub>1</sub>-irra<sub>2</sub>-ma-ra-nangka* ]  
 n<sub>w</sub>.ANAPH walk 3msg-GO-PRS-CONT [ 1sg-do-PST kill 1sg-DEFS-DO-PST-3sg.IO ]
- 820 *ngala jina mardumarl*  
*ngala jina mardumarl*  
 animal m.PROX long.neck.turtle

821 ‘Then he is walking. “I did it, I killed it” the long neck turtle [said]’ (Coate, 1970)

822 The defenestrated reported speech clause *anjaku murlnbun kujilennyina* ‘why are you arguing with each  
 823 other?’ in (33a) is preceded by the clause *balya bungoni* ‘I went to them’, which introduces as its grammatical  
 824 subject the reported speaker to whom the following reported speech clause is to be attributed. Instead of  
 825 an M-clause (which would be part of the same prosodic sentence and include the M-verb *-ma-* ‘say, do’), the  
 826 speaker inserts a pause after the reported message and, like an afterthought, adds the single pronoun *ngin*  
 827 ‘I’, clarifying the identity of the reported speaker. The form of the sequence in (33b) is fully equivalent: it  
 828 starts with the motion clause *di mardu ayirri* ‘then he is walking’, is followed by the defenestrated reported  
 829 message clause *ngamara ngurr ngurrumernangka* ‘I did it, I killed him’, a pause and a specification of the  
 830 reported speaker.<sup>34</sup>

831 We may distinguish two other types of defenestrated clauses in addition to the one illustrated above, one  
 832 of these is shown in (34a) and (34b).

- 833 (34) a. *nyinda wurla on* [ *yirrkalngarri* [ *balya bumalu* ] ]  
*nyinda wurla a<sub>1</sub>-w<sub>1</sub>u-n* [ *yirrkalngarri* [ *balya ba<sub>2</sub>-ma=lu* ] ]  
 f.PROX talk 3msg.O:3sg.S-ACT.ON-PRS policeman [ go IMP-DO=PROX ]
- 834 ‘She tells the policeman to come’
- 835 b. *dubulangarri buk biyengkangarri* ... *ngayak nyumarni* [ *nyangkiku*  
*dubulangarri buk birr-a-ngka<sub>2</sub>-ngarri* *ngayak nya<sub>2</sub>-ma-rni* [ *nyangki-ku*  
 red come.out 3pl-GO-PST-SUB ask 3fsg.O:3sg.S-TAKE-PST [ who-DAT
- 836 *jinda* ... *yila* ]  
*jinda* *yila* ]  
 m.PROX child ]

<sup>32</sup>Ungarinyin shows one regular exception to the construction with the matrix verb *-ma-* ‘do’ in reciprocal saying events, i.e. ‘x and y said to (*-inga-*) each other’, in which case the verb is replaced by *-inga-* ‘put’, as, e.g., in example (37e). I do not consider this an instance of defenestration (but see section 6.2.2).

<sup>33</sup>A transcription of the entire story can be found in Spronck (2015b).

<sup>34</sup>Rumsey (2010: 1662) cites a very similar strategy in Bunuba (Bunaban), although that language shows slightly more variation in its frame-in constructions.

‘When the red [child] was born, he asked her ‘Whose child is that?’’<sup>35</sup>

838 In (34), the reported speech elements are again indicated between brackets, but the preceding clauses  
 839 carry a meaning that is more directly relevant to the reported speech interpretation than the motion verbs in  
 840 (33). While the subject of the clauses immediately preceding the defenestrated clause, again, introduces the  
 841 reported speaker of the defenestrated clause, it also lexically specifies the defenestrated clause as representing  
 842 a reported speech event: the clause *nyinda wurla on yirrkalngarri* ‘she talks to/calls on the police’ (34a)  
 843 sets the following clause up as the product of talking or calling, and *ngayak nyumarni* ‘he asked her’ in  
 844 (34b) introduces an interrogative speech act. Both (34a) and (34b) have a different illocutionary value  
 845 in the introductory clause and in the defenestrated clause, a feature I will label ‘illocutionary change’,  
 846 and one they share with (33a). Illocutionary change creates a contrast between the introductory clause  
 847 and the defenestrated clause, contributing to the demarcation of the latter. The fragments following the  
 848 defenestrated clause and identifying the reported speaker in (33) are absent in (34).

849 The third type of external defenestration is illustrated in (35a). It consists of a ‘psych action’ verb,  
 850 followed by a defenestrated clause which could either represent a thought or a locution. It also shows  
 851 illocutionary change to an imperative and contains an interjection to further mark the boundary between  
 852 the introductory clause *di mara andon* ‘then he sees them’.

853 (35) a. *di mara andon* [ *a diyali buma* ]  
*di mara anda<sub>2</sub>-w<sub>1</sub>u-n* [ *a di-y<sub>2</sub>ali ba<sub>2</sub>-ma* ]  
 n<sub>w</sub>-ANAPH see 3pl.O:3sg.S-ACT.ON-PRS [ ah n<sub>w</sub>.ANAPH-INDEED IMP-do ]

854 ‘And then he sees them. “Ah, that’s how you should do it” ’ (Coate, 1966: 110, line 112)

855 b. *bandu buna wurrngijanyirri* [[ *anjaku dambun ruluk* ]  
*bandu buna wurr-ngija-n-yirri* [[ *anja-ku dambun ruluk* ]  
 3pl.AMBIPH 3pl.PROX 3n<sub>w</sub>sg.O:3pl.S-wonder-PRS-CONT [[ what-DAT camp shift  
 856 *mumanganyirri dowanda* ] *budmerri bunda balangkarra* ]  
*ma<sub>2</sub>-ma-nga-yirri down-da* ] *burr-ma-ra-rri bunda balangkarra* ]  
 3n<sub>m</sub>sg.O:3sg.S-TAKE-PST-CONT one.side-LOC ] 3pl-do-PST-DU 3pl.PROX people ]

857 ‘They are wondering about it. “Why did he shift his camp to one side?” those people said’  
 858 (Coate, 1966: 110, lines 119–120)

859 As (35b) shows, the elements used in defenestration are not incompatible with a full frame-in construction.  
 860 In (35b), the frame-in construction is preceded by the psych action clause *bandu buna wurrngijanyirri* ‘they  
 861 are wondering about it’ and R shows illocutionary change with respect to the introductory clause and M.  
 862 Also, the position immediately preceding the frame-in construction is often used to specify either properties  
 863 of the narrated speech event (as, e.g., asking, shouting, wondering), or referential properties of the reported  
 864 speaker. For example, in (36), the phrase *yirranangka jinda* ‘this father’ preceding the frame-in construction  
 865 lexically specifies the subject of M *amanangka walawi* ‘he said to his son’.<sup>36</sup>

866 (36) *yirranangka jinda* ... [[ *balu* ] *amanangka walawi* ]  
*yirra-nangka jinda* [[ *ba<sub>2</sub>-a=lu* ] *a<sub>1</sub>-ma-ø-nangka walawi* ]  
 father-3sgPOSS 3m.PROX [[ IMP-go=PROX ] 3msg.S-do-PRS-3sg.IO son ]

867 ‘His father, he says “Come” to his son’ (090812JENGPDi, 1:42-145)

<sup>35</sup>This passage comes from an allegorical story about red snakes and black snakes, with a black father discovering that his wife has given birth to a red (i.e. non-Aboriginal) child.

<sup>36</sup>Since Ungarinyin rarely expresses both the subject and (indirect) object referents of a predicate as full lexical elements within the same construction (cf. Du Bois, 1987), the position immediately preceding R can be used to specify referential properties of the grammatical subject of M if the addressee is also lexically specified.

868 The defenestration introductory clauses in (33) correspond to what Verstraete (2011: 498) calls ‘perspec-  
869 tivising clauses’. These ‘are different from typical [M] [...] in that they are not explicitly metalinguistic but  
870 simply describe a non-linguistic event in the narrative’, yet, ‘they put a specific participant into perspective  
871 and thus anticipate a shift to their speech or thought’ (Verstraete, 2011: 498–499). The rigidity of frame-in  
872 constructions in Ungarinyin allows us to define this class as a slightly broader type: unlike, e.g., in English,  
873 Ungarinyin does not allow M-clauses to precede R, so any clause introducing the reported message  ${}_{(p)}E^n$   
874 serves to anticipate the perspective shift in the defenestrated clause or in R. For their functional similarity  
875 with M-clauses I will refer to these introductory clauses as LITTLE-M. As examples (34) and (35) demon-  
876 strate, little-m clauses may include metalinguistic meanings, specifying properties about the narrated speech  
877 event, such as manner of speech or illocutionary type, which Ungarinyin M-clauses, which can only contain  
878 the verb *-ma-* ‘say/do’, do not allow to specify lexically themselves. Little-m clauses therefore identify  
879 elements of the narrated speech event, most importantly the reported speaker  ${}_pE^{ns}$ , which creates a context  
880 in which M-clauses can be omitted, although in Ungarinyin they frequently are not.

881 Although the defenestration patterns illustrated above are restricted to these three types of little-m  
882 clauses, these clauses themselves show little *a priori* semantic or structural coherence. This is exactly the  
883 point: little-m clauses remain independent sentential units, with no syntactic dependencies between the  
884 little-m and defenestrated clauses. They are not a type of M in Ungarinyin in the sense that they form a  
885 frame-in construction with the following R. The distinction becomes particularly clear when we compare  
886 little-m and M: while both can be left out given the appropriate context (also see section 6.2.2), speakers of  
887 Ungarinyin will often characterise a defenestrated clause as incomplete, and supplement the defenestrated  
888 clause with an M-clause when examples are played back to them. This is not the case for little-m. As  
889 indicated, little-m clauses are not restricted to a specific matrix verb, or even the class of speech/cognition  
890 verbs. Although little-m loosely follows a general convention about relative position with respect to the  
891 narrated speech event representing clause (preceding, rather than following it, as in the case of M) and the  
892 subject referent of little-m indexes a reported speaker similar to M, the conventionalised relation between  
893 little-m and a defenestrated clause is quite different from that between R and M in a frame-in construction.  
894 While the latter *mutually* signal each other as members of the frame-in relation, a defenestrated clause is  
895 understood as R, and is thereby associated with a full frame-in relation as defined in (19). The properties  
896 of M, expressing an indexical relation to the evidential narrated speech participant and the modal narrated  
897 participant, and delimiting R are evoked through the conventional constructional meaning of frame-in, but  
898 not expressed through conventional syntactic means. In defenestration M is treated as an optional element  
899 in the sense of McGregor (2013): ‘the construction remains unchanged as a linguistic sign regardless of  
900 whether or not the element is present’ (McGregor, 2013: 1152). However, because the full constructional  
901 meaning of frame-in becomes available as soon as a defenestrated clause is interpreted as R, the unexpressed  
902 properties of M become associated with an indexed entity that is consistent with the meaning of M that has  
903 already been introduced in the discourse. This is the function of little-m clauses.

904 The traditional analysis of patterns such as those formed by little-m and defenestrated clauses is that  
905 they are a matter of style rather than syntax (Banfield, 1982: 231). I believe that this view is fundamentally  
906 correct. Two conclusions that are not warranted, I believe, are that these patterns show that reported speech  
907 is therefore mostly ‘a rhetorical strategy with motivations in interpersonal relations and online discourse  
908 management’ (D’Arcy, 2015: 57) or that such patterns constitute ‘a relatively new technique, which fully  
909 developed in the context of writing in the 20th century’ (Foolen and Yamaguchi, 2016: 194). Little-m clauses  
910 are not a syntactic device, and lack the structural conventionalisation of an M clause, as demonstrated by  
911 the types of predicates and clause types involved. However, what defines them as a type is that in the  
912 absence of an M clause they provide the semantic values for the conventional variables of frame-in that  
913 require an interpretation: What matters for the form and interpretation of little-m clauses is the *contrast*  
914 between the little-m clause and the defenestrated clause. This contrast is formed in (33-35) by illocutionary  
915 change, but the introductory and defenestrated clauses in these examples often also display a contrast in  
916 tense present/past (33b) (also in the full frame-in construction in 35b), past/present in (33a) and the verbless  
917 defenestrated clause in (34b), and present/non-present in the imperative defenestrated clauses in (34a) and  
918 (35a). The referential properties of little-m clauses help identify a reported speaker, the contrast between  
919 the little-m and defenestrated clauses signals the semiotic status of the defenestrated clause. Boundary



920 marking is essential to the interpretation of reported speech and thought (Besnier, 1993; Glenister Roberts,  
 921 2004), since it sets apart the reported message clause from the immediate context, signalling its semiotic  
 922 status as an icon.<sup>37</sup> One of the most obvious ways of doing this is through prosody (Couper-Kuhlen, 1998)  
 923 and through more idiosyncratic supra-segmental means (such as voice quality), but little-m clauses can serve  
 924 to perform this function in Ungarinyin quite effectively.

925 Little-m clauses exemplify external defenestration, since elements that are normally expressed through  
 926 elements within the frame-in construction, are specified by elements outside the defenestrated clause. Un-  
 927 garinyin has other non-syntactic ways of satisfying conditions in which M can be left out without causing  
 928 difficulty for interpretation: internal defenestration relies on elements within the defenestrated clause to  
 929 signal a reported speech or thought meaning.

### 930 6.2.2. Internal defenestration

931 The exchange in (37) below illustrates multiple clause relationality, the phenomenon in which one M has  
 932 scope over multiple R, and one of the idiosyncracies of reported speech pointed out by McGregor (1994). The  
 933 M in this brief dialogue is the reciprocal speech clause *bidningengkerri* ‘they said to each other’ in (37e), and  
 934 over the two preceding lines the identity of the reported speaker changes: (37b) and (37c) are understood to  
 935 be spoken by *nyina nyalwangarri* ‘the old woman’ specified in the little-m clause *nyina nyalwangarri buluba*  
 936 *nyangka* ‘this old woman was looking around’ in (37a). The following reported message in (37d) is spoken by  
 937 another, unidentified reported speaker. Although (37) is strictly not an instance of defenestration, given the  
 938 presence of an M-clause, it does contain a change in perspective that is not directly signalled by a specific  
 939 M. Unlike with the examples of external defenestration discussed above, the little-m in (37) cannot explain  
 940 the shift to the reported speaker of (37d) since the subject of the little-m clause in (37a) is not coreferential  
 941 with it. What allows the seemingly unmarked shift in (37d) to be interpreted?

- 942 (37) a. *nyina nyalwangarri buluba nyangka ...*  
*nyinda ny-alwa-ngarri buluk-w<sub>1</sub>a nya<sub>2</sub>-a-ngka*  
 f.PROX fsg-old-NMLZ look.around-ITRV 3fsg-GO-PST
- 943 ‘This old woman was looking around’
- 944 b. [[ *manjarn nyangka rimij wudmanira kanda narnburr ...*  
 [[ *manjarn nyangka rimij wurr-ma-ni-ra kanda narnburr*  
 [[ stone who steal 3n<sub>w</sub>.sg.O:3pl.S-TAKE-PST-1sg.IO n<sub>m</sub>.PROX paperbark
- 945 ‘“Who stole my coins and banknotes?”
- 946 c. *nyingankarra rimij wunjumanira ...*  
*nyingan=karra rimij wunja<sub>2</sub>-ma-ni-ra*  
 2sg=MAYBE steal 3n<sub>w</sub>.sg.O:2sg.S-TAKE-PST-1sg.IO
- 947 ‘Maybe you’re the one stealing my things” ’
- 948 d. *anjaku rimij nginkenungarri ngin maji buluba*  
*anja-ku rimij ngin-w<sub>2</sub>a<sub>2</sub>-y<sub>2</sub>i-ø-nu-ngarri ngin maji buluk-ba<sub>2</sub>-a*  
 what-DAT steal 1sg.S-IRR-BE-PRS-2sg.IO-SUB 1sg MUST look.around-ITRV
- 949 *wura jadarn ... ]*  
*wa<sub>2</sub>-ra jadarn ]*  
 3n<sub>w</sub>.sg.O-GO.TO properly ]
- 950 ‘“Why would I steal from you? Why would I rob you? You should look around for it properly” ’

<sup>37</sup>Hickman (1993) finds that in the acquisition of English reported speech constructions, the ability to use boundary marking strategies between M and R comes relatively late, which is characteristic for the imperfect realisation of reported speech constructions by young children.

951 e. *bidningengerri* ]  
*birr-ninga-y<sub>1</sub>i-ngka<sub>2</sub>-yirri* ]  
 3pl-put-REFL-PST-CONT ]

952 ‘they said to each other’

953 The shift in perspective in (37d) is supported by at least one strategy already introduced above: illo-  
 954 cutionary contrast. Following the statement by the reported speaker of (37c), the question *anjaku rimij*  
 955 *nginkenungarri ngin* ‘why would I be stealing from you?’ signals the initial boundary of the reported mes-  
 956 sage. Illocutionary contrast cannot fully explain the perspective shift, however, since the following imperative  
 957 clause *maji buluk ba wura jadarn* ‘try to look for it properly’/‘you should look around for it properly’ does  
 958 not coincide with a change in reported speaker.<sup>38</sup>

959 A strategy that more directly contributes to the interpretation of perspective change in (37d) is ‘res-  
 960 onance’ in terms of Du Bois (2014): in dialogue speakers often echo parts of the immediately preceding  
 961 utterance, through lexical choice or the grammatical construction. The representation in (38) shows a  
 962 slightly simplified version of the glosses of (37c-37d) as a diagraph, a schema in which the resonant elements  
 963 between the two utterances are aligned (Du Bois, 2014: 362). The underlined pronominal elements in (38)  
 964 are resonant because they occur in mirroring positions of the dialogic structure and have the same grammat-  
 965 ical function, but they display opposing semantic values (second versus first person). The contrast between  
 966 A and B in (38) is further highlighted by the free pronouns on opposite sides of the clause, i.e. the clause  
 967 initial second person pronoun in (37c) and the clause final first person pronoun in (37d).

(38) A: you -perhaps steal 3nsg- 2sg- AUX -PST -1sg  
 B: why steal 1sg.IRR- AUX -2sg -SUB me

968 The primary semiotic function of M is to index the relation between the reported speaker and the  
 969 reported message. In the absence of a dedicated M-clause, properties of a defenestrated clause that are  
 970 therefore particularly well-suited to compensate for the underspecification of the functions of M are indexical  
 971 elements. The pronominal resonance in (37d) has two effects: on the one hand it simply mimics a turn in  
 972 dialogue, which suggest two separate reported speakers, and since these speakers are indexed with local  
 973 pronouns across these two entities are alternately construed as speaker and addressee. But in addition, and  
 974 more significantly, these indexical elements perform a second function: they serve to imply values that in a  
 975 regular frame-in construction would be explicitly indicated in the M-clause.

976 The relevance of indexicality is not restricted to pronominal elements, however, and this introduces a  
 977 third strategy common in defenestrated clauses: they disproportionately involve elements that are ‘judge  
 978 dependent’ or invoke ‘protagonist projection’ (see section 4.2.7). Such subjective, evaluative words include  
 979 interjections, modals and predicates of personal taste. Taking a maximally inclusive approach to such  
 980 elements, table 1 lists all item types of judge-dependent words in the narrative text of which (37) form the  
 981 opening lines (see Spronck, 2015b: 271–287).<sup>39</sup> The relative frequencies of the judge-dependent elements in  
 982 table 1 are shown in table 2. The table compares non-attributed (i.e. ‘regular’ utterances, which do not  
 983 constitute frame-in or defenestrated clauses), defenestrated clauses and frame-in constructions.

984 Although the relative frequencies in 2 are admittedly a crude measure, they demonstrate a fundamental  
 985 property of defenestrated clauses: both frame-in and defenestrated clauses contain a relatively high number

<sup>38</sup>Note, however, that the preceding question is subordinated to this imperative clause, and that (37d) therefore forms a single sentential unit.

<sup>39</sup>The list also includes negatives, which describe a non-existent entity or event and therefore require some ‘judge’ conceptualising the event or entity (cf. Verhagen, 2005), gradable words and comparatives, which involve a scale, and therefore a norm that needs to be judged (even if it is by convention or generally recognisable norm, which I’ll assume constitutes a specific type of ‘judge’ as well), and general evaluative predicates (e.g. *jajarrngaliku* ‘for fun’, i.e. ‘not seriously’). While it may turn out that some of these elements are more central to understanding defenestration than others, for our present purposes only the distribution of these elements between non-attributed, frame-in and defenestrated constructions are taken into account, and there is no *a priori* reason to expect the distributions to substantially differ between these construction types using the inclusive definition of judge-dependent elements.

	ITEMS (duplicates within the same construction type removed)
non-attributed	<i>yow</i> ‘yeah’, <i>wali</i> ‘wait’, NEG IRR, <i>wadingarri</i> ‘many’, <i>-y<sub>2</sub>ali</i> INDEED, <i>nga</i> ‘yes’, <i>burray</i> ‘nothing’, <i>-nga</i> ‘only’, <i>ru</i> ‘just’, <i>nimanima</i> , ‘too heavy’, <i>jirrkalwa</i> ‘lie’
defenestrated	<i>yow</i> ‘yeah’, <i>-nga</i> ‘only’, <i>ru</i> ‘just’, <i>jajarrngaliku</i> ‘for fun’ (i.e. ‘not seriously’), <i>jojongarri</i> ‘really many’, <i>=karra</i> ‘maybe’/‘must be’, <i>way</i> ‘none’, <i>-nga</i> ‘only’
frame-in	<i>=karra</i> ‘maybe’, IRR negation, <i>maji</i> ‘must’, <i>jadarn</i> ‘properly’, IRR hypothetical, <i>=karra</i> INDEF, <i>wali</i> ‘wait’, <i>-ah</i> ‘ah’, <i>yow</i> ‘yeah’, IRR negation, <i>ah</i> ‘ah’, <i>=ka</i> epistemic, <i>yaku</i> ‘try’, IRR epistemic modality, <i>burrayngangka</i> ‘nothing’

Table 1: Judge-dependent elements in non-attributed, framed and unframed attributed clauses in the Bowerbird story.

	JUDGE-DEP. ELEMENTS	TOTAL ELEMENTS/ INTONATION UNITS
non-attributed	13	13/53 = 0.25
defenestrated	11	11/14 = 0.79
frame-in	22	22/29 = 0.76

Table 2: Distribution of judge-dependent elements

of judge-dependent elements, compared to non-attributed constructions. This finding is replicated for other samples of Ungarinyin narratives (cf. Spronck, 2015c: 210). The function of judge-dependent elements in defenestrated clauses is similar to that of pronominal elements in that they invoke an indexical meaning that signals a reported speaker referent, but across a much wider range of constructions and word classes. In frame-in constructions, M-clauses provide a specific referent anchoring such indexical meanings, with reported speaker-indexical elements in R maintaining a regular co-indexical relation with the grammatical subject of M. In defenestrated clauses, the indexicality of judge-dependent elements is not anchored explicitly, but the referential value of the unexpressed M is implied by the judge-dependent values in the defenestrated clause. The process was illustrated in the first clause in (30b), which contains two judge-dependent elements: the discourse marker *aka* ‘not so’ and a negated/irrealis verb. The connective *aka* ‘not so’ has a clear speaker-indexical value (a speaker evaluating the event under scope as untrue), which contrasts with the imperative event anchored in the subject of the M in (30a). The indexical value of *aka* ‘not so’ implies a referent for the absent M-clause in (30b), and thereby facilitates the interpretation of the defenestrated clause.

Defenestrated clauses that demonstrate resonant pronominal patterns and judge-dependent indexicality form a type of defenestration that relies on elements *within* the clause itself for signalling its defenestrated status, i.e. they constitute internal defenestration, a class of defenestrated clauses whose interpretation is guided through clause-internal indexical elements. Defenestration is signalled through a diverse set of strategies, and often involves a combination of little-m clauses, illocutionary contrast, pronominal resonance, in addition to extra-linguistic strategies for signalling reported speech status, such (air) quotation marks, voice imitation and other types of mimicry. But despite all these available strategies, internal defenestration often contributes to the interpretation of defenestrated clauses, and represents an area that so far has received relatively little attention.

### 6.2.3. Interpreting defenestration

Like insubordination and non-specificity, defenestration is a phenomenon necessarily defined in negative terms: a defenestrated clause expresses the meaning of frame-in, *without* a syntactic M-element, or with features of M left un(der)specified. This has the important consequence that the class of defenestrated clauses does not form a single, coherent structural construction type, nor do the other elements that can specify aspects of the frame-in relation with defenestrated clauses, such as little-m.

Many of the Ungarinyin examples could plausibly be classified as ‘free direct speech’ or ‘free indirect speech’ if we understand them under the common characterisation that ‘[w]hat these two types of reported

1016 speech have in common is that they lack the presence of a reporting clause’ (Keizer, 2009: 848).<sup>40</sup> Given the  
1017 observation that this category is defined by what is *not* there, it is hardly surprising that ‘the generally used  
1018 category of Free Indirect Discourse has so far escaped a rigorous definition’ (Verhagen, 2016b: 2). Defining  
1019 defenestrated clauses/free (in)direct speech (in this sense) as a constructional class is simply the wrong goal.  
1020 The phenomenon of insubordination (Evans, 2007) provides a helpful parallel here, cf. (39).

- 1021 (39) a. If you could just sit here for a while please (, you would be doing me a favour / I would be happy,  
1022 etc.) (Evans, 2009)  
1023 b. (I am surprised / It is an outrage, etc. ) That you would do that!

1024 The insubordinate clauses in (39) could be made into regular subordinate clauses with any of the clauses  
1025 between the round brackets, turning (39a) into a fully standard conditional construction, and (39b) into a  
1026 complement construction. The constructional status of these insubordinate clauses varies highly within and  
1027 across languages, with some insubordinate clauses having fully conventionalised, becoming constructions  
1028 themselves, and some merely remaining non-syntactic discourse patterns (D’Hertefelt and Verstraete, 2014).  
1029 We could level two irrelevant arguments against labelling the examples in (39) insubordinate clauses: we  
1030 could say that (39a) nor (39b) could be labelled insubordinate because we cannot reconstruct the precise  
1031 conditional or main clause that would turn them into subordinate constructions. Second, we could say that  
1032 (39) does not illustrate a coherent phenomenon, because (39a) represents an insubordinate if-clause and  
1033 (39b) an insubordinate that-clause. The relevant feature of insubordinate clauses, however, lies not in what  
1034 is *not* there (i.e. the form or type of ‘missing’ clause), but in that at least at some level of analysis they are  
1035 interpreted as an instantiation of the ‘constructional meaning’ (Langacker, 2005) of a more fully developed  
1036 syntactic structure. Insubordinate clauses may show a degree of constructionalisation themselves as well,  
1037 but their identity as insubordinate clauses relies on this basic feature.

1038 I claim that a similar analysis applies to defenestrated clauses, and the type of signalling found in internal  
1039 and external defenestration. For defenestration the point is arguably even more straightforward than for  
1040 insubordination, since subordinate structures are quite diverse, although languages will often include more  
1041 different types of frame-in constructions than the type illustrated for Ungarinyin here. Having defined  
1042 the frame-in construction as a dedicated syntactic relation allows us to interpret defenestrated clauses as  
1043 instances of the frame-in construction in which parts of this relation are signalled through non-syntactic  
1044 means. But the diversity does not mean that they are random, stylistic, not determined by grammar, or  
1045 that linguistic convention has become immaterial. What is necessary to classify a defenestrated clause is  
1046 that we can interpret it as partial expression of a fuller syntactic structure, that it can be interpreted as  
1047 the ‘linguistic sign’ (in sense of McGregor, 2013: 1152) of a frame-in construction. This can only be done  
1048 if we have a sufficient semantic description of a full frame-in construction, and this is what the definition  
1049 of frame-in in section 4 intends to provide. As long as we identify a defenestrated clause as an R without  
1050 an expressed M, it *has* to allow us to interpret the variables conventionally determined by the semantics of  
1051 frame-in.

1052 As indicated, a frame-in relation crucially consists of three semantic components: it signals, first, that  
1053 there should be an R and an M, it signals that M has the semiotic status of an indexical symbol and R that  
1054 of an iconic symbol, and, third, it projects a double participant structure of evidential and modal values,  
1055 which in (17) I labelled ‘stance’. Specifically, three variables need to be interpretable in order for a frame-in  
1056 relation to be understood: these are the identity of the reported speaker  ${}_pE^{ns}$ , the semiotic interpretation  
1057 of R as an icon, and the identity of the modal narrated speech participant  $P^{\mathfrak{n}}$ . The interpretation of  
1058 a defenestrated clause starts with the realisation that the utterance expresses the meaning of a frame-in

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<sup>40</sup>I have avoided the terms free (in)direct speech in referring to the Ungarinyin examples here for three reasons. First, these notions have a long analytic history that is mostly associated with literary analysis that has resulted in often theory-specific classifications. For example, many of the Ungarinyin defenestrated examples would not be free (in)direct speech in the sense of Vandelanotte (2009). Second, Ungarinyin does not have a direct-indirect speech opposition, and can thereby not be characterised as ‘direct speech’, rendering any label including ‘(in)direct speech’ inconsistent. Third, I propose that the only workable way of interpreting R-clauses without M-clauses is in relation to frame-in, which is not helped by giving them a common substantive label, rather than to understand them as a result of a process, the process of defenestration.




Figure 1: Identifying defenestrated elements

1059 relation. In a fully expressed frame-in construction, the syntactic structure provides the values for each  
1060 of these variables,<sup>41</sup> for a defenestrated clause the interpretation has to be based on non-syntactic means.  
1061 External defenestration strategies, such as little-m may help to interpret the semantic structure, as can  
1062 internal defenestration strategies, such as clustering protagonist projecting indexical constructions. Figure  
1063 1 sketches a process for the identification of each of the values involved, the reported speaker, the semiotic  
1064 status of the defenestrated clause and the modal narrated speech participant.<sup>42</sup>

1065 The identification of the three elements of the frame-in relation in defenestrated clauses involves two  
1066 processes, indexation and inference, and two separate classes of signs: grammatical (i.e. conventional  
1067 construction types expressed through the speech signal) and extra-grammatical ones. The contribution of  
1068 extra-grammatical types of signalling, such as pointing, voice quality, and quotation marks,<sup>43</sup> accounts for  
1069 the qualification of defenestrated and frame-in constructions as ‘multimodal constructions’ in some of the  
1070 studies cited above. But from a grammatical perspective, such a characterisation ignores the more important  
1071 fact that the extra-grammatical signs compensate for identifiable, conventionalised and primarily *linguistic*  
1072 aspects of the syntactic frame-in relation. While a speaker may, e.g., point at a discourse participant while  
1073 uttering a defenestrated clause evoking the interpretation ‘you said this’, this interpretation can only arise  
1074 if the defenestrated clause is also understood as an iconic utterance that requires a reported speaker and  
1075 a modal narrated speech participant (i.e. someone who is understood to actually believe the defenestrated  
1076 clause to be true). In other words, what is distinctive about extra-linguistic signalling in defenestrated  
1077 utterances is not the presence of the extra-linguistic signals themselves, but the semantic elements these  
1078 compensate for in the conventionalised meaning structure of the frame-in relation.

## 1079 7. Pragmatics, multimodal meaning and defenestration as a grammatical phenomenon

1080 With the account of Ungarinyin frame-in presented in this paper I have hoped to argue for a position  
1081 in the debate about the division of labour between syntax, semantic and pragmatics in the expression of  
1082 reported speech that may seem somewhat reactionary in light of much recent literature on multimodality.  
1083 In this literature, reported speech is frequently described ‘as a complex discourse practice densely packed  
1084 with verbal and nonverbal resources’ (Hengst et al., 2005), or even as a ‘multimodal construction’:

1085 ‘Quotation appears to be a multimodal construction. When speakers use direct quotations,  
1086 they generally produce a high level of demonstration in both the vocal and bodily channels.  
1087 Moreover, the level of demonstration in each channel is correlated. When speakers use more  
1088 vocal demonstration, they also use more bodily demonstration [...]’ (Blackwell et al., 2015: 6)

1089 I fully agree that examining correlations between multimodal and grammatical expression are long over-  
1090 due. Studies of multimodality present an important corrective on the singleminded focus on linguistic

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<sup>41</sup>The two main missing variables from this set are the indexical status of M, which is constant, and the narrated speech event  $E^n$ , which should always be provided. As was shown for Ungarinyin above, the interpretation of three variables listed in figure 1 can indeed receive different semantic values within a frame-in construction.

<sup>42</sup>The distinction between the (reported) speaker and the modal narrated speech participant is reminiscent of the fundamental distinction by Goffman (1979) between the speaker (or reported speaker, in this instance) as author (i.e. the entity constructing an utterance) and the principal (i.e. the entity committing to the truth of the utterance), and the default assumption is that both roles index the same referent. The present account shares this analysis, but without invoking the notion of speaker roles (which are inherently problematic in grammatical analysis, see Irvine, 1996): if the contrast between the  ${}_pE^{ns}$  and the  $P^n$  is not made explicit, they are most likely indexing the same participant. Since defenestrated clauses inherently underspecify the referent of the  ${}_pE^{ns}$ , I hypothesise that complex modal meanings, multiple-perspective constructions in which the two entities as in (14b) are dissociated, are mostly confined to full frame-in constructions, in which the  ${}_pE^{ns}$  is sufficiently marked. This expectation is in accordance with, e.g., McGregor’s (1997: 260) observation that M-clauses of thought in Gooniyandi are mostly used in utterances that contrast two opposing views, although a language that would have a modal marker with a meaning such as ‘(I believe) contrary to y’s belief’ (cf. Wilkins, 1986; Evans, 2006) could potentially fulfil this requirement in a single marker.

<sup>43</sup>For a discussion of the prominence of quotation marks in philosophical approaches to reported speech (quotation), see Saka (2006).

1091 convention that has long dominated language studies. Linguistics has shown a notorious neglect of cross-  
1092 linguistic diversity in usage, meaning and form over the past six decades (Evans and Levinson, 2009), and  
1093 this neglect certainly includes gesture and other types of multimodality. I believe that it is likely that,  
1094 especially in the area of what Dor (2015) calls ‘stable experience clusters’, such as kinship or cardinal di-  
1095 rections (i.e. experiences that have a relatively stable common cultural basis), conventionalised multimodal  
1096 behaviour may take on a role similar to grammar (cf. Floyd, 2016). Our experience with language and  
1097 dialogue may even present such an experience cluster: as Pascual (2002; 2014) shows, conversation shapes  
1098 our lexicon, syntax and conceptualisation in fundamental ways. But, crucially, we can only assess the role  
1099 of extra-linguistic elements, for our present purposes, in reported speech, if we have a full understanding of  
1100 what is *linguistic* and *conventional* about the phenomenon.

1101 Defenestrated clauses rely on intra-clausal and extra-clausal indexical properties for signalling stance  
1102 meanings, and on the semiotic exceptionality of the iconic defenestrated clause to indicate the reported  
1103 message meaning. Both indexicality and iconicity (in the semiotic sense) are problematic topics in contem-  
1104 porary linguistics (cf. Fludernik, 1989), and the contribution of extra-clausal/extra-sentential dependencies  
1105 does not fit well with a sentence-oriented view of syntax, in which nearly all grammatical functions are de-  
1106 fined in relation to the verbal predicate. In a strict sense, little-m clauses are not in a syntactic relation with  
1107 a defenestrated clause under both a predicate-oriented approach and the constructionist account developed  
1108 here, and the observed diversity of little-m clauses highlights that they are not in a constructional relation  
1109 with defenestrated clauses. However, little-m clauses *derive their interpretation from conventionalised as-*  
1110 *pects of the frame-in construction*, which is a syntactic judgement. Therefore, if we call phenomena like  
1111 little-m clauses ‘extra-linguistic’ or ‘stylistic’, this is not a characterisation of the phenomena represented by  
1112 defenestration, but of what we allow to be part of syntactic theory. Such statements represent an implicit  
1113 acceptance of the view that clearly conventional meanings such as evidential and modal participants and  
1114 semiotic status in reported speech are and should not be classified as part of a theory of syntax.

1115 If we cannot agree on what aspects of language are conventional and structurally expressed, we cannot  
1116 make a case about the pragmatics of reported speech. Analyses of the phenomenon in well-described  
1117 languages, as well as in newly documented languages often find very similar features with respect to the  
1118 apparent optionality of M-clauses, as in the following statement about Choctaw (Western Muskogean), which  
1119 mentions aspects that are normally signalled by M:

1120 ‘Values of the discourse variables ([reported] SPEAKER, SELF [i.e. current speaker], ADDRESSEE,  
1121 PLACE, TIME) may be shifted whenever the grammatical, stylistic, or discourse context allows  
1122 them to be identified’ (Broadwell, 1991: 425)

1123 This means that in Choctaw, like in Ungarinyin, elements of the semantic structure of frame-in are  
1124 allowed to remain unexpressed, i.e. to be treated as ‘optional’ under the interpretation in McGregor (2013),  
1125 if they can be pragmatically recovered. The conclusion cannot be that therefore reported speech is a stylistic,  
1126 or pragmatic phenomenon. Rather, the reverse is true: the conventional meaning of frame-in is what allows  
1127 the pragmatic interpretation to take place.

1128 While the more fine-grained semantic distinctions of indirect speech and morphological reportativity  
1129 vary in individual languages, and the opposition between direct and indirect speech form two ends of a  
1130 continuum/gradient (Evans, 2013), as a construction type I hypothesise that frame-in constructions are  
1131 semantically regular across languages.<sup>44</sup> The reason the properties discussed strike us as odd is because the  
1132 conventional parts of the frame-in relation are not able to be characterised in common referential-symbolic  
1133 grammatical terms, but this reflects a limitation of certain approaches to syntax, not a fundamental analysis  
1134 of reported speech. Reported speech forces us to accept the indexical, iconic, evidential and modal properties  
1135 laid out in (19) *as elements of syntax*. With the definition of frame-in, and the approach to defenestration

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<sup>44</sup>This article has not attempted to present a typological account, so the validity of the definition of frame-in in section 4 remains to be cross-linguistically established, but the patterns Broadwell (1991) describes closely resemble what I have labelled here ‘external defenestration’ and phenomena very similar to internal defenestration are described by Haßler (2010) for French, and by Si and Spronck (2016) in the Dravidian language Solega.

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